Contribution values as the criterion to evaluate a pluralist assumption

Hick (1995) has defined his model as an ‘explanatory theory’, and argues that

“the right response of someone who does not like my proposed explanation is not to

complain that it is not proved but to work out a viable alternative” (p.51). Nonetheless,

despite the challenge Hick proposes, Eddy (2002) has still chosen to question the

applicability and contribution value of Hick’s theory rather than propose an alternative

model or discuss the likeliness of Hick’s explanation34. As Eddy himself admits, “In

response, I would want to emphasize that, generally speaking, I affirm the validity of

this [Hick’s] theoretical distinction. It is in the practical application of it that problems

arise” (ibid, p.177).

In fact, it is quite a common tendency for religionists to evaluate the applicability

or contribution value of a pluralist model rather than examine whether it is

philosophically possible. Cornille (2008), for instance, has opposed the standpoint of

Hick’s neutral approach mainly because she believes it would impoverish genuine

interreligious dialogue or hinder personal religious growth (pp.123-125). Heim (1995),

34

Eddy is well aware of Hick’s challenge, and has explained why he does not think a critic must propose a better alternative model. For references, please see Eddy (2002, p.204).

in addition, also argues that the concept of multiple, confessional Ultimate

Realities/religious-ends is more advisable because it would save more religious

referential values than the singular, neutral Ultimate Reality/religious-end proposed

by Hick (pp.53-70). This idea is supported by Eddy (2002), who believes that Hick’s

pluralism is ‘guilty’ of spreading ‘monotheist complacency’ on the practical level

(p.197). Or as Quinn (2000) comments, Hick’s model is ‘phenomenally polytheistic’

and ‘noumenally non-theistic’, and thus would not contribute much for the

development of an authentic theology of religious pluralism (p.164).

Despites that he is supposed to be on the opposite side, Hick has nonetheless

shown the similar tendency. As he states in The Fifth Dimension (2004b), his model

would help to provide a more thorough description of this universe that neither

modern science nor traditional religious beliefs has been able to completely describe

(pp.1-2; 259-60). Or as Hick criticises in a book review of The Depth of the Riches

(Heim, 2001), Heim’s rather inclusivistic position is actually “less inclusive than the

traditional version,” and therefore “challenge of religious pluralism becomes even

more acute” (Hick, 2001a, pp.399-435). Also, as a conclusion of a talk given in

Norwich, he has urged the audiences to reject religious absolutism and hold a more

pluralistic viewpoint because it would help to diminish interreligious conflicts and

religious pluralism, either the supporters of a neutral or confessional approach, tend to

evaluate a model or theory based on the contribution it can potentially make or how

useful it can be to solve interreligious conflicts or enrich dialogue.

It is true that many theorists, such as Hick (1989a) or Heim (1995), are trying to

solve the problem of religious pluralism, but by ‘solving the problem of religious

pluralism’ it does not intentionally mean bringing peace to humanity. Rather, it is to

make a reasonable yet very often empirically unverifiable hypothesis that explains

why there are so many religious traditions in this world, each with very different

historical or trans-historical truth-claims. Since it is very often something untestable at

least in the scientific sense, the concept involved is quite similar to traditional

religious beliefs in that their validities are always more crucial than what profits they

promise. If a religious belief is true (in all senses), then whether it would offer

something good to our society or not, it is still true – it remains true even if what it

conveys is purely evil and destructive. That being said, it is also true that many would

choose to follow a religion because the promises it makes sound most attractive.

Especially when the core hypotheses made by the theorists of religious pluralism are

often empirically unprovable, it is quite a reasonable attempt to support a model that

is most profitable to all humanity or certain social/religious groups. Therefore, the

because of the contribution value it lacks.

Regarding the theories of religious pluralism, there are a few contribution values

the critics tend to concern the most. First, a model is considered less preferable if it is

too Christian-centred (i.e., biased). As Smart (1993) describes, there are Christian

pluralists who attempt to understand other religions by seeking Christ in their

doctrines (p.60). However, according to Driver (1987), this kind of Christocentric task

is “certainly Western,” a bit ‘crusading’ even, just that their biggest opponent is now

the ‘godless communists’ rather than followers of other religions (pp.206-208). Hick

also points out that “the Christian superiority complex supported and sanctified the

Western imperialist exploitation of what today we call the ‘third world’” (as cited in

Thomas, 1992, p.49). He has therefore made an example by proposing a neutral

interpretation of religion, so that Western values or beliefs are no longer forced on the

people from the ‘third world’. Such principle is indeed honourable – what this thesis

tries to demonstrate is only that his model did not fulfil such promises.

What worth-noting, though, is Driver’s implication that contemporary theologies

tend to see atheists as enemies. Although he is mainly referring to the exclusivists and

‘patriarchal inclusivists’, the same can also be applied to Hick’s model. Hick (2004)

does attempt to make his theory as neutral as possible, though it is still a theistic

positions are preferable, mainly because they do not contain the ‘cosmic optimism’35

he speaks of (pp.13-18; 173-174).

In terms of practicability, then, we may say that his theory, however neutral it

may seem, can at most attract the audiences who are religious. For the

atheists/agnostics who do not believe in the existence of any salvific-state or do not

agree that what religions encourage are actually good (e.g., Russell, 2007, pp.81-82;

Dawkins, 2006, pp.317-348) they should find it difficult to consider Hick’s

assumption likely. Therefore, given that no pluralist assumption can be attractive to

all audiences, it is necessary to develop a model that can at least speak for the ones

who are not treated equally by any existing theory. After all, one of the major

functions of a pluralist model is to help one to understand, respect and establish

dialogue with the religiously others, but the existing models are quite unhelpful to

solve the conflicts between the religious and the non-religious, or between the ‘great

world faiths’ and the ‘primitive, less authentic faiths’. The question is, if this would

somewhat contradict the seemingly more basic task of having the best explanation for

world religious situation, should we sacrifice reliability for contribution value? In

35 _{As he further explains, “The idea of the universal divine goodness/love/compassion is common to}

Judaism, Islam, theistic Hinduism, Sikhism, Jainism, as well as Christianity. These are theistic forms of what I call the ‘cosmic optimism’ of the great post-axial traditions – their affirmation of the possibility for all human beings of a limitlessly better state grounded in the ultimate nature of reality. But this cosmic optimism is not confined to the theistic religions. In their own different ways Buddhism, advaitic Hinduism, and Taoism also share it. For they affirm the possibility of attaining a limitlessly better state” (Hick, 1995, pp.104-105).

other words, should we have a so-claimed ‘most likely’ explanatory theory, or should

we consider more the usefulness and practicability of a model?