Figure 5 Matrix for cross analysis of Accountability case studies: causal link between process and outcome?

UNESDA EPACA WFA FINDINGS

 No mandate from public or consumer groups

 Statement of acting in “public interest”

 Pre-consultation with CSOs on presentation of commitment results

 Regular consultation with parents and head teachers, deriving a tacit mandate

 DG SANCO acts as surrogate public ?

 No mandate from public or consumer groups to EPACA to self regulate or hear complaint

 Will to profile public affairs profession

 EPACA management committee mandates PPP to hear complaint

 Self fulfilling mandate via mission and membership

 High visibility of product (advertising) to public, i.e. no need for awareness raising on issues

 DG SANCO acts as surrogate public?

Little evidence of public based motivation in participation

Rationale of context lies in reputation management Element of interaction with CSOs and public on ad hoc consultation within formal process or audit

cto

 UNESDA and its 9 company members, participating in the Forum and representing 80% of market.

 EPACA (for profession)

 Interel (within EPACA hearing)

 The trainee (within Interel)

 WFA and its members Public interest concerned with good professional practice and moderation in consumption of certain products

Professional activities of lobbyists inherently indirectly impact wider public

 Obesity Forum system allows for scrutiny in passive form (via database) as well as active (Forum) meetings to ask questions

 About ½ members of Forum are “not for profit”

 Lack of deliberation amongst and within CSOs and wider debate in media

 Not representative of the public, the PPP is a professional panel

 Meets in private, hears complaint and response in camera

 Is concerned for public opinion

 Alcohol Forum allows for scrutiny in passive form (via database) as well as active (Forum) meetings to ask questions

 CSO walk out was directed at self regulatory approach and not focused on social media case study

 CSO deliberated internally, discussed with alliance partners and engaged media, eliciting more press coverage

EPACA forum was professional and internal although decisions will impact “stakeholders” (since March 2013

Obesity Forum CSOs not contributing to creation of EPS through consultation, deliberation and publicity

Alcohol Forum CSOs created deliberation in press, sought mandate from internal public, initiated discussion amongst CSOs to lead alliance

A cc o u n t gi vi n g

 “obliges” progress on account within fixed time frame via Forum database

 Prescribes format of report and independent auditing (cost)

 Obligation to provide an account in circumstances of a hearing is linked to membership, just as undertaking regular training for all staff and signing of Code

 Code process was closely implemented

 No “obligation” to progress

 Prescribes format of report and independent auditing (cost)

Hence, the efficiency of the monitoring process and the co-related providing of an account, impact directly on the accountability of the outcomes.

C o n seq u e n ce s

 Forum has mandate to hear report but not to pass judgment

 Participants can do so individually, acting in “public interest” (CSOs)

 PPP enjoys mandate from management committee and membership to hear case

 Imposes sanctions, such as membership withdrawal (did not occur)

 Ability to recommend amendments to Code (occurred)

 Individual CSO led small alliance walk out

 Self regulatory approach of advertising and alcohol producers branded, “shamed” in “insider” press as self serving

 WFA continues to support self regulation

 CSO walks out of Forum because it has failed to deliver promised discussion on reducing alcohol relate harm.

No unit was sanctioned in these cases, although alcohol Forum advertising and alcohol producing members were named

Little evidence of enforceability of sanctions More clarity on role and purpose of sanction would lend teeth to process

TYP O LOGY  Stakeholder accountability  Market accountability  Professional accountability  Market accountability  Stakeholder accountability  Stakeholder accountability  Market accountability

 Public accountability (weak)

 Need for CSO active deliberation, greater publicity and means of grass roots consultation

 Improved role allocation in process

185 4.1.5. The study’s initial propositions – verified or not? :

My initial four propositions were presented at Chapter 1.2. and were set up to better guide questions for salient data collection and provide depth to the criteria for analyses. They are an intrinsic part of the evaluation framework and contribute in particular to defining the circumstances in which an

accountability mechanism might be applied to yield an expected outcome. They are presented and discussed in turn below.

 Public accountability mechanisms are desirable in particular given contexts of policy

development dealing with issues of a sensitive nature combined with concerns of reputation management in a highly competitive interest representation environment.

The initial search for case study units of analysis demonstrated the narrow remit of the scope of research in particular combining the condition of EU policy participation with an external process. The second difficulty lay in the mapping of the process and it’s satisfying of the criteria related to the inclusion of a public vocation. The number of potential associations was therefore limited by the criteria and quickly revealed specific circumstances. These are related to the sensitive nature of the industries examined and their potential to harm. A heightened sensitivity comes in play when children or young adults are involved such as for UNESDA and WFA. EPACA deals with the reputation management of the lobbying industry, which suffers from a poor reputation. The context of these analyses is the influencing of policy outcomes where the respective industries are confronted with a non-governmental sector that

specializes in limiting the spread of the business. An observer would deplore the geographical limitation of the debate to the Brussels bubble since the topics addressed engage on a much wider scale and would benefit from a greater balance as regards science over political positioning. The European Commission set up the respective Forums on issues that deserved wider consultation and which polarized the populations. These are also sectors in which regulation is undesirable for several practical reasons such as the lack of a chain of responsible actors that are easily identifiable by law, or an activity where there is too great a number of potential rule contraveners. Regulation might also be undesirable due to a prohibitive tracking cost or delays caused in bringing the case through a classical justice system, such as with advertising. The measures, however, undertaken by the respective business associations lie beyond legal compliance, and thus demonstrate a will on the part of the private sector to meet expectations of policy makers and stakeholders within well defined limits.

186

 All business organizations that comply with public accountability arrangements boast internal governance structures which allow for accountability mechanisms to be applied.

This proposition is taken up in the literature and apparent in the case studies, as commented. My initial assertion rested on a practical consideration in that external accountability with the requirements in the account giving to describe steps and demonstrate progress, would require administrative tracking and annotation at each stage. This tracking itself would rest on an internal accountability procedure dealing with record keeping and providing evidence of tasks accomplished. The governance structure of each organisation would, at the least, need to allow for such an internal system. This is more evident for WFA and EPACA than for UNESDA.

The WFA internal accountability system is at the core of the association’s existence; its members all operate under the self regulatory code of practice. The rules and implementation of the internal system are transparent, it provides for tracking and is set in a procedure that operates EU wide. Its applicability is however questioned by NGOs in the framework of the public accountability system. This last

questioning potentially undermines the principles on which the system rests.

The EPACA case study remains focused on the internal system embodied in the Code of Conduct of the association. The professional accountability type lacks somewhat the causal link with the public although the amendments to the Code can be construed as demonstrating a will to widen liability, a result of accountability.

The sanction mechanism discussed when analyzing the UNESDA case study was described as the potential for naming and shaming in the Forum remit. I analyzed the founding documents of the association and queried as to the internal tracking system on which the commitment lay. The secretary general referred to internal discussions having occurred when a member appeared to fail to reach the targets set out by commitment and this led to a resolution of the problem, it seems, with no formal procedure followed. This approach might be the co-relation of the fact that the main activity of the organization is the inputting to the obesity Forum itself.

 Business organizations have had little call for developing processes of public accountability and have been reluctant to assert a public role that might impact market stability.

187 And,

 Existing accountability mechanisms in business associations engaged in EU policy participation were historically not widely promoted towards the EU public.

What is the motivation for the private commercial sector to engage in exercises that render a business association publicly accountable? Business organizations are notoriously wary of torts cases (where a plaintiff might demand damages) and therefore limit their liability through contractual clauses which come into effect upon purchase. Any closer link with the public might be seen as increasing the

likelihood of liability and therefore adversely affecting market stability. The situation changes however when reputation management is required. Furthermore, the respective DG SANCO Forums and the EPACA web site are relatively safe environments from which to engage in accountability processes. The absence of main stream media from the Member States and leadership by the services of the

Commission who choose not to communicate the work of the Forums on their front page ensure that the potential wider coverage is limited.

The result of the above situation, coupled with the Brussels centric remit of this assessment lead to the fact that business associations have not been widely promoted to the EU public. The increased use of internet however and new social media as a vehicle to discuss societal concerns and emit citizen

opinions could greatly impact this state of affairs. There is likely to be greater involvement of grass roots activity in the future where missing links and knowledge gaps will be filled, including better research about how organizations function and profile themselves. Add to this the new procedural rules of the Lisbon Treaty which reduce the duration of the decision making procedures and increase the need for lobby alliances and coalitions earlier in the process. These coalitions might give rise to the new and unto now rather incongruous matching of business and NGOs claiming a public interest. The public

accountability of that coalition and the professional accountability of duly mandated actors will become of heightened importance.

4.2. Final conclusions:

This final section of the thesis summarises the conclusions of the case studies and reflects upon the adequacy of the theory as presented in Chapter 2. These reflections lead to the proposal of means of improvement to the structure and the method of application of the accountability framework.

In document The public accountability of business associations under conditions of EU policy participation. (Page 197-200)