Examples

The distinctions between nationality and citizenship and between cultural and political nation are very important in parts of the world where conflicts over borders are not yet settled or, if they are, then memories of historic injustice loom large. A case in point here is Central and Eastern Europe, where after the fall of communism states started to engage in nation politics which reached individuals and had consequences beyond their own borders, creating what has been called a ‘Status Law syndrome’ (Ieda 2004: 4). After the two waves of European enlargement states like Hungary replaced the external protected status applicable in its EU member state neighbours with semi-dual citizenship status in a first step (that is, citizenship minus political rights, what I have called here ‘nationality’) and full dual citizenship in a second step. Political rights have been accorded to non-resident citizens (the former ‘ethnic kins’ in neighbouring states) on 1 January 2012 when the new Hungarian Constitution came into force. I will discuss later in the next chapter the problem of external protected status – or of what I will call ‘external quasi-citizenship’; what is important to underline here is that in such cases dual citizenship is clearly not an option: ‘kin nationalities’ are better protected through some form of cultural and political autonomy in the state of residence than through citizenship offered en masse by the kin state. However, because of disputed borders and memories of historic injustice kin minorities cannot have both autonomy and dual citizenship status: indeed, there is a trade-off between the two (Bauböck 2007a), (Bauböck 2010a).

If this is correct, then the distinction I have proposed between nationality and citizenship is an important one and it must also be applied in Central and Eastern Europe. Here, as elsewhere, not plural citizenship, but one citizenship plus multiple nationality (or, as I will call it in order to avoid a strictly ethnic interpretation, ‘external quasi-citizenship’) is the answer. The advantages of certifying and coding ‘nationality’ will be discussed in the next chapter. But one could claim that it also creates more problems than it solves – for example problems of discrimination, precisely in those societies where nationality and citizenship could actually be separated in meaningful ways.149

Before ending this section, a specific objection must be answered. According to it, it makes no sense to have a distinction between citizenship and nationality, as long as some citizenship rights – for example, political rights – can be provided according to the residence criteria: since this is easily feasible, the proposed distinction becomes superfluous (Spiro 2003: 143), (Owen 2010: 61-62). But there are two motives for which this division may not be so. The first reason is normative. As we have already seen, equality is citizenship’s main thrust; introducing a second class citizenship – for those nationals stripped of their political rights for residence-related reasons – may not be a liberal and

However in chapter six I design the concept of ‘external quasi-citizenship’ in such a way that, firstly, it is not based only on ethnicity or ‘nationality’, but also on different other ties people may have to an origin country. And secondly, such a status is applied by the home state on its territory; the codification is not at the international level so it does not have legal influence in other states.

In the next chapter on the ‘external quasi-citizenship’ status I will go into detail regarding the rights ‘nationals’ – more exactly, a part of nationals defined as ‘external quasi-citizens’ – may enjoy. For the moment it is enough to say that the range of rights may be anywhere between ‘full citizenship rights minus political rights’ – as in Turkey, where having Turkish nationality but not citizenship has almost no consequence in what concerns enjoyment of rights (Rumpf 2003: 369) – and simply receiving financial aid for the protection and promotion of kin minority’s language and culture in the state of residence (on the one hand) and other small benefits in the ‘kin country’ (on the other hand) – as provided by the revised 2004 Hungarian Status Law (Ieda 2004: 49-53). Of course, it goes without saying that in the case of nationals having no electoral rights, their status does not imply that they enjoy no forms of political manifestation at all: for example, they can still engage in lobbying, delivering electoral discourses, or can even be allowed to form a consultative council that can have an official or semi-official status in the home country (Spiro 2003: 146).

149 _{I would like to thank Anna Triandafyllidou for drawing me attention on this point (personal communication on file with}

democratic way to conceive a political community. The second reason is rather pragmatic. Since citizenship status is very demanding – it requires permanent residence within state’s borders – criteria for nationality can be relaxed, such that any link which can be considered ‘genuine’ – speaking the language, sharing the culture, having family ties, owning property, and so on – may be used by individuals to access nationality status in the countries they feel linked to. However, neither relaxed rules for offering nationality nor the possible multiplicity of such a status have an impact on

citizenship. In other words, citizenship – that is, political membership – is not devalued by recognizing various ‘nationality’ ties an individual may have to one or multiple states of which he is not a citizen.

5.5. Conclusions

This chapter has led to the following findings: (a) the advantages offered by formal plural membership are either inexistent or they can be obtained through other means; (b) dual citizenship can raise various and serious difficulties for all the actors involved; (c) normatively, this status violates in several ways the democratic principle of citizenship equality; (d) the same principle of equality prohibits creating different classes of citizens enjoying different types of rights; (e) citizenship status should be offered only to individuals who have a legitimate claim, and the only legitimate claim is based on permanent residence; (f) normatively, politically and historically there is a real distinction between nationality and citizenship. From these six premises, I conclude that we should abandon multiple citizenship status altogether.150

There are two simple ways to eliminate the incidence of dual citizenship in order to implement my proposal. The first one is the option model – as in Germany, where between the age of eighteen and 23 a plural citizen who acquired German citizenship via ius soli (as the child of settled immigrants) is

Instead of it, I have advanced the proposal of ‘one citizenship, multiple nationalities’ – according to which a person may enjoy only one, exclusive formal political status if she permanently resides in a state, but she can also have recognised her various ties with the states in which she does not reside through nationality status which enables her to enjoy different rights short of political rights.

150

But what happens in this case to immigrants who do not want to naturalise? One could say that a consistent defence of residence-based citizenship that wants to avoid a ‘citizenshipless’ status would have to abolish consent in both exit and entry, i.e. automatically withdraw citizenship and automatically bestow citizenship based on ius domicilii. As I will show in the last chapter, I do not want to go that far. First of all, according to sociological studies regarding immigrants, the longer the residence period, the stronger the desire to naturalise. Moreover, I claim that the onus is on states to offer stimulating incentives for immigrants to naturalise. And finally, if even in this case there would still remain a number of long-term immigrants that refuse to naturalise, I claim that this number of second-class citizens is extremely small, so accepting some dissenters cannot destroy liberal democratic values. In their case we can apply Ottonelli and Torresi’s view discussed in chapter four, according to which one may need to strike a balance between migrants’ individual plans and liberal democratic values.

obliged to choose only one citizenship (Gerdes, Faist et al. 2007b: 47).151 Of course, the formulation of the law implies that those who acquired citizenship based on ius sanguinis can usually continue to keep any other citizenship acquired at birth. However, the law could apply to every individual irrespective of the way she acquired citizenship, so it should also address the question of inherited dual citizenships. The second way is the renunciation requirement for those who apply for another state’s citizenship.152

151 _{Obviously, this model does not eliminate dual citizenship for children. This may raise some problems like military}

service, if at least one country conscript at the age of 18. The law could be modified to the extent that the decision must be taken either by parents at birth or by the child between the age of 16 and 18, for example.

152 _{This condition may require enforcing universal compliance, since multiple citizenship would still result if some states do}

not comply (e.g. do not release their citizens).

The only possible exception from the principle of avoiding dual citizenship I am aware of emerges in the case where origin country refuses to release its citizens from their formal status. This refusal cannot be defended in normative terms, but it does happen in the real world, for example in Afghanistan, Morocco, and Tunisia (Hagedorn 2003: 191), (Gerdes and Faist 2007a: 154). The solution here is not acceptance of dual citizenship status but strengthening international norms of human rights in the direction of obliging non-democratic states to release their citizens from their formal status according to their request – arguably, they cannot only be released from their citizenship status, but this status may be also withdrawn. There may be, of course, different conditions of and sanctions for renunciation. As one scholar puts it, the state may permit renunciation but is not obliged ‘to be gracious about it’ (Legomsky 2003: 112). However, the possibility of renunciation must exist and the conditions must not be difficult to fulfil.

Finally, it should be stressed that citizenship must be exclusive only in its horizontal dimension. It is not and should not be exclusive vertically. A state’s formal membership can be the basis of

vertically nested citizenship either internally – in the case of federations – or externally – in the case of unions of states, like the European Union (Bauböck 2010b), (Skrobacki 2007). Moreover, vertically nested citizenship could promote better than dual citizenship objectives such as enhanced freedom of movement, since it would not discriminate against mono-citizens, as formal plural status presently does. Of course, in the near future states will continue to accept or tolerate dual citizenship, hence my proposal of ‘one citizenship, multiple nationalities’ may seem rather utopian. However, the fact that most of the international community accepts such a status does not thereby render dual citizenship normatively legitimate.