Common ground for interreligious understanding

Some of the contemporary scholars we will discuss who approach the problem

from a Buddhist perspective are Bloom (2007), Tsuchiya (2005a), O’Leary (2002),

Harris (2002; 2005), Schmidt-Leukel (2005b; 2005c), Abe (1985; 1995) and

Makransky (2003; 2005a; 2005b)43. Generally, almost all of these scholars have

attempted to find a common ground between Buddhism and Christianity, regardless of

43

These scholars were not necessary a Buddhist themselves. Schmidt-Leukel (2005c) and Harris (2005), for example, have responded to the debate as a Christian.

their theoretical positions. As Schmidt-Leukel (2005a) presents, Bloom, Abe and

Makransky, for instance, have all with a very similar approach try to suggest how the

Buddhist concept dharmakaya can be understood in Christian terms, even though they

may have based their understandings on the teachings of different Buddhist sects

(pp.172-173). In response to Schmidt-Leukel’s review (2005c), Makransky (2005c), a

Mahayana Buddhist, claims rather affirmatively that “‘God’ and ‘dharmakaya’ point

to the same transcendent reality because God and dharmakaya are functionally

equivalent” (p.207). This may look quite consistent with Hick’s (1989a) idea of a

universal denominator, although Makransky is with Heim (1995) while rejecting

Hick’s concept of a common religious-end.

Seeking the common ground between the two religions from a Buddhist

perspective may serve two purposes. First, it is believed that learning from other

religious traditions would help to understand one’s own religion better, and that

finding the common ground between the two religions is essential for the task – there

must be something related or similar between the two religions, otherwise there

should be little reason to believe that we can understand our own religion more

thoroughly by studying the others. Second, proving that there is something common

assumption that there is more than one religion that teaches the truth44.

That being said, the Buddhist scholars would seldom deny that there are

theological differences between Christianity and Buddhism. While reviewing Heim’s

model from a Mahayana Buddhist point of view, Makransky affirms that the two

religions contain very different understandings and concepts of religious-end, ultimate

reality (God or dharmakaya), and way that leads to salvation or liberation45. Which

leads us to one of the challenges the Buddhist scholars raise against Hick’s pluralist

model: although Hick’s assumption that most religions can lead us to a good

religious-end is probably true, the teachings of the non-Christian traditions (e.g.,

Buddhism) are very often misunderstood or distorted in order to fit the vision of the

Christian-centred assumption.

As an example, Smart (1993), who has quite thoroughly compared the

similarities and differences between the two religions on most aspects, argues that the

Western theories of religious pluralism that he consults have sometimes ignored the

original meanings of certain Buddhist concepts (pp.20-25). The idea of ‘one noumenal

44 _{For example, as a reinterpretation of Heim’s (1995) model, Makransky (2005b) argues, “…a}

Mahayana Buddhist would be inspired by patterns of Christian communion and learn from Christianity with regard to the very reality that he understands himself to engage in Buddhist practice… a Buddhist would be motivated to improve his understanding of liberation, ultimate reality and praxis in part through discussion and argument with Christian theologians and saintly practitioners, discussions that take note both of analogues and differences between Buddhist and Christian understandings of the natures and roles of love, wisdom, devotion, communion and emptiness (p.199).

45 _{While discussing the differences between Christian and Buddhist soteriology, Makransky (2005a)}

writes, “Christian traditions… tend to focus intensively on the love and communion aspects of participation in the ultimate reality. Mahayana traditions that I have received, while profoundly integrating those two aspects, focus more intensively than Christian traditions upon the wisdom-emptiness aspects as the centre of soteriology, the very source of liberation” (p.195).

Reality’ proposed by Hick, according to Smart, is incompatible with the rejection of

substance in Buddhism, and the theistic concepts such as ‘the centrality of the feeling

of absolute dependence’ would conflict the non-theistical Buddhist assumption (ibid,

p.21). Nevertheless, despite there are seemingly unresolvable conflicts on every

aspect, Smart is optimistic about the effectiveness of interreligious dialogue, and

urges that it is important to understand other religions from their perspectives (ibid,

pp.10-11). This attitude is quite common for the scholars who interpret religious

pluralism from a Buddhist perspective. Senauke (2005a), for instance, affirms a

‘common ground’ between Christianity and Buddhism in regard to the ways they

purify sins or sufferings, even though he also admits that how they interpret the

concept of original sin are different (pp.242-243).

It is therefore necessary to make clear the distinction between ‘common ground’

and Hick’s idea of ‘common denominator’. The affirmation of the former concept, on

the one hand, should be understood as the affirmation that some Buddhist and

Christian teachings are very similar, and that a Buddhist may use the particular

Buddhist idea to help to understand that of Christianity; the latter concept that Hick

proposes, on the other hand, should be understood as the assumption that there are

some foundational teachings being taught by all ‘great world faiths’, and that these

certain common grounds between Christianity and Buddhism, but reject the idea of a

common denominator.