Global Warming Consciousness
Although the current international climate change regime is associated with the signing of the climate change convention in 1992, global concerns can be traced back to as early as the 1960s. During this time various research networks were established to study the
218 Pamela Chasek and Lavanya Rajamani, "Steps toward enhanced parity: negotiating capacity and
strategies of developing countries," in Providing global public goods: managing globalization, ed. Inge Kaul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 255.
impact of concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere219. The climate research from various scientific centres was central to the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) arguments to establish the first ever international conference in 1979 devoted to the problems of the climate, namely the World Climate Conference (WCC)220. Over the next decade, the impetus that came from this science collaboration was a need for political action; one of these calls came from the Villach Conference on Global
Warming 1987221. Political action was needed to address “the rate and degree of future warming (would be) profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy
conservation, use of fossil fuels, and the emission of some greenhouse gases”.222 The concern that anthropogenic increases of emissions enhanced the natural greenhouse effect, and would result on average in an additional warming of the Earth's surface, saw the necessity of the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
A political congress of hundreds of scientists and specialists from around the world, the IPCC, collated scientific information related to the various aspects of climate change. The body would evaluate the environmental and socioeconomic impacts of climate change and formulate the response strategies for the management of climate change. The second WCC in 1990, adopted the first IPCC assessment report that substantiated a correlation between global warming and greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs). Its findings further underscored the need for understanding the science of climate change, and secondly, created a state-led diplomatic platform to craft an
integrated and comprehensive regulatory system to manage a new situation where small
219 In the 1960s these research networks were wide and varied, ranging from Study of Mans Impact on
the Climate (part of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment), Lawrence Livermore National laboratories, the National Centre for Atmospheric Research, the National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the UK Meteorological Office and University of California. Campbell and Barnett, 52.
220 The global conference would establish the World Climate Programme, jointly-organised under WMO,
UN Environmental Programme and the International Council of Science.
221 The World Commission on Environment and Development’s (WCED) Brundtland Report’s Our
Common Future 1987 not only created and popularised the term sustainable development, but also the work of the Villach Conference on Global Warming.
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island states mobilised diplomatically, heeding the calls by scientists and the realities of sea level rise from global warming impacting their island nations223.
The Need for a Treaty and Regime
Heeding the recommendations of scientists, the UNGA passed Resolution 45/212 establishing the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC). Supported by UNEP and WMO, the INC was mandated to prepare the skeleton of a possible treaty/conventions, agenda and bodies of a climate regime. In five negotiation sessions between February 1991 and May 1992, delegates from 150 states discussed the difficult and contentious issues of: binding commitments; targets and timetables for the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions; financial mechanisms; technology transfer; and common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities of developed and developing countries224. The INC sought to achieve an ambitious task of consensus that could be supported by a broad majority, rather than drafting a treaty that dealt with specific policies that might limit participation225. By May 1992 the INC completed its work with a consensus text, which would become the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
At the UN Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Rio Earth Summit in June 1992, the UNFCCC text was opened to parties for signatures.
Considered the mother of all environmental meetings, the Rio Earth Summit
encapsulated three key conventions: climate change, biodiversity and desertification226. From 155 signatories in 1992 it has since increased to 196 states and entities that have ratified the Convention (193 states of the UN, the regional entity of the European Union, and the non-state entities of Palestine, Cook Islands, and Niue). At the heart of the UNFCCC was the call for signatory parties to "stabilize greenhouse gas
223 Ibid.
224 ENB, "Summary of the Eleventh Session of the INC for a Framework Convention on Climate Change
6-17 Febraury 1995," in Establishment of the INC/FCCC, ed. Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Berlin: Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 1995).
225Ibid.
226 The three conventions from Rio were: UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change; CBD: UNFCCC. Convention on Biological Diversity; UNCCD: United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".227 While the ultimate call by scientists, and small
island states, would have been to decrease GHGs, a compromise with industrialised countries led to the ambiguous aim of stabilising greenhouse gas emissions efforts. An intrinsic element of the treaty was the differentiation of the developed world into Annex I228 categories, and non-Annex I for the global south based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It denotes that all states have a shared obligation to address climate change but have different responsibilities due to their development capabilities. Annex I countries who had benefited from industrialisation in the past had the specific aim to return emissions to 1990 levels by 2009. Furthermore, these
countries had the responsibility to provide financial assistance and promote technology transfer to developing countries. This differentiation of countries has left a legacy of political polarisation within the negotiations,’ of a firewall between the north Annex I countries and the south non-Annex I countries.
The treaty, after receiving its 50th signatory, came into force in 1994, and in the
following year the first Conference of the Parties (COP) took place in Berlin. The tasks of COP1 were to complete the architecture of the climate regime and the rules of procedure and to affirm the new home of the secretariat in Bonn, Germany to carry out the work of the regime. However, at the end of COP1 participants concluded that the goals previously reached by those participating in the UNFCCC treaty were not sufficient to meet the challenge of global warming and needed to go beyond the year 2000229. The treaty did not provide a rule book on how states should decrease
emissions, and mechanisms to channel funding for climate adaptation. The Berlin Mandate established an ad hoc process of negotiations for parties to establish a legally binding standards and emissions limits.
227Ibid.
228 Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine.
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Kyoto: A Protocol for climate mitigation and adaptation
The Kyoto Protocol was finalised after two years of negotiations that concluded at COP3 in Japan in 1997. It put forth a ‘top-down’ compliance system that committed industrialised countries and countries in transition (Annex I), to reduce their overall emissions of six GHGs by an average of 5% below 1990 levels in 2008-2012 (first commitment period). These mitigation targets varied from country to country.
Recognising that developed countries were principally responsible for the high-levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol placed a heavier burden on developed nations under the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.230 Adaptation, or adapting to climate change impacts became a key component for all countries, with specific financing and technology transfers to be endowed from developed Annex I countries.
Despite global optimism in reaching an agreement in Kyoto, it took more than a decade before it was implemented in 2008. The delay was in part a product of slow negotiations on implementing the Protocol that concluded in 2001, known as the Marrakesh
Accords. One major setback was the refusal by the U.S. to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, fuelled by resentment of the U.S. Republican party government. The withdrawal of the world’s largest economy and biggest GHG polluter led to anxiety that the Protocol would fall apart if countries follow the American stance. Nonetheless, Kyoto survived with Iceland and Russia’s support, leading to ratification in 2004231.
Before the start of the Kyoto Protocol commitment period, the Bali COP13 in 2007 marked another turning point in climate change multilateralism. The Bali Action Plan (BAP) set forth a mandate to initiate negotiations to include a focus on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology; and a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. The latter was vital in situating concerns at this time for a global agreement post 2012
230 UNFCCC, "Kyoto Protocol Introduction," United Nationa Framework Convention on Climate
Change, https://unfccc.int/process/the-kyoto-protocol
231 The Protocol survived with Iceland (as the 55th state 2002) and Russia (ratification in 2004), it met
Article 25 “the article enters into force” on February 2005. Article 25 states that the Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties [Iceland] to the
Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I [Russia] which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
when the implementation period for Kyoto concluded232. Thus, parties consented on a ta mandate for negotiations to begin on a new form of the protocol, to be concluded in 2009.
Copenhagen: Diplomatic Failure
Deemed as ‘Hopenhagen’, the Copenhagen COP15 was the biggest global gathering with over 40,000 participants negotiating a new agreement on climate action233. The conference situated climate change prominently in the international agenda and became the largest diplomatic endeavour in history. According to Radoslav Dimitrov,
negotiators believed in the “heads-of-state factor as a solid guarantee that something will be decided, since failure to produce any document would be a politically
unaffordable scandal”234. COP15 started under a veil of conspiracy with a rumour of a secret ‘Danish text’, where select countries were invited by the Chair (Denmark) known as Friends of the Chair, and revisions were negotiated and put together to be tabled at the meeting. A draft document was subsequently leaked to the UK Guardian newspaper just as the Copenhagen meeting started235. As a result of this rumour, the Earth
Negotiations Bulletin reported that many negotiating groups and ad hoc coalitions began working on their own texts, some of which were also leaked to the media236.
The aftermath of Copenhagen was a devastating blow to the climate regime process and multilateral diplomacy. The rumours of a secret informal process of a select few
spearheaded by the Danish Chair, gave way to protests in favour of process transparency, inclusive participation of all states and accountability both within
232 ENB, "Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference 8-13 February 2015," in Establishment of
the INC/FCCC, ed. Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Berlin: Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 2015).
233 "A brief analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change Confernce: an IISD commentary," in
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009, ed. Earth Negotiation Bulletin (Copenhagen Earth Negotiation Bulletin, 2009), 1.
234 Radoslav S Dimitrov, "Inside Copenhagen: the state of climate governance," Global environmental
politics 10, no. 2 (2010): 19.
235 John Vidal, "Copenhagen climate summit in disarray after 'Danish text' leak," in The Guardian
Weekley (Sydney: The Guardian, 2009).
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negotiation rooms, and civil society on the streets of Copenhagen237. These suspicions unfolded when more than 115 heads of governments arrived in the final days of Copenhagen, where an impasse had awaited them. Throughout the two-week
conference, various coalitions under the G-77 and China or global South, staged various walkouts and the Annex I coalitions blocked progress citing procedural reasons238. The more than 200 pages of negotiated texts from the two years prior were ‘trashed’, as leaders frantically attempted to ‘cover up the failure’ with a new text agreement in the final 48 hours239.
Away from the formal negotiations, the Friends of the Chair, 28 Presidents and Prime Ministers240 drafted a two and half page, Copenhagen Accord text late in the evening of December 18, 2009. The text was subsequently submitted to the plenary at 2am for final debate in a heated and 13-hour marathon final plenary241. Tuvalu was the first state to openly object and renounce the Accord, followed by Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba and Nicaragua as untransparent and undemocratic242. Given the lack of a consensus, the Copenhagen Accord was cited by parties to take note of in the COP decisions, with the mandate for negotiators to continue in 2010.
Climate Change Finance
Despite its diplomatic failure to achieve an outcome among parties, Copenhagen was a step forward in climate policy and global action. COP15 was the first occasion since the early days of the Convention that climate change received both high-level leadership support and wider global media and citizenry attention. In the months leading up to Copenhagen, there was an “avalanche of positive developments” by the EU, Japan, U.S.
237 Tom Zeller, "Thousands march in Copenhagen, calling for action," New York Times,
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/science/earth/13climate.html.
238 ENB, "A brief analysis of the Copenhagen Climate Change Confernce: an IISD commentary," 3. 239 Dimitrov, 19-21.
240 The Friends of the Chair consisted of the world’s 80 percent of GHG polluters and some vulnerable
states: U.S., China, India, Brazil, South Africa, U.K., France, Australia, Germany, the E.U., Japan, Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Russia, Mexico, Spain, South Korea, Norway, the Maldives, Columbia, and Indonesia Jake Schmidt, "Key countries agreed to Copenhagen Accord," in Climate & Energy (Grist 2009).
241 ENB, "Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference 8-13 February 2015." 242 Ibid.
Brazil, China and India in carbon emission target pledges243, following years of careful diplomacy by UN Secretary Ban Ki Moon and the UNFCCC leadership to garner political will. It was the first time the emerging economies and other developing countries joined Annex 1 in pledging voluntary mitigation goals, where in 2010 more than 80 countries submitted mitigation targets244 and more importantly established a global climate stabilisation goal of average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. “The 2°C target was officially sanctioned as essential policy guidance, with the hope that it may subsequently become a legal goal in a new climate agreement”245.
Furthermore, mentioned under the Copenhagen Accord, and later adopted under the Cancun Framework the next year, a global fund was to be established for parties to pledge USD$30billion annually, expected to rise to USD$100 billion in 2012 to support parties’ mitigation and adaptation efforts. However, the events in Copenhagen were a shock to many. The multilateral process was questioned over lack of inclusion,
transparency and the decision making of the Danish Chair, and the collective actions of technical negotiators to draft a text over two years could not lead to a consensus.
Political bargaining by leaders overshadowed the work of multilateral process at the last minute.
Rebuilding faith in the multilateral consensus process
Over the next three years, the negotiations would focus on saving the regime by restoring the faith of negotiators in the process, and its global legitimacy to provide international climate policy direction. Cancun COP16 saw the establishment of the Green Climate Fund to administer the USD $20billion/$100 billion global fund pledged in Copenhagen. However, Cancun still could not provide a consensus on the
outstanding matter from COP15, a replacement protocol/agreement for post-Kyoto. The Durban meeting in the following year was more successful in cementing a guiding framework. Parties agreed to establish of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform (ADP) to negotiate both a process and a text for a new agreement after 2020. Parties and the Secretariat, learning from the failures of 2009, needed a drawn-out
243 Dimitrov, 19-20.
244 ENB, "Summary of the Geneva Climate Change Conference 8-13 February 2015."
245 Petra Tschakert, "1.5 C or 2 C: a conduit’s view from the science-policy interface at COP20 in Lima,
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process that was open and gave enough time for negotiators to absorb and negotiate the text.
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol or Doha Climate Gateway 2012 encouraged states to ratify a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.
However this time Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Russia did not sign and joined the U.S. stance in ignoring to ratify the protocol. In Warsaw 2013, parties continued
negotiations on two key issues by establishing two bodies. By the time negotiations had come around COP20 Lima 2014 and the ADP process was at the centre of attention. The Lima Call for Climate Action set in motion the negotiation process for an agreement to be concluded by the end of 2015. While over the previous four years progress had been made over contentious issues in the regime such as the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (WIM), mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD), and intended nationally determined contributions (INDC), 246there were still
apprehensions that history would repeat itself when it came to negotiate a protocol. Thus, as explored later in this chapter and throughout this thesis, negotiating climate change is far from an easy or straightforward process.
Institutional Process and Bodies of the Regime
The short history of the negotiations detailed above provides insights into the
complexity of issues around international climate change policy leading up to 2015. However, this trajectory does not detail the intricacy of activities and actors that
participate within the UNFCCC negotiating arenas. The purpose of this sub-section is to provide context for the structure of negotiations by looking at the bodies or institutions within the UNFCCC. Understanding the structures and bodies within the UNFCCC provides a framework to understanding how and where states and their delegations participate in the negotiations detailed in later chapters.
The INC negotiations affirmed and established four key basic institutional structures: the COP, Subsidiary Body of Implement (SBI), Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and to provide support in implementing decisions the Secretariat247. It is important to note that while the main bodies like COP, SBI and SBSTA are formal, their internal structure and operations have changed gradually over the years. In other words, while the COP, subsidiary and ad hoc bodies are identified as