Common developments, surprising differences: discussion of the four cases

6.4.1. Who qualifies for ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status?

Before asking what is and what is not normatively acceptable in the above ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes, it is important to see in a comparative perspective who qualifies for such a position and what is the range of rights enjoyed by an individual eligible for this status (see table 4 in the Annex).

The first interesting thing is that while in India and Mexico the criteria of inclusion seem to be former citizenship and presence in the territory, in Turkey and Hungary – the states whose ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes seemed to be more liberal at the beginning – the criteria are strongly connected with ethnicity. Indeed, as we have seen in the preceding section, the governments in India and Mexico developed a territorial notion of citizenship. Previous presence in the territory and previous citizenship status of a candidate or of one of her relatives seem to be the only qualifiers for ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regimes: their target is formed by the group of former citizens and their children

irrespective of ethnicity. However, there is an important difference between the Indian and Mexican

regimes. In India, the existence of previous citizenship status for first generation migrants or the existence of a family link with a former citizen – for second generation migrants and beyond – are the only requirements in order to get the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status.

Mexico is a bit more restrictive. Since the 1997 constitutional reform, ‘a legacy of anti- interventionist nationalism restricted emigrant nationality by limiting ius sanguinis to the first

generation born abroad’ (Fitzgerald 2005: 183). Thus it is clear that second and third generations born abroad will not automatically receive citizenship. Moreover, they would not even keep the ‘nationality’ status – and, with it, the ‘external quasi-citizenship position.’172

172 _{This decision seemed to have been influenced by US politicians, who warned Mexico about the possible huge number of}

Mexican dual nationals in the future – for example, if we take into account that today there are approximately ten million Mexicans in the US and consider also that that they tend to have several children per family, we can easily make an estimate about the huge number of Mexican dual nationals on the US territory in four or five generations.

Consider the following imaginary case. Pedro is born in Texas to a Mexican-born father and a French mother; he automatically receives

Mexican nationality – and, if he doesn’t have another citizenship, he also receives Mexican citizenship at the age of 18. Now suppose Pedro has two children, a boy Carlos with another Mexican woman who is also born in Texas and thus belongs to the second-generation and another boy Yoshiro with a

Japanese-American woman (also born in Texas). The two children would not qualify for Mexican nationality: Carlos would thus be a third-generation Mexican, while Yoshiro would be the grandson of one Mexican national. Suppose now that Pedro has three other girls: Rosita, born in the US (with a native Mexican mother who has just crossed the border), Blanca (born in Spain to a Spanish mother who previously naturalised in Mexico), and Larisa (born in Mexico whose mother is a Romanian tourist Pedro met during a crazy holiday in Cancún). All these three girls will acquire Mexican nationality: Rosita (her mother is Mexican-born), Blanca (her mother is a naturalised Mexican), and Larisa (because of ius soli).173

In Hungary, the first ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime (1920-1947) and part of the second (2001-2003) were designated only for ethnic Hungarians and their families – mixed families included – so this was actually not an ‘external quasi-citizenship’, but an ‘ethnizenship regime’ just like the Turkish one. Moreover, after the Venice Commission’s decision in October 2001, Hungary had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with Romania in order to successfully implement the Status Law;

In Turkey, both the pink card and the document that replaced it – the blue card – were strictly designed only for Turkish emigrants living in states where dual citizenship was not accepted.

Moreover, both cards have been designed only for former Turkish citizens who meet two very strict conditions: (a) they must be Turkish by birth, and (b) have renounced their citizenship with state

approval. Since this strict possibility of renouncing citizenship became available only after the 1981

law, it is clear that the Turkish ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime was designed to exclude minorities who left Turkey before 1981 – like Armenians, Jews, Roma, etc. The reason for this exclusion was that the Turkish state wanted to eliminate the possibility for members of these minorities to come back to Turkey and ‘reclaim property that had been confiscated when they changed their citizenship’

(Kadirbeyoglu 2010: 7). Again, the same regime excludes those individuals who became Turkish citizens by naturalisation. As we can see, although the Turkish state accepts dual citizenship, its ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is the most restrictive – in comparison with that of India and Mexico, where these two conditions do not apply.

173 _{See Article 30 – ‘The Mexicans’ – of the Mexican Constitution:}

http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/infjur/leg/constmex/pdf/consting.pdf (accessed 9 May 2012). I want to thank Henio Hoyo for offering me Pedro’s imaginary example (email on file with the author, 9 May 2012) and to Luicy Pedroza for checking the accuracy of my interpretation of the Mexican Constitution (discussion on file with the author, 15 July 2013).

some modifications were implemented at the request of the Romanian Government – one of them, for example, being that ‘non-Hungarian dependants of ethnic Hungarians would no longer be eligible for Certificates or benefits’ (Waterbury 2010: 113). From this point of view, and with the unintended help of the Romanian Government, the ‘ethnizenship regime’ centred even more on ethnicity than ever before. Since the revision of the Status Law in 2003 by the Socialist government, the benefits retained – after the elimination of the most controversial ones – in the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime have been extended not only to ethnic Hungarians, but also to everyone learning Hungarian. However, this law’s ethnic flavour has remained, since in order to qualify for the identity card a person should be supported by an organisation – a local Church or political party – which must testify that she is an ethnic Hungarian. Since 1 January 2012 any ethnic Hungarian from a neighbouring country can acquire Hungarian citizenship, thus becoming a dual citizen.

6.4.2. What rights could ‘external quasi-citizens’ access?

Let me now investigate the range of rights that can be accessed by an individual eligible for ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status. Clearly, the most important right enjoyed by all those who qualify for this position – in all the four countries studied above – is the right to return. This was, until the emergence of quasi-citizenship regimes, a right reserved only for citizens. This is logical, since one cannot be eligible for national housing in India, acquire property in the coastal and border zones in Mexico, practice certain professions reserved only for Turkish citizens, or apply for a state-subsidised place at a Hungarian university unless one is able to come back to the country of origin.

Another important right is the right to re-acquire full citizenship status by re-establishing permanent residence. In Hungary the situation was, until 2012, more complicated. During the communist period national minorities were considered the problem of the state in which they lived. Since the fall of communism and until the Status Law the Hungarian state was afraid of mass migration so it decided to design a system of benefits that could be accessed by ‘external quasi-citizens’

especially in their countries of residence. However, after the 2004 and 2007 accessions to the European Union, more than 90% of ethnic Hungarians became free to travel to Hungary, so acquisition of

Hungarian citizenship became initially less important. Further, since 2012 ethnic Hungarians have been able to apply for Hungarian citizenship; this is important not only for ethnic Hungarians living in non- EU countries – since they can thus acquire free movement rights within the European Union – but also for those living in EU countries which are not part of the US visa waiver program – for example,

Romania – and thus cannot travel to the US without a visa; Hungary has been in this program since 2009.

The third right concerns buying and owing property in the origin country. This may not be a spectacular offer in Hungary and the rest of the Western world, where foreigners are not restricted in acquiring property. However, the other three countries under scrutiny restrict foreigners in their rights in this respect. Until 1997 only Mexican citizens were allowed to buy land in the coastal and border zones; in Turkey, foreigners cannot buy land in the villages or in security sensitive areas; while India also offered ‘external quasi-citizens’ similar property rights.

The fourth important right that is offered by all four regimes without exception is admittance to

state educational institutions. This right is accompanied by other educational and cultural rights for

both individuals and cultural associations, ranging from subsidised tickets for state-owned cultural museums – for individuals – to eligibility for state-supported cultural activities for cultural

organisations.

There are also some differences between these four regimes regarding the rights offered to ‘external quasi-citizens.’ For example, only India and Turkey clearly underline the rights to live, work

and invest in the country. Mexico most likely takes them for granted, while Hungary has to offer these

rights to all European citizens, so probably only the small number of Hungarians living in non-EU countries would benefit from such entitlements. Some social rights that foreigners cannot access, such as eligibility for national housing schemes in India or the retention of attained social security rights in Turkey, are generously offered to ‘external quasi-citizens’. The Turkish state also offers them the right

to practice certain professions reserved only for Turkish citizens, makes them eligible for inheritance,

and allows them to have funerals in Turkey. Hungary goes even further: it offers not only a set of rights that ethnic Hungarians abroad can use while on Hungarian territory (for example, subsidies to public

transportation) but also a set of benefits that can be accessed even from the country of residence,

without having to go to Hungary. Among these, one can find subsidies for ethnic Hungarian

educational, cultural, and media institutions, as well as subsidies to political parties and organisations in the host state.

However, there is a type of rights neither of these countries has offered to ‘external quasi- citizens’: political rights. There may be extensive differences between the four regimes analysed here, but this seems to be the most important similarity. Interestingly, even Turkey, a country which

rights and the right to be employed in the public sector. The motive for this reasoning advanced by origin states seems to be that, while there are important justifications for keeping some formal ties with ‘external quasi-citizens’ – such as promotion of common language and culture, or securing the flow of remittances – these ties are not strong enough to qualify such a person for full citizenship status. Another alternative interpretation is that democratic representation is the one aspect of citizenship that requires a clear distinction between members and non-members. While rights to ownership, return, benefits, etc. can be extended to various categories of quasi-citizens, voting rights cannot because this creates uncertainty about the boundaries of membership that undermines democratic representation.

However, when some government mistakenly considers these formal ties strong enough, or when political purposes require it, the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime is transformed into some form of dual citizenship. This happened in 2005 in Mexico, when the government decided to offer non- residents the right to vote in presidential elections. It also happened in 2011 in Hungary, when the false dual-citizenship regime – arguably, an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime, since it offered no political rights – was transformed into a real dual citizenship status through the offer of some form of voting rights to dual citizens. One could argue that I wrongly assume here that ‘real’ dual citizenship always entails external voting rights. According to such a critique there are many countries that have

traditionally tolerated dual citizenship but do not grant ‘external’ citizens voting rights, no matter whether they are mono- or dual citizens – e.g. Ireland and Greece; the question of whether citizenship comes with external voting is thus considered to be a separate one.174

174 _{Rainer Bauböck, personal communication on file with the author, April 2013.}

However, as I have already tried to explain in chapters one and five, I consider political rights as the only item that still offers

citizenship some particular value: anything else – social rights, economic rights, and the right to return – is now largely disconnected from citizenship status. So if we go further and disconnect citizenship and political rights too (a move which some countries have already made, as we will see in the next chapter), then it is hard to understand what citizenship is supposed to mean anymore.

6.5. What is acceptable and what is not in an ‘external quasi-citizenship’ regime? Normative