Conclusion to Chapter 2:

This chapter has addressed and discussed the literature on accountability, and the related role of business associations as civil society participants in the EU policy process.

Chapter 2.2 first described the emergence of civil society and its role in the EU’s practice of participatory democracy. It found limits to that practice not least in the limited evidence of deliberation and

consultation on the part of organized civil society. As specific interest organizations, business

associations promote a private commercial interest and can be seen as “distant” from matters that lie in the public interest. Ascertaining whether a business association might render itself publicly accountable will therefore first lead to defining the specific interest at stake, the stakeholders and contributors. Questions then arising from this section to be applied to the case studies will include whether the unit of analysis engages in deliberative practices with members of the public, pure civil society organisations or not. Also, to what extent the practice if there is one contributes to the efficiency and legitimising of the output and corresponds to the design characteristics set out by Tanasescu and the key conditions of Fischer.

Chapter 2.3.1. dealt with distinguishing the core concept of accountability and mapping its relationship to other related governance concepts. This analysis gives rise to several questions on representation and the quality of the mandate derived for action that is then subject to accountability. Does the lack of a clear public mandate indeed heighten the need for an accountability process? Organisations that claim representation of wider interests and hence more freedom from capture by particular interests also struggle to link directly with that wider public and derive a mandate from it. Similarly, struggling to link with that wider public, business organizations however represent a specific narrow interest though their activities are usually clearly mandated by an identified set of members. Representative but de facto weak on public accountability, business associations might rely on accountability processes to establish that link with the organizations more representative of the public in the civil society spectrum. The “public” credentials of organizations are in part reliant on transparency; a necessary quality for

accountability to proceed. However, transparency lacks the essential element of scrutiny and therefore does not allow us to draw reliable conclusions based on observed practices.

Transparency allows however for public involvement and this potential establishment of a causal link with the public will enhance legitimacy. In effect, input legitimacy can be achieved according to Risse (2006), when the actors are held accountable by their internal constituents. But accountability

83 developed as a governance concept with an external effect of potential legitimization, based on internal accountability processes that engage at some stage with a “public” representative.

Chapter 2.3.2. examines the differing types of accountability as described by leading accountability authors and seeks to align definitions and nomenclature where viable. Where possible, this exercise ascertains commonality in drivers, circumstances and expected outcomes. There is some overlap in contexts studied by the authors which tend to focus on international NGOs. I justify the particular choice of business associations again in this argumentation by pointing to their own need of reputation

management, as per INGOs, their transnational activity, and their role in policy making. Accountability processes can be common to both organisational types. Bovens offers a definition of an accountability process in several steps which I have questioned and sought to re-balance with differing emphases (see Figure 2.). The combination of the defining of accountability as a governance concept and its mapping into a process as applied to a business association allowed me to draw further key conclusions from leading authors.

The first is that the application of an accountability process is a governance choice. It is strategic and political, and lies beyond legal compliance. Its application therefore is deliberate and should yield an outcome or satisfy an expectation. On a practical level this also entails adoption of this process or mechanism as a deliberate choice on the part of the actors and also wider stakeholders. The setting out of the process would be found in internal documents that take the form of “operational rules” or “codes of conduct”. The key question lies in the existence and quality of the “public involvement; where and when does this occur and in what form? Does deliberation takes place?

The second conclusion relates to the context in which accountability questions arise. Goodin identifies “market accountability” as linked to the management of reputational deficits which I assert is a concern common to most civil society organizations, business associations included. The need for reputation management arises in circumstances related to obtaining funding from the public directly or from public authorities. Business entities engage with the public as consumers and also rely on a market reputation management. But what is the quality of that relationship and how is it measured? Is this the motivation behind the use of accountability mechanisms?

The third conclusion lies in agreement with Bluemel’s (2005) reference to the interplay between the internal and external aspects of accountability mechanisms. Bluemel relates accountability types to the function that the organisation was carrying out which then gives rise to a denomination. Although I

84 believe that the classifications arrived at do not point to any greater emphasis of a procedural stage or of a particular actor, thereby allowing us to further refine a definition of accountability, Bluemel points to a clear advantage in complementing internal controls with externally imposed constraints such as advisory boards. But how “external” must that constraint be and is this a formal basis for public involvement, interaction or consultation?

Deleon also emphasizes the interdependence of internal and external aspects of accountability by stating that the “professional” is individually accountable whilst the profession is publicly accountable. I carry this thinking further by claiming that the adherence of all professionals to internal rules of accountable will realize the sum total of public accountability of that profession. Is there any evidence of tracking of individual behaviour in business associations, professional societies in particular? She refers to codes of conduct as the tool for individual accountability but points to the problem of leniency of experts towards their own kind. I ask whether this might not be overcome by that public element in the process, such as participation in the review panel and note that the question arises only in the context of external assessments and reputation management.

The last conclusion to this part of the chapter is that the notion of a sanction and its enforceability are dealt with by accountability authors in a tentative way. This is partly explained by the voluntary nature of the not for profit sector actors and the risk of bringing about inaction through fear of retribution. I therefore ask whether the sanction element becomes more prevalent for public actors that are not volunteers. I also agree with Koenig Archibugi’s claim that accountability is likely to enhance legitimacy and is “normatively desirable from a more impartial point of view” (2010, p. 1146). These conclusions, however, need to be tried against the case study findings.

Chapter 2.4 has focused on the steps and components, as described by Bovens, of an accountability process for analysis and to identify the outstanding questions to be applied to the observed practice of accountability. Concerning the relationship, the responsiveness of the account holdee to the holder is identified as of importance as well as the measure of independence of the mandatee in the fulfilment of the task. Key questions on the forum centre on its mandate to hear the account and to pass judgment as well as its composition. Is the public element derived from the presence of a “public” representative on a forum panel? This in turn raises the questions related to the public quality of CSOs and their ability to represent the public interest or not, as well as satisfying the correlated expectation of deliberation to emulate a public sphere.

85 The obligation to provide an account is questioned to the extent that the weight of an obligation sits uncomfortably with the voluntary nature of the not for profit sector. Also, there is no mention in literature of the co-related obligation to call to and hear the account on the part of the forum. The frequency, content and format of the account giving itself are referred to, to the extent that it would be either the nature of the act or of the forum which would point to the rules to be followed. Does the account giving follow a prescribed set of rules? Are these generic or specific to the act or the forum, or to another component or actor in the process? What are the consequences of the application of the rules in relation to the expected outcome?

Finally for this section, the important element of sanction or the passing of judgment is discussed. Several vital questions are raised here, not least the origin of the mandate to pass such a judgment on the part of the forum and the potential for a link with the “public interest”. However, the tool used for application of the process such as a code of conduct can also constitute a form of de facto mandate from stakeholders. The nature of the sanction and its severity tend to vary in the literature although I

contend that loss of reputation can be a “consequence” across all CSO types. The enforcement of the sanction is absent from the constitutive components and this would appear to weaken the choice of application of an accountability process. Further research on the existence and forms that judgments might take is required in order to ascertain their severity and impact on the actor and or organization concerned. The origin of the mandate and its scope needs to be identified as well as a means of enforcement. This section closes with the proposed Generic Accountability Model, at Figure 2. that I have derived from the above analyses focusing on the origin of the missing mandates to act and to judge and setting out each step as a separate component in the process.

The next chapter is empirical and deals with three case studies involving four business organizations engaged in the EU policy process in diverse ways. The questions as derived from the above analysis of literature and the generic model will be applied to the units of analysis in order to better qualify accountability contexts and the detail of the application of an accountability procedure. The data will allow for us to better ascertain the role of accountability and its legitimizing potential when practised by transnational actors in the specific circumstances of the EU political and legal structure.

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Chapter 3: ACCOUNTABILITY IN PRACTICE UNDER CONDITIONS OF EU POLICY PARTICIPATION