CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Chapter 1 introduces a conceptual framework within which the research is situated. On a meta-theoretical plane, the framework attempts to integrate the work of Michel Foucault with that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. The integration of the two scholarships on the conceptual level and the consequent application of this converged framework follow Foucault and Deleuze/Guattari’s belief in “theorisation as conceptual practice” and the need for scholarly experimentation. Chapter 1 discusses and links key concepts of these authors. These concepts are used to interpret the Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages in the following chapters. As for the conceptual contribution of Deleuze and Guattari, they developed the most intriguing conceptualisation of assemblages in social science and philosophy to date. Their discussion of two types of assemblages – arborescent and rhizomatic assemblages – is absolutely crucial for this research and fits perfectly with the two case studies. They are crucial for a comprehension of how a given articulation of human security – both discursive and material – is constituted, maintained and hybridised as an assemblage. Foucault’s contribution through his “analytics of government” is then vital for an examination of political rationalities which have shaped and regulated these human security assemblages. The key concepts of such analytics are outlined and related to an analysis of socio-political orders and economies of power which have sustained these orders. Finally, the chapter discusses “governmentalised human security assemblages” which are, conceptually, a result of the ontological convergence of Foucauldean and Deleuze-Guattarian analytical grids.

Theorisation as Conceptual Practice, Experimentation and Assemblages

This chapter introduces a conceptual framework that will in turn serve the role of an interpretive grid through which empirical material can be read. A conceptual framework is preferred to theoretical framework because the aim of the thesis is neither to apply a pre-made theory nor to propose a new theory on the basis of an ultimate generalisation of findings. A post-structural theoretical approach – rather than a substantive theory – guides this thesis. This approach will draw insights from the work of two key figures of French post-structuralism: Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault. Despite the fact that their research interests and modes of thinking overlapped significantly, their works are still read, interpreted, and applied separately. Contrary to that, and despite the fact that their scholarly overlap has never been complete (Hand 1988: vi-ix), their key concepts are juxtaposed and interlinked to explain the two human security assemblages.

There are a number of points at which Foucault and Deleuze converge, the latter both in his sole role of an author as well as a co-author of books with Félix Guattari, a post-structuralist psychoanalyst. At the most general plane, they share a view concerning the role of theory and its relationship with practice. As Deleuze (Deleuze and Foucault 1977: 205) points out in his discussion with Foucault, practice has neither been a consequence or application of theory nor the opposite: its inspiration. Rather, resembling the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze, the relationship between theory and practice has been more incomplete and fragmentary, as theory is ‘always local and related to a limited field’ (Ibid: 205). Deleuze uses the metaphor of a theory having wall-related qualities in that it encounters obstacles and blockages; as for practice, it is portrayed as a necessary tool ‘for piercing this wall’

(Ibid: 206). Foucault not only concurs with this depiction, but goes further and maintains that ‘theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is

practice’ (Ibid: 208). Although never perfect in its ability to synthesise – or rather

totalise – fully, theory is seen by both thinkers as a ‘box of tools’ used in order to expose power where it is most unexpected and invisible (Ibid: 208). Thus, the kind of tools used always depends on a specific problem that one plans to examine, which is also the case of this thesis.

To understand theory as practice, one needs to ask an additional question: what kind of practice? As Deleuze (1987: 19) suggests, writing is more than anything else an orientation. It consists ‘in developing a compass’ and can be understood as ‘the art of conceptual and perceptual colouring’ (Lorraine 2005: 207). The process of theorising – rather than the application of a ready-made, totalising theory – is an important part of an overall conceptual framework formation. It can be argued that while theorisation is the practice of writing, the writing itself relies on conceptual colouring: the tool-box-like quality of theorising both Deleuze and Foucault speak of emerges with the invention and development of concepts which are subsequently put to use. As Deleuze and Guattari point out,

[t]here are no simple concepts. Every concept has components and is defined by them. It therefore has a combination [chiffre]. It is a multiplicity, although not every multiplicity is conceptual. There is no concept with only one component …. Every concept has an irregular contour defined by the sum of its components, which is why … we find the idea of the concept being a matter of articulation, of cutting and cross- cutting. The concept is a whole because it totalises its components, but it

is a fragmentary whole. Only on this condition can it escape the mental chaos constantly threatening it, stalking it, trying to reabsorb it (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 15-16).

The process of working through concepts is the basis of the Deleuze- Guattarian method of experimentation. The nature of decoding the two human security assemblages is indeed experimentary practice. Through experimentation, one not only attempts to elucidate how one of Deleuze and Guattari’s key concepts – assemblages (see below) – works, but also how they can be dismantled and recreated in this process. Experimentation is simultaneously theoretical and practical, confirming the notion of theory as practice: it has the ambition to both conceptually interpret as well as to understand functional workings. The important part of the method of experimentation is that it takes seriously the interconnections between orders of assembled conditions and the resulting tendencies, thereby examining ‘what it does and what is done with it’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 180). Experimentation is thinking anew, always concerned with ‘the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearance of truth and are more demanding than it is’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 110). Similarly to Foucault’s (1977a: 139-164) discussion of genealogy, Deleuze also pits experimentation against history. One the one hand, experimentation needs history as the latter represents ‘the set of almost negative conditions that make possible the experimentation of something that escapes history’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1994: 111). This is significant for this thesis because the historical and genealogical tropes of Canadian and Japanese assemblages are always different as they have completely different analytical grids behind them. As the next chapter shows, to rely on “official history” is unproductive insofar as it

presents historical processes and conditions in linear synoptic imagery which never withstands the empirical check. On the other hand, despite the fact that ‘history isn’t experimentation’, it is sorely needed since without it ‘the experiments would remain indeterminate, divorced from any particular [historical] conditions‘ (Deleuze 1995: 106). In this sense, while the method of experimentation is not a historiographic method, it does not mean that it is ahistorical.

With direct implications for the method of experimentation, Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 361-374) distinguish between two different conceptions of science: what they term Royal Science as opposed to nomad science. As the following chapters demonstrate, one of the key differences between Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages has consisted in the type of knowledge production about human security and the distinction between “Royal” vs. “nomad” science helps to account for this difference. Royal Science is performed through royal scientists who play the role of master gatekeepers in stabilising and fettering theory for the purposes of the State. The objective of their activity is to ensure a legislative primacy of this type of scientific conduct – usually by portraying nomad science as prescientific or parascientific, with the aim of reinforcing the role of the State (Ibid: 367). According to Deleuze and Guattari, Royal Science operates deskilling aimed at the reproduction or execution of the plans proposed by the “intellectuals”, who really are technocratic bureaucrats (Ibid: 393). Contrary to that, nomadic science is not concerned with “axiomatics” and reproduction (of bureaucratic rules, laws, political purpose of the State, etc.): rather, it follows the application of the method of experimentation and the “problematics” of contingent developments associated with it (Ibid: 372-374). Nomad scientists embrace heterodoxy and try to avoid the stabilisation of their

knowledge. A prima facie example of nomadic science is provided by Deleuze when he reflected on the similarities between his and Guattari’s work and that of Foucault:

We had no taste for abstractions, Unity, Totality, Reason, Subject. We set ourselves the task of analyzing mixed forms, arrangements, what Foucault called apparatuses. We set out to follow and disentangle lines rather than work back to points … We looked for foci of unification, nodes of totalization, and processes of subjectification in arrangements … We weren’t looking for origins, even lost or deleted ones, … but for new things being formed (Deleuze 1995: 86)

Despite the fact that Deleuze and Guattari argue that there have been two different conceptions of science, they too maintain that ‘ontologically, [one can see] a single field of interaction’ within which Royal Science attempts to appropriate nomad science and the latter ‘continuously cut[ting] the contents of royal science loose’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 367). Thus, their interaction is marked by capture and flight.

The ability to flee is closely related to the notion of freedom in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. For a start, they do not understand the concept of freedom through the humanistic or liberal quality which can be attributed to atomised individuals, as Western liberal political philosophy does. In fact, humans are understood as unstable, a ‘constantly changing assemblage of forces, an epiphenomenon arising from chance confluences of languages, organisms, societies, expectations, laws and so on’ (Stagoll 1995: 22). In both Anti-Oedipus and A

organism (a whole body with an identity and an end) and their preferred understanding of humans as human machines which are constituted and sustained by their connections (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 458). Similarly, they do not understand freedom as something unambiguously positive. Rather, they are interested in the ontology of connections, i.e. how connections develop through the interactions of different lines, how they transform and mutate, and cease to exist. It is precisely the possibility of a mutation, especially when the positive turns into the negative, which precludes Deleuze and Guattari from normatively embracing freedom as a desired value.

In this context, they argue that individual and collective entities are composed of three types of lines. First are molar lines, which correspond to rigidly segmented and coded forms found in bureaucratic and legal apparatuses (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 203, 218, 224). These are associated with the State-dominated politics of

molarisation. Deleuze and Guattari link molarity to the so-called striated space

which is homogenised and disciplinary and is instituted by the State apparatus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 373, 384). Second, molecular lines form an in-between category which is more fluid and organised around flows and quanta. They allow individuals and collective entities to develop in ways that are not fully controlled by the surrounding (striated) space. Thus, entities can partially flee the territory of the State and operate, though in a solely local manner, in interstices between organised segments, with the result of their partial deterritorialisation and decoding. The molecular serves as the basis of micropolitics and contributes to the harmonisation of previously dissimilar forms (business, finance, non-profit sector, bureaucracy) in the current neo-liberal capitalism:

Capitalism has always had as its “utopia” the capacity to function without the State … [F]or Deleuze and Guattari this is not because State apparatuses have disappeared (clearly they have not); rather the rigid demarcation between State and society is no longer tenable. Society and

State now constitute one all-encompassing reality, and all capital has become social capital. Hence, the generation of social cooperation,

undertaken primarily by the service and informational industries in the advanced economies, has become a crucial one for capitalism. In a situation of this kind, a molar politics … becomes increasingly irrelevant (Surin 1995: 162, emphasis added).

An important, or one should rather say constitutive, part in capitalist micropolitics is

desire. Deleuze and Guattari’s take on desire is the opposite from the psychoanalytic

conception, which argues that desire is defined by an insatiable lack regulated by the Oedipal law (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 26-28). Rather, they understand desire as a positive social force and introduce the key notion of desiring-production in this context. Desiring-production is important for molecular lines. The authors discuss the links between two mutually reinforcing processes: that of desiring-production, i.e. the investment of psychical energy into the production of what is taken as reality, and of social-production, which does the same through corporeal energy, i.e. labour (Ibid: 10-11):

[T]he desire constrained by the orders of capital is deterritorialised or folded back into the social field. When this happens the liberated desire integrates into itself the flows and components of the Socius or social

field to form a “desiring machine”. The heart of micropolitics is the construction of these new desiring machines: without a politics to facilitate this construction there can be no productive desire, only endless repetition of the non-different (Surin 1995: 163).

Third are lines of flight, which form the most transformational type of line, as

they rupture the other two (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 202-230). Deleuze describes them as the strangest lines and characterises them as ‘if something carried us away, across our segments, but also across our thresholds, towards a destination which is unknown’ (Deleuze 1987: 125). In these lines, all segmentarity collapses and deterritorialisation takes place. As a result, the striated space is replaced by a different kind of space – smooth place, though the authors emphasise that ‘the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 474). That the three lines with the related two spaces coexist together can be seen in the example of the Holy Roman Empire: while the Empire itself embodies molar segmentarity (striated space), it too includes molecular micropolitics exemplified by migrant barbarians who move along the barbaricum fringe of the Empire and are sometimes reterritorialised by integration into indigenous communities; finally, there are nomads who escape along lines of flight all attempts to get captured into a State-like territory and promote deterritorialisation wherever they move in the steppes (smooth space) (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 222-223). Importantly, in the end of their exploration of smooth space and its relations with striated space, Deleuze and Guattari warn against putting freedom on a normative pedestal through one’s preference for smooth space: ‘smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the

struggle is changed or displaced in them … Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 500; also, cf. Deleuze 1995: 33).

The three types of lines outlined are important for human security assemblages, particularly in how these assemblages have been governmentally/bureaucratically regulated. As the respective chapters on Canadian and Japanese human security assemblages show, the predominance of molar lines (Japan) as opposed to molecular lines and lines of flight (Canada) has structured human security discourses and practices existing in each of the assemblages. According to Deleuze and Guattari, assemblages are ‘complexes of [these] lines’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 505) and each assemblage is said to be territorial, though it too includes lines of deterritorialisation (Ibid: 503-4). As will be shown later in the thesis, to grasp the shape of Japanese human security, its (partial) deterritorialisation through the U.N. and bilateral ODA convergence machine needs to be investigated. As for Canadian human security assemblage, it will be shown how it became deterritorialised through the insertion of Canadian NGOs into the assemblage. Assemblages can be conceptualised alongside a horizontal axis and a vertical axis: horizontally, there are content-based machinic assemblages of

effectuation composed of things, bodies, actions and passions, and expression-based collective assemblages of enunciation which comprise regimes of utterances and

signs (Ibid: 88). These are ‘two non-parallel formalizations’ of assemblages and their relationship, and the importance of distinguishing – at least formally – between them is given by the fact that ‘one never does what one says [and, equally,] one never says what one does’ (Deleuze 2006: 53). This is not because one would like to lie, but rather due to one’s practice of ‘assembling signs and bodies as heterogeneous components of the same machine’ (Ibid: 53). Then, on a vertical axis, assemblages

have two sides: a territorial or reterritorialised side and cutting edges of

deterritorialisation which carry it away (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 88). The used

example of reterritorialisation of human security assemblage in this thesis are attempts of the Canadian government to use human security for domestic counter- terrorism purposes as well as Canada and Japan’s state-building activities in Afghanistan.

As Deleuze and Guattari suggest, ‘[i]t is necessary to ascertain the content and the expression of each assemblage, to evaluate their real distinction, their reciprocal presupposition, their piecemeal insertion’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 504). Additionally, one needs to examine assemblages alongside their vertical axis. This is because each concrete assemblage is penetrated by abstract machines (or what Foucault calls a generalisable “diagram” of power, such as panopticism), and these machines draw cutting edges of decoding and deterritorialisation, thereby opening the territorial assemblage onto assemblages of another type (Ibid: 510). For both human security assemblages under microscope, generalisable diagrams will be identified and discussed. How two specific assemblages relate to the abstract machine can be seen through two alloplastic and anthropomorphic examples: the

State apparatus and the war machine (Ibid: 513). With regard to the concrete

assemblage of the State apparatus, it ‘realizes the [abstract] machine of overcoding of a society … [I]t is the abstract machine which organizes the dominant utterances and the established order of a society … [as well as] the homogenization of different

segments, their convertibility’ (Deleuze 1987: 129, emphasis added). When the

example of Bentham’s panopticism is used, the abstract machine of panopticism is responsible for the convergence of the discourse of delinquency and disciplinary techniques, together forming a social assemblage which Foucault called carceral

dispositif (Deleuze 1988: 37). A less molar and more molecular example of an abstract machine that has penetrated (at least some) State apparatuses is the axiomatic machine of global capital. Its exceptionality stems from the fact that, unlike other types of abstract machines, it does not operate through coding flows, but rather through their decoding. Where recoding would take place in non-capitalist societies, the recapturing of decoded flows is replaced by the process of axiomatisation, i.e. by introducing a law of general equivalence in the form of monetary value (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 222-239). How the Canadian human security assemblage has been driven by axiomatic abstract machine of capital (financial capital/funding turned into social capital), and with what implications will be tackled in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis. Similarly, Chapters 7 and 8 will shed light on the reasons and effects of the Japanese human security assemblage shunning axiomatic abstract machine of capital.

Apart from the State apparatus, the war machine can also be identified. The war machine was originally invented by nomads and ‘does not itself have war for its

object, but necessarily adopts it as its object when it allows itself to be appropriated

by the State apparatus’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 513, emphasis in original). Also, not only is the war machine distinct from the State apparatus, but it is also exterior to

In document Human security assemblages. Transformations and governmental rationalities in Canada and Japan. (Page 37-77)