UN Complex Peace Operations Model, the IMPP and DPMs

Significant changes have recently taken place in terms of the UN approach to peace missions and one of the solutions is to have a more integrated approach in terms of the planning processes pertaining to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In order to manage the inter-relationships among the diverse range of functions pertaining to peacekeeping and peacebuilding more effectively, the UN developed the Integrated Missions Model (IMM) that is essentially aimed at enhancing the coherence between the UN Country Team that is humanitarian and developmental in focus, and the UN peacekeeping operation, that is essentially peace and security focused (De Coning, 2006:4). The current missions in Burundi, Côte d‟Ivoire, the DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia and Southern Sudan all have Integrated Mission management structures (De Coning, 2006:4). This more integrated approach has been encapsulated in the UN IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy in the form of guidelines that were endorsed by the UNSG on 13 June 2006. These guidelines serve to promote a more comprehensive and inclusive UN systems-approach to the planning of integrated peace support operations (hereafter called „integrated missions‟).

However, while structural reforms have been made, and approaches to and processes of peace missions have been altered to accommodate integrated planning processes, these reforms still do not explicitly explain how and when to integrate peacekeeping and peacebuilding on „grass roots‟ level – thus how to effectively address the military-civilian interface on the execution level.

In view of this, the concept of DPMs, proposes a way for policy-makers to effectively organise, plan and co-ordinate the integration of civil-military operations that bridge the traditional gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding, as well as to mainstream development principles into conflict prevention and resolution (Gueli et al, 2006d:4). It is important to note that the concept of “integration” as it relates to peace missions, is aimed at planning processes, and not focused on the integration of the actions by the various role-players during the execution of their respective tasks on tactical level. Malan (2007:3) points out that the role and functions of humanitarian organisations should not include humanitarianism within the scope of

the military strategy. He argues that humanitarian aid boils down to far more than the mere provision of basic human resources. Humanitarian aid should be provided in the true spirit of humanitarianism: adhering to the “„core principles‟ of humanitarianism – humanity, impartiality and independence and that these should be used to guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to induce compliance with political demands, and upholding the principles demands constant vigilance against cooptation of the language of humanitarianism by political and military actors”

(Malan, 2007:3). In light of the above, it is important to note that there should be a clear differentiation in terms of the line-functions of the respective humanitarian, political and military role-players on the tactical or execution level.

However, in many instances, humanitarian interventions are called for as a direct result of the crises that were created by the failures of political actors. As result of the complex nature of these crises, it will essentially require the combined efforts of the military, political and humanitarian role-players to solve the problem. Malan (2007:3) argues that not many scholars and observers would contest the need for these three components to collaborate in the field. However, he also points out that the differences in philosophy and operational priorities mean that these three types of responses do not naturally co-exist. He concludes: “there can at best be good liaison and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors – but not integration. Even within UN peace operations, which are reliant on relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance from humanitarians to the concept of „integrated missions‟ in the field” (Malan, 2007:3).

The term „integration‟ as far as peace missions are concerned, should therefore be understood in terms of planning processes, and not in terms of the execution of tasks in the field by the respective role-players.

The UN developed the IMPP as part of a broader UN peacebuilding strategy (UNSG‟s Guidelines on Integrated Missions, 2006). The UN adopted the IMPP as the “authoritative basis for the planning of all new integrated missions, as well as the revision of existing integrated mission plans, for all UN departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes” (UN, 2006:K-2). Following the endorsement of the UN IMPP Guidelines by the UNSC on 13 June 2006, the Draft ASF Doctrine Handbook (Chapter 7) was presented. This chapter encompasses the Planning of Multi-dimensional Peace Support Operations for the AU, which has drawn extensively on the existing UN IMPP Guidelines. The IMPP is presented as a process by means of which structure is derived from an in-depth understanding of the specific country setting, of the evolving imperatives facing the security, political, humanitarian and development pillars in that particular country, and of the particular mix of assets and capacities available and/or required to achieve the desired impact

(UN, 2006:K-3). The UNSG‟s IMPP Guidelines noted that: “integration is the guiding principle for the design and implementation of complex UN operations in post-conflict situations and for linking the different dimensions of peacebuilding, political development, humanitarian aid, human rights, rule of law, social and security aspects into a coherent support strategy” (UN, 2006). An integrated mission is based on a common strategic plan and a shared understanding of the priorities and types of programme interventions that need to be undertaken at various stages of the recovery process. Through this integrated process, the UN system seeks to maximise its contribution towards countries emerging from conflict by engaging its different capabilities in a coherent and mutually supportive manner.

The IMPP approach is in line with the UN‟s current IMM, and is more focused on fusing the planning of security and development efforts by military and civilian elements from the start of a mission, rather than only shifting the focus to peacebuilding and post-conflict environments during the later stages of a mission as was the pattern when utilising the IMM. This process is directly in line with the aims of and approach to DPMs. The IMPP can thus very effectively be applied to plan DPMs in bringing security closer to development, as the IMPP aims to ensure that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate flexible, creative and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning (UN, 2006:K-2). The IMPP thus promotes simultaneity and integration of planning processes and role-players (military and civilian) right from the start of a mission, thus meeting one of the key prerequisites of effectively implementing DPMs. The IMPP also addresses security and development issues in an inter-related and contextually relevant way – as opposed to a primarily sequential, sectored approach that has been applied in terms of the UN‟s earlier Complex Peace Operations Model (Midlarsky, 1997:1).

De Coning (2006:5) points out that, as is the case with most new innovations, the adoption of the IMPP has not been without its detractors. There are still various technical, administrative, organisational and budgetary challenges that need to be resolved, before all the aspects of the model can be fully implemented.

Earlier peace mission planning processes proved that there was, generally, a lack of strategic vision, and that planning occurred along functional „stovepipes‟, which in turn lead to potential contradictions. The lack of awareness of specific processes lead to partial application and there was no common approach between missions, that all the role-players were not included and that there was insufficient information and data on the situation in the battle space (UN, 2006:K-2).

The current IMPP is guided by specific planning principles and assumptions and requires the full engagement of the key UN actors, both at headquarters and the country level, as well as consultations with the national authorities and other relevant external actors. However, it is emphasised that the IMPP should be implemented in a flexible manner, taking into account varying circumstances and timeframes, while ensuring that adequate planning standards, outputs and the key decisions points are respected. The IMPP proposes differentiated time frames for each level and provides for the fact that planning according to minimum timeframes necessarily involves tradeoffs (UN, 2006:K-2).

It is evident that planning for integrated missions must be inclusive from the outset and that both the process and mission structures must be effectively established so as to avoid the ad hoc approach of the past and ensure that system-wide strategic objectives are clearly established and supported by the functional planning of the respective mission and UN components (UN, 2006:K-3). The development of the IMPP that is focused on the concept of the integration of processes and activities is the result of a realisation that, when responding to conflict, speed and momentum do matter in peace missions and that effective missions require integrated efforts, and not separate tracks that do not converge (Gueli et al, 2006c:1).

The integration and coordination of processes and approaches towards the resolution of conflict and the streamlining of different national interests into a common and cohesive strategy shared by all the countries involved, remains a major challenge for political and military role-players working for conflict management, especially in the regional context (DFA, 1999:9). Hence, coordination of different national interests and their synthesis into a common strategy by all countries concerned are imperative (Williams, 1999:15). This interface between political and military affairs also emphasises the importance of clear mandates and rules of engagement.