Our model for constructive engagement attempted to define constructive engagement as well as applied neo-liberal approaches to conceptualizing it within general IR theory. We established that unlike appeasement, constructive engagement should be perceived as a strategy to bring about meaningful change in a state’s behaviour without the use of force. It is also usually associated with an effort of “reintegrating” ostracized states back into the international community. The latest example for this perception in international relations literature and amongst policymakers alike, is Chris Patten’s speech in Tehran during the Comprehensive Dialogue entitled “The Iranian Choice – An Opportunity to Embrace the Family of Nations”, during which he emphasised that human rights are universal and reminded the Iranian government that “no nation state, however mighty, is sufficient unto itself. Cooperation with our partners – cooperation between the EU and Iran – is a requirement, not an ideal.” 177 Reiterating that such cooperation was conditional on human rights improvements, Patten’s vision was one of which:
I am convinced that there is a vital role that Iran, if it really wants to, can play on this international stage, among the Family of Nations. You may seize that role tomorrow, or in twenty years from now – the choice lies with you. Rome was not built in one day, nor was a democratic Europe or even the European Union created overnight. But the challenge – the imperative of working with others is one that every modern society has to face.178
In this light, constructive engagement was perceived as a peaceful policy, in which the sender attempts to extract political concessions or demand political or economic reform from the target without the use of force. Ultimately, this refers to a causation in which the sender attempts to dominate the target’s political agenda. That the latter is being co-opted to such extent that it aligns its preferences along that of the sender. This ability of shaping the preferences of others is what Dahl referred to as implicit 177
Chris Patten, “The Iranian Choice – An Opportunity to Embrace the Family of Nations” in The Iranian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. XV, No.1&2, (Spring-Summer, 2003), p. 129
influence and Nye as soft power. Whilst recognizing soft power as a fundamental aspect of constructive engagement, it was asserted that hard power in the form of sanctions (i.e. carrots and sticks) still forms part of the dynamics of constructive engagement. Therefore, during constructive engagement, it was argued, that hard and soft power assets manifest themselves on two levels. The former constitutes the short- term inducement, the latter the long-term mechanism to get the target to permanently align itself to sender’s political agenda. Thus, it was asserted that the use of positive (as well as negative sanctions) provides policymakers with tools to extract respective concessions from the target state. We also recognised that respective asymmetries in political and economic interdependence are vital for our understanding on sources of power and influence. Given the changing nature of interdependence in international relations, it was established that such asymmetries are potential source of power for both sides of the relationship. As such, it was argued that either side has the potential to influence the actions of the other. Therefore, we were careful not to exclusively relying on Hirschman’s findings on the power of manipulating the terms of trade in an asymmetrical interdependent relationship. Rather, we followed Wagner’s conclusion, that asymmetrical interdependence can only be a source of power in a bargaining situation when the less dependent actor chooses not to exploit certain asymmetries. Instead, the more powerful actor can offer incentives, thus indicating that it could afford to change the terms in the existing relationship.
This issue of interdependence eventually led to a structural explanation of cooperation under anarchic conditions in which approaches explaining the formation of regimes were used to explain (a) the short-term mechanism for cooperation and / or rapprochement and (b) the long-term mechanism to control the target state’s behaviour. Theories explaining the formations of international regimes have, thus, been identified as providing functional explanations of international cooperation and also helped to understand that an institutionalised coordination of preferences, rules
and principles during regime formation 179 may achieve cooperation under anarchy. Game theory, based on the iterated PD approaches to international relations, can provide the principal tool for analysing and explaining this cooperation. Axelrod’s TFT strategy has shown that a cycle of reciprocity, that is a situation in which the attempt of cooperation of one egoistic actor influences the decision for cooperation of another egoistic actor. Whilst such structural explanations were helpful at identifying patterns of cooperation and how positive sanctions can be used to initiate a cycle of positive reciprocity, the agent-level was considered equally important. Putnam’s two- level game was seen as vital as it explains how involuntary defection or cooperation during international negotiation can merely be seen as a reflection of the domestic environment.
Overall, constructive engagement was approached as a deliberate non-coercive policy of any given state to demand changes in the behaviour (domestic or international or both) of another state. Since the focus was on statecraft and power and the ability to sway, the model almost solely relied on neo-liberal accounts on achieving cooperation under anarchy. By and large, soft power, i.e. the ability to make others believe what you believe or co-opt rather than coerce was seen as the ultimate goal of constructive engagement. Since the focus will be on human rights diplomacy, Chapter Three will build on this idea and show that constructive engagement, far from being seen as cultural imperialism, constitutes a means to establish a universal normative consensus.
179
Since 2000, the Commission of the EU offers Iran to enter a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU which is subject to political and economic changes in Iran (particularly improvements in human rights) and which gives Iran most favoured nation status.
CHAPTER TWO
CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT - PUTTING THEORY INTO DIPLOMATIC REALITY
1. Introduction
In foreign policy analysis literature, the reference to diplomacy is often seen as synonymous with negotiation in international relations or sometimes even used interchangeably with international relations itself. Whilst negotiation is a central task of diplomacy, uses of the term diplomacy in such general ways, however, do not give justice to both the profession as such and the meaning it has in the context of international cooperation. Accepting the common definition of diplomacy as the “management of international relations by negotiations” 180, this study also identifies diplomacy as the profession of persuasion and diplomats as statecraft ´s visible practitioners which, as peaceful heralds of state power, implement respective foreign policies towards other states. 181Turning to Harold Nicholson for a definition we find a characterisation of the ideal diplomatic practitioner:
Diplomacy […] in its essence is common sense and charity applied to International Relations; [it is the] application of intelligence and tact to relations between governments […] The worst kind of diplomatists are missionaries, fanatics, and lawyers; the best kind are reasonable and humane sceptics. The art of negotiation is essentially a mercantile art. The foundation of good diplomacy is the same as the foundation of good business – namely credit, confidence, consideration and compromise. 182
The essentials of Martin Wight’s conception of what constitutes diplomacy, which is particularly important within the context of constructive engagement, are summarized in the following set of fundamental moral principles:
Honesty or truthfulness: don’t tell lies or break promises, it does not pay and brings its own retribution; establish a reputation for straight dealing.
180C.T.Onions (ed.) The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford, Claredon Press, 1976), p. 270 181Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. Arts of Power – Statecraft and Diplomacy, p. 4 While this may appear obvious to
the reader, the intention behind this emphasis is to stress the significance to accept the study of diplomacy as an important segment in the field of foreign policy analysis.
Moderation and restraint: keeping a sense of proportion […] requires the absence of assertiveness of national (and personal) egotism, and a readiness to make concessions, to give way on unessentials.
Courtesy: seeking not diplomatic victories, triumphs or successes, all of which imply a defeated antagonism, but agreements, which suggests common achievement; or perhaps seeking victories which come without being noticed. The art of diplomacy is that which gets its own way, but leaves the other side reasonably satisfied.
Respect for the other side: thinking the best of people […] trying to share their point of view, understand their interests […]183
While liberal institutional approaches explain how cooperation among states evolves through the use of positive sanctions, reciprocity and coordination of interests and preferences, literature on diplomatic practices actually helps to formulate a practical model for constructive engagement. A model which surely derives its explanatory power from liberal institutionalism, but, which on a more detailed and pragmatic level eventually conceptualises the ideas, techniques and practices of constructive engagement.