When examining the measures in Figure 6, note the similarities in their trajectories over time. This should not be too surprising, given that I have already displayed their pairwise correlations above. The one exception in this group is Vanhanen’s ID. For each year in which it is available (1972-2000), it is higher than the other three indicators. The other three indicators appear to be closely intertwined throughout time. However, somewhat amazingly, they all take turns being the highest, middle, or lowest measure, depending on the year. So, while these indicators may not always agree over time, but, overall, Bollen’s Liberal Democracy, Freedom House’s average of political rights and civil liberties, and Polity IV’s polity2 variables display an amazing amount of congruence over time. Vanhanen’s ID follows the general trend of the other three, but for each year is substantially higher than the others, and appears to even further diverge from the others in the mid-1990s. I conclude that either of the three other indicators appear to be reasonable substitutes for one another. It is beyond the scope of this descriptive analysis to investigate empirically the consequences of using one particular indicator or another in any particular study. It seems reasonable that there may be differences in results depending on the indicator chosen. However, if one’s goal is to examine the trends of liberal democracy, any of the three measures seems able to elucidate the general contours of change.
Similarities in the Three Indicators Over Time
These three indicators of democracy share some important characteristics in their trajectories over time. First, it is clear that there were distinct periods of growth during the third wave of democratization. All three of the indicators demonstrated growth in the overall period from 1972 to approximately 1988 or 1989. While Freedom House did show a decline in the early years, when looking from 1972 to 1988, it does conform to the other two indicators. Next is a period of rapid increase, apparent for all of the measures. This period is followed with a very
short period of decline for Freedom House and Polity of two and three years respectively. Bollen’s Liberal Democracy does not register a decline in these years. Next comes an extended period of slow growth for all three measures. Towards the end of this period near approximately 2005 to 2007 begins a period of total stagnation, if not reversal, for Freedom House and Bollen’s Liberal Democracy. Polity shows during this period a mix of increases and decreases. Due to the data limitations of Polity and Bollen’s Liberal Democracy, we do not get the benefit of seeing scores for 2014 and 2015. Freedom House has recently released the scores from 2015 and it is clear that the world is currently in decline. Bollen’s indicator also shows decline from 2012 to 2013 (the most recent year that the underlying data is available). Polity is the only indicator that ends on a slight upward swing.
Final Choice: Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator
This study, and subsequent chapters of this dissertation, will use Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator as the indicator for liberal democracy3. There are several reasons why this is justified. First, this indicator has a clear conceptual definition of liberal democracy featuring two dimensions. Each of these dimensions is clearly operationalized. Bollen’s measure is approximately continuous on a 0 to 100-point scale, compared to the Polity’s indicator’s 21- point scale and the Freedom House’s indicator’s 7-point scale. It is clear that Bollen and many other argue that liberal democracy is a continuous concept, so it only makes sense to measure it continuously. Other benefits of this indicator include its measurement properties and the ability to control for measurement error. In addition, when comparing the trends with the other two prominent indicators, it appears as if they all yield similar results. The major difference is the measurement of the apparent decline that has characterized recent years. Here, Bollen’s measure
is more conservative than Freedom House, but there is every indication that Bollen’s indicator shows this decline as well. Finally, all of these indicators have high correlations with each other, although the correlations slightly decreased over time. It seems unlikely that major differences in these findings will depend upon which indicator is used.
In summary, given the lack of criticisms of Bollen’s measure, its ability to minimize measurement error due to subjective ratings, the fact that it is available for over 40 years, and perhaps, most importantly, that its operationalization matches closely with its conceptual definition, this is the preferred choice for the main indicator of liberal democracy in this dissertation.
Descriptive Analysis
Overall Worldwide Trends in Liberal Democracy
Again, the recent trajectory of Bollen’s Liberal Democracy Series I Indicator suggests that the period from 1972 to 2013 can be divided into three distinct sub-periods, as distinguished by their overall pattern of liberal democracy growth: 1972-1989, 1989-1995, and 1995-2013. The first 17-years sub-period illustrates moderate growth in liberal democracy. During the second sub-period, 1989-1995, there were steep increases in liberal democracy world-wide. In the final sub-period, 1995 to 2013, the growth rate has been very slow, even less than in the early period. Looking at liberal democracy over the entire 41-year period we see some incredible gains during the third wave. If we look closely within the third sub-period, it is also clear that growth in democracy has stagnated since 2008, and from 2012 to 2013 it has declined. It is reasonable to anticipate that we are just beginning to see democratic decline, since Freedom House’s indicator has shown decline in 2014 and 2015, and there is a high degree of correlation between these two indicators.
These are the overall contours of worldwide change in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. The sections that follow in this descriptive analysis will investigate whether or not these trends can be seen equally around the world. I posit that the different regions may differ as to their regional experiences with liberal democracy throughout this period. To investigate this, I divide the world into regions following the World Bank’s seven regional classifications: East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, North America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In addition to the possibility of distinct regional trends, it is also possible that there could be distinct trends by income group. Indeed, one of the most commonly held findings in the literature is the close relationship between economic development and democracy (e.g. Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959). Thus, this study investigates the likelihood that trends will differ by World Bank income groups as well. Within each of these group’s descriptive analyses, I will discuss the nature of the trends and their most important aspects.
Regional Trends in Liberal Democracy
East Asia and the Pacific
Listings of the countries, regions, and income groups examined in this study are provided in the Appendices.
In the East Asia and Pacific (EAP) region, this study identifies four significant
characteristics of this region’s trends in liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. First, there was steady growth throughout the period. Second, despite this steady growth, the region still has relatively low levels of liberal democracy at the end of the period. Third, there is quite a lot of diversity in the trajectories of the different countries in this region. Lastly, there are numerous
over and underperforming countries in this region. Below I will discuss each of these characteristics and the graph
Figure 7: East Asia & Pacific mean of liberal democracy 1972-2013
Steady growth through the period. When examining EAP the region appears to be rather unremarkable in its region-level trajectory of liberal democracy from 1972 to 2013. On the positive side, overall, the region has seen steady growth throughout the 1972 to 2013 period. Notably, this region did not experience the major increases that were seen in other regions of the world, such as Latin American and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa and, to a lesser extent, Europe and Central Asia. It appears as if the third wave left the EAP region rather untouched of dramatic increases. In 1972, the region had an average score of 36, and by 2013 this had
increased approximately 61 points. Again, this demonstrates rather moderate growth compared
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 (m e a n ) lib d e m 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002 2007 2012 Year