Although only a selected aspect of Fichte’s overall philosophical system, circular demonstration draws attention to the problem of method in philosophy and, for that matter, any discipline that is concerned with the problem of knowledge. The question of method, whose main aim is the acquisition of truth, and the avoidance of error,14 is as old as philosophy itself and remains a controversial subject. At least since the pre-Socratics, philosophers have used a wide array of methods in formulating and defending their philosophical positions. What this implies is that our attempts to understand philosophical theories are tied to a large extent to the conceptual framework within which the theories in question were formulated.
If the absence of dissension with respect to what constitutes an acceptable method of inquiry in any given field is a positive, then it could be stated that some specialties fare better than others. For example, it could be assumed that mathematics and the sciences fare better than philosophy in this regard. A typical scientific method utilizes the resource of experimentation, relying almost exclusively on the testing of hypotheses. Closely aligned with the scientific approach is the mathematical paradigm, which probes
propositions in order to make determinations about the presence of contradictions or lack thereof. Moulines cautions, however, that the absence of significant disagreement within the scientific framework should not be confused with homogeneity. For instance, he
14Paul Moser, “Skepticism, Question Begging and Burden Shifting,” in Epistemology (The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy) vol. 5, ed. Richard Cobb-Stevens (Bowling Green, OH:
Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 2000), 209–10.
draws a line of demarcation between Newtonian science and other scientific theories.15 Although science may not be a homogeneous discipline, the scientific community is united in the belief that knowledge transcends experience. What is more, scientists view the scientific method as the method par excellence and judge it capable of yielding objective knowledge, a view that is shared by some philosophical systems, for example, analytic philosophy. This point of view is articulated by Bertrand Russell, who reportedly accuses anyone opposed to this point of view of insincerity.16
Moser quite appropriately takes issue with this mind-set, especially that of Bertrand Russell, for suggesting that anyone who fails to recognize the scientific method as the method par excellence is “insincere.” Moser maintains that arguments relating to the dependability of memory or sense perception as a reliable source of knowledge are merely presumptive and, therefore, inconclusive.17 Moser seems to be rehearsing the thesis of John Stuart Mills, who reportedly views consensus in any given field as inimical to progress, rationality, and truth. Mills reminds us that human beings are necessarily fallible, further maintaining that when it comes to the search for truth, disagreement with regard to method should be privileged. Implicit in Mills’ argument is the idea that each approach brings only a perspective to a debate without any one position completely exhausting the discussion. To the extent that no one view brings any discussion to an end
15Ulises Moulines, “Ontology, Reduction, and the Unity of Science,” in Philosophy of Science (The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy), vol. 10, ed. Tian Yu Cao (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 2000), 21.
16Isaiah Berlin, Three Critics of the Enlightenment: Vico, Hermann, Herder, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 29.
17Moser, “Skepticism, Question Begging and Burden Shifting,” 212.
by itself, consensus might prevent the discovery of truths embedded in dissenting positions.18
Kant finds the appropriation of the mathematical method for the resolution of philosophical problems problematic. In his view, the mathematical paradigm fails as a philosophical strategy because it cannot, for example, provide “transcendental and philosophical proofs,” that are crucial for the resolution of the problem of knowledge.19 Kant believes that the resolution of the problem of knowledge rests with his critical philosophy, whose strategy is the examination of our cognitive faculties in order to ascertain how much thought can comprehend independently of the mind’s activity.
One important conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing conversation is that there cannot be a sole method of philosophy, even as the aim of every philosophical system remains the attainment of truth and the avoidance of error. There are as many philosophical methods as there are philosophical systems. Philosophical strategies, to the extent that they are based on certain categories or assumptions, remain the sole
prerogative of the philosopher, making it difficult, perhaps impossible, to defend the position that there is only one acceptable way of doing philosophy. The strategy for the acquisition of truth is varied for philosophy, and what each method does is merely specify how it arrives at its truth. We will now proceed to look at circular argumentation in Fichte’s system.
18Miriam Solomon, “Consensus in Science,” in Philosophy of Science (The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy), vol. 10, ed. Tian Yu Cao (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, Bowling Green State University, 2000), 193–4.
19CPR, B 810.