Conclusion: Towards a Comprehensive Power-Sharing Based Model of Multilevel

Du Toit infers that the meaningfulness of using bargaining theories in explaining interethnic relations has been pointed out before.²⁵³ He posits that a basic challenge with the attempts to combine both theories is that the previous approaches viewed “bargaining theory and consociational theory as contrasting rather than complementary perspectives.”²⁵⁴ Following up on du Toit, I hypothesize that these two theoretical perspectives can be integrated into a coherent, meaningful way. The conceptual link, according to du Toit, lies in the nature of the executive power-sharing (i.e., grand coalitions) in deeply divided societies. Thus, the elites who represent the interests of different segments, and might be essentially incompatible with those of other segments, participate in a coalition in the hope of settling these conflicts of interest, but at the same time, being segmental leaders, they hope to achieve a settlement most favorable to their supporters. The extent of the concessions every coalition member will have to make in order to reach common ground is dependent upon the concessions every other participant is prepared to make. This is what Young describes as “strategic behavior.” According to Young:

“strategic behavior is the behavior of any individual member of a group involving a choice of action contingent upon that individual’s estimates of the actions (or choices) of others in the group, where the actions of each of the relevant others are based upon a similar estimate of the behavior of group members other than himself.”²⁵⁵

A bargaining party’s alternatives depend upon whether it can obtain similar or substitutable resources from other relationships. Commitment is determined by the importance of the outcome and/or issue about which the conflict arose in the first place. From this perspective the

252 Biswas, B. (2006). The Challenges of Conflict Management: A Case Study of Sri Lanka. Civil Wars, 8(1), pp.

63-65.

253 Covell, M. (1981). Ethnic Conflict and Elite Bargaining: The Case of Belgium. West European Politics, 4, pp.

197-218; and Covell, M. (1982). Agreeing to Disagree: Elite Bargaining and the Revision of the Belgian Constitution. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 15, pp. 451-469.

254 Young, O.R. (1975). Strategic Interaction and Bargaining. In Oran R. Young (ed.) Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation. Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 5-6; Cf. Du Toit, P. (1991). Bargaining power:

dependence capabilities and tactical options in South African politics. Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies, 18(2), pp. 74-90; see also Du Toit, P. (1989). Bargaining about Bargaining. Inducing the Self-Negating Prediction in Deeply Divided Societies-The Case of South Africa. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(2), pp. 210-230.

255 Ibid, p. 5.

following propositions emerge. (2) “A party’s bargaining power should be greater, the lower the opponent’s alternatives and the higher the commitment of the opponent to the outcomes at issue in the relationship.”²⁵⁶

The fundamental assumption is that bargaining as a means of conflict settlement can be initiated once all those contestants involved in a conflict acknowledge that none of them can emerge from the conflict as an outright winner who has conceded nothing and gained everything at the expense of his opponents. This is the crucial threshold which has to be crossed before bargaining about the substantive issues in a conflict can proceed.²⁵⁷

According to du Toit, “bargaining about bargaining” is the first and most important stage om the process of consociational power-sharing conflict settlement.²⁵⁸

Power sharing and consensus politics do not have to be justified only by the negative consequences of their alternative (that is, group domination, internal strife, and civil war), but on a more positive basis as well.

Consociational engineering, aimed at achieving the elusive goal of elite cooperation, should not just concentrate on drawing up constitutional coalitions, mutual vetoes, proportionality, and segmental autonomy, but should also adopt a wider perspective and concentrate on institutional mechanisms which create, maintain, and reinforce mutual dependence between societal groups.²⁵⁹

This chapter set the analytical framework of my thesis, by discussing both negotiation and (consociational) power-sharing (both liberal and corporate) theory. It analyses and explains what is ‘power sharing’, how does it work and not work sometimes, and whether favourable conditions to achieving as well as maintaining power sharing system matter. With regard to negotiation, it started with analysis of two principles of negotiation process - positional and principled negotiations. The chapter looked at how one comes to the negotiation table and, eventually, to an agreement based on power-sharing institutional arrangements. It deconstructed the process of negotiation by showing how to ‘negotiate negotiation’ and what the conflicting groups have to give up in order to be able to negotiate and reach a durable solution. It started from the premises of the ‘principled’ negotiation, which state that one can negotiate anything as long as the principles are followed, and critically examines their validity in a non-western, post-conflict, transitional setting. The chapter also showed why the parties should be interested in negotiating an ‘amicable solution’ in the first place, what are the

256 Ibid., p. 180.; see also the concept of BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement).

257 See the concept of MHS (Mutually Hurting Stalemate).

258 Du Toit, P. (1987). Consociational Democracy and Bargaining Power. Comparative Politics, 19 (4), p. 423.

259 Idem, p. 426.

incentives, who negotiates (regimes, rebels, etc.) and what are the parties prepared or willing to give up in order to reach an agreement. In the following chapter, the reader will be presented with a comprehensive narrative of my case studies, my hypotheses will be tested and the dependent variables for each case study measured.

III. Case Studies: Conflict Stages, Negotiation Process, Assessment and