The Structure of the Thesis

The thesis seeks to explain how and why power-sharing arrangements come into being, succeed or fail their purpose by combining negotiation theory with consociational power-sharing theory.

Additionally, by marrying the theories and based on the lessons learnt from the case studies, it analyses and proposes strategies to negotiate what seems non-negotiable and irrational. The thesis contributes to the existing research on conflict resolution and explains how traditional and modern approaches lead to innovative solutions, e.g. public policy, whereas the innovative solutions thus emerging lead to legitimacy, stability, robustness and efficacy of a power-sharing system. The thesis compares case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to the selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram), and Sri Lanka (Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis focuses on the case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia).

The thesis builds its own model of negotiating conflict in deeply divided societies; by combining and extending the neo-institutional dynamic model (Mitra 1999, 2005, 2018), Faure and Rubin’s model of structure and agency in negotiating cultural conflicts (1993) and the methods of levels-of-analysis approach (Cordell and Wolff 2014). The thesis fine-tunes its model of “multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation,” and claims its validity and applicability both in western as well as non-western contexts. The thesis consists of six chapters, besides a general Introduction.

Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the general theme of ethnic conflict and negotiation in post-conflict societies. Besides the research questions and hypothesis, it includes subchapters on definitions, terminology, methodology and the structure if the thesis. It first explains why the

92 Basedau, M. and Kellner, P. (2007). Area Studies, Comparative Area Studies, and the Study of Politics: Context, Substance, and Methodological Challenges. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, 1, pp. 110-111.

93 Bunce, V. (2000). Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations. Comparative Political Studies, 33(6-7), pp. 703-734.

selected case studies are compared, whether the size matters, and how one can generalize from these findings. Moreover, given the fact that the case studies are selected from both post-colonial and post-communist contexts, the chapter seeks to explain whether it is the same by looking at similar characteristics such as post-conflict, post-traumatic and transitional societies.

While being aware of deterministic-causal predictions, which could be disconfirmed by a single

“critical” case, the case studies are probabilistic, theory-confirming and theory-informing.

However, the case studies are picked in accordance with the hypothesis and not systematically and their number is inherently limited. Thus, the thesis analyses deeply divided societies.

Chapter 2 sets the analytical framework of the thesis. It undertakes a critical review of the existing body of literature on negotiation and (consociational) power-sharing (both liberal and corporate) theories. It analyses and explains what is ‘power-sharing’, how does it work and not work sometimes, and whether favorable conditions to achieving as well as maintaining power-sharing system matter. With regard to negotiation, it starts with analysis of two principles of negotiation process - positional and principled negotiations. The chapter looks at how one comes to the negotiation table and, eventually, to an agreement based on power-sharing institutional arrangements. It deconstructs the process of negotiation by showing how to

‘negotiate negotiation’ and what the conflicting groups have to give up in order to be able to negotiate and reach a durable solution. It starts from the premises of the ‘principled’ negotiation, which state that one can negotiate anything as long as the principles are followed, and critically examines their validity in a non-western, post-conflict, transitional setting. The chapter also shows why the parties should be interested in negotiating an ‘amicable solution’ in the first place, what are the incentives, who negotiates (regimes, rebels, etc.) and what are the parties prepared or willing to give up in order to reach an agreement. Moreover, additional concepts relevant to the analysis of the case studies, such as BATNA, asymmetry, mediation, mutually hurting stalemate, ripeness and prisoner’s dilemma, are discussed and thoroughly analyzed. The concluding part of the subchapter analyses whether principled negotiation is adequate in negotiating identity-based conflicts. The last subchapter merges negotiation theories and power sharing into a theory of ethnic conflict management in deeply divided societies.⁹⁴ It states that a durable settlement of an ethnic conflict can be reached through a “multilevel ‘principled’

negotiation”, whereas the durability and legitimacy of solutions depend on finding an appropriate formula made of identities and institutions for handling ethnic relations - a comprehensive consociational power sharing system.

94 Cf. McCulloch and McGarry, 2017, pp. 405-424.

Chapter 3 analyses the case studies from South Asia and Eastern Europe. With regard to the selected case studies from South Asia, these are India (Punjab and Mizoram), and Sri Lanka (Sinhala – Tamil, Sinhala - Tamil - Muslim), whereas in the case of Eastern Europe, the thesis focuses on the case studies from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova (Transnistria and Gagauzia). In case of the Eastern European states, various degrees of involvement of international actors have taken place. I analyze the (re)action and support of domestic actors in terms of efficacy and legitimacy of and involvement with central state institutions, perceived as de facto or de jure protectorates of the external powers. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Moldova constitute a part of a broader regional phenomenon such as transition from authoritarian to democratic systems, subsequent inclusion of minority demands, as well as both experience with different intensities of violence based on ethnic/cultural conflict and international actors’ intervention and mediation. The knowledge gained from the European cases viewed as instances of complex consociational power-sharing serves as a viable tool and sheds a new light on mitigation and management of such seemingly intractable and protracted conflicts as Kashmir and Sri Lanka. The analyses of each case study follows the levels-of-analysis approach and analytic narrative methods. Thus, each ‘story’ has a ‘prelude’ explaining how and why did the conflicts emerge and escalate as well as how these were settled (in terms of structure, agency and process).

The dependent variable ‘power-sharing’ is measured through a ‘power-sharing index’ (PSI), which includes the following factors, which serve as explanatory and/or independent variables:

(1) group representation; (2) proportionality; (3) separation of powers; (4) qualified majority for constitutional amendments; (5) inclusiveness of cabinets; (6) minority government; (7) functional veto players (8) veto power for political parties/groups; (9) segmental autonomy (including both symmetric and asymmetric autonomy); (10) federalism.⁹⁵ These are quantified in a scale going from zero to nine, with an additional point for each factor. For the second dependent variable “durable peace”, which a conflict settlement should lead to, the data from Polity IV and v-dem used. The logic and empirical accuracy of the coding is done transparently in order to be easily verified. The dependent variable “’principled’ negotiation” is measured through its four constitutive characteristics (people, interests, options, criteria), which are quantified by 1 (applicable) or 0 (non-applicable). Chapter 4 consists of conclusions and lessons drawn from the case studies, it revisits the theoretical framework and the hypothesis, and evaluates the proposed model of “multilevel ‘principled’ negotiation” across the cases. Chapter

95 Linder & Bächtiger, 2005; Cf. Bogaards, M. (2014). Democracy and Social Peace in Divided Societies.

Exploring Consociational Parties. Palgrave Macmillan.

5 spells out the contribution to the theories of conflict resolution, negotiation and power-sharing, whereas Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, comprises policy recommendations based on theoretical and empirical findings of the Thesis.