It has been shown that diplomatic reality of constructive engagement can largely draw on conflict resolution theory. Negotiation, in particular, a core function of diplomacy, has been identified as the main pillar of constructive engagement. It has been shown that the exchange of information between conflict parties of how to reach a win-win outcome has the potential to achieve harmony as Keohane sees it. Since the point of constructive engagement is to change the behaviour of the target state in a peaceful way, the function of diplomacy is fundamental. By the same token, however, a commitment to non-coercive measures and a tactic of negotiation in an interdependent relationship is susceptible to changing realities of power between State A and State B. Given this condition it is possible to propose following hypotheses and variables:
A. Most fundamentally, states are recognized as rational egoists, which can resolve conflict through a policy of “constructive engagement”. Constructive engagement is recognized as a policy, which is best suited at resolving conflict between states as well as for bringing so called “rogue” or “outlaw” states to conform to what are held by the great powers to be legitimate international norms; in this case human rights.
1. Conditionality in the form of “cooperative moves” (referring to economic incentives or political support) are used to initiative a “positive cycle of
247ibid, p. 191 248
A traditional device regularly employed by negotiators in order to keep up the momentum of their negotiations is to employ deadlines, that is, calendar dates by which either some partial, interim, or final agreement must be reached. seeG. R. Berridge, Diplomacy – Theory and Practice, p. 58
reciprocity”, commonly referred to in political science literature as TIT FOR TATT (TFT). In diplomatic reality, TFT implies the exchange of information and the search for alternative solutions to the problem. Both parties shift from respective positions to focus on common interests.
2. TFT results in harmony, as defined by Keohane, and both parties agree to a “win-win” outcome. Rewards are exchanged for political concessions, which in this case refers to improvements in human rights (resolution of thefatwa.)
B. Asymmetries in an interdependent relationship, which can refer to perceived or objective political or economic leverages, are sources of power.
1. State B’s vulnerability to state A being capable of making changes in their relationship, makes A more powerful than B. Thus, A is able to transform this leverage into “cooperative moves” which influence B’s actions or decisions. 2. State B reciprocates A’s “cooperative moves” and TFT follows, which results
in B meeting A’s demands.249
C. Shifts or fluctuations in an interdependent relationship affect power relations and ultimately affects A’s ability to sway B.
1. A’s perceived or objectivesensitivityto any changes in the relationship allows B to defect or even influence A’s actions or decisions. A’s perceived or objective vulnerability to changes in the relationship impedes any of A’s efforts to influence B.
2. State A may be unable or restricted in its ability to sway or influence B. On the contrary B may be in the position to influence A’s decisions or actions.
249Ceteris paribus.“Uncooperative moves” will be punished and reciprocated with “uncooperative
D. All negotiations and efforts to influence are subject to respective domestic constituents. Thus, any successful Level I negotiation or even the attempt to initiative dialogue requires domestic consent.
1. a) Level II (domestic) “win-sets” are supported by “internationalist forces”, but because the “isolationist” camp enjoys more influence on the domestic front, it is able to constrain or jeopardize efforts by the “internationalists.” The more coercive “Level I diplomacy” on the part of A, the more constraints will be imposed on “internationalists”, thus empowering “isolationists.”
b) State B may be forced to defect from A’s “cooperative moves” on Level I negotiations. Involuntary defection obstructs any of A and B’s efforts to come to an agreement or even engage in negotiations.
2. a) Because “internationalists” have more influence over the “isolationists”, all domestic camps support the “win-set.” A policy of constructive engagement is more likely to empower “internationalist” forces by pursuing a non-coercive diplomacy, thus making it harder for “isolationists” to jeopardize their efforts. b) State B can reciprocate A’s efforts at dialogue, which will end in successful negotiations reaching a “win-win” outcome.250
Hypothesis Independent Variable Dependent Variable A.States are rational egoists and can resolve
conflict through a policy of “constructive engagement”. It is a policy of “constructive engagement” which is best suited at promoting human rights.
Inducements or “cooperative moves” (referring to economic incentives or political support) are used to initiative a “ positive cycle of
reciprocity” commonly referred to as Tit For Tat (TFT).
TFT results in harmony (as defined by Keohane) and both parties agree to a “win-win” outcome.
Rewards are exchanged for political
concessions (i.e. improvements in human rights) B.Asymmetries in an interdependent relationship
(both political and economic) are sources of power.
State B’svulnerabilityto state A being capable of making changes in their relationship, makes A more powerful than B. This allows A to initiative “cooperative moves”, which influence B’s actions or decisions.
State B reciprocates A’s “cooperative moves” TFT follows. B meets A’s demands.1
C.Shifts or fluctuations in interdependent relations affect power relations and ultimately affects A’s ability to sway B.
State A’s perceived or objectivesensitivityto changes in the relationship allows B to defect or even influence A’s actions or decisions. A’s perceived or objectivevulnerabilityto changes in the relationship completely impedes any of A’s efforts to influence B.
State A is unable or restricted to sway or influence B. On the contrary, state B may be in the position to influence A’s decisions or actions.
D.Level I negotiations are subject to respective domestic constituents. Any successful Level I negotiation requires domestic consent.
a)Level II (domestic) “win-sets” are supported by “internationalist forces”, but are constrained by the “isolationist” camp. The latter enjoys more influence over the former. The more coercive “Level I diplomacy” on the part of A, the more constraints will be imposed on “internationalists”, thus empowering “isolationists.”
State B is forced to defect from A’s “cooperative moves” on Level I negotiations. These
involuntary defection obstruct A and B’s efforts to come to an agreement.
b)All domestic camps support Level II “win- sets”. “Internationalists” enjoy more influence over “isolationists.” A policy of constructive engagement is more likely to empower “internationalists”, thus making it harder for isolationists to wreck negotiations.
State B can successfully negotiate with A on Level I and agrees to a “win-win” outcome.2
1
Ceteris paribus. “Uncooperative moves” will be punished and reciprocated with “uncooperative moves” resulting in a “negative cycle of reciprocity.”
2
Ceteris paribus. All Level II constraints apply equally to state A.
CHAPTER THREE
THE HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE, HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY AND CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAN
1. Introduction: The Concept of Human Rights
Before elaborating on the interaction between Britain and Iran, the research specific focus on the human rights aspect of constructive engagement demands that we explore more closely the concept of human rights as well its relation to foreign policy.
Human rights are literally, the rights that one has simply because one is a human being 251
, they are equally enjoyed by everyone, are inalienable and universal. However, they are not merely abstract values such as liberty, equality, and security. Rather they are considered rights, particularly, social practices to realize those values. Traditionally, human rights have been thought of as moral rights of the highest order, but have also become international (and in some cases national and regional) legal rights, making the object of human rights an ordinary legal right in most national legal systems. 252Human rights are needed not for life but for a life of dignity. Thus, theories and documents on human rights point beyond actual conditions of existence – beyond the “real” in the sense of what has already been realized – to the possible, which is viewed as a deeper human moral reality. In this light of reasoning, they are less about the way people “are” than about what they might become. Essentially, they are about moral rather than natural or juridical right holders. 253Promoting human rights at home or abroad means demanding the social changes required to realize the underlying vision of human nature. Human rights are both a utopian ideal and a realistic practice for implementing that ideal. 254As Donnelly puts it:
Human rights seek to fuse moral vision and political practice. The relationship between human nature, human rights, and political society is “dialectical”. Human rights shape political society, so
251seeUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly Resolution
217 A (III) of 10 December 1948
252Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press,
2003) p. 11
253ibid, p. 15 254ibid, p. 15
as to shape human beings, so as to realize the possibilities of human nature, which provided the basis for the rights in the first place.255
Historical notions and foundational appeals, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, were attempts to converge theory and practice and produced an impressive body of texts appealing to the inherent dignity of the human person. Ultimately, the Universal Declaration Of Human Rights of 1948 codified the idea of human rights. Early statements in the Universal Declaration concentrated on First Generation rights, such as freedom of speech and assembly and the right to take part in the government of his (sic) country, directly or through freely chosen representatives (Art. 21). 256 The same declaration also recognized Second Generation rights and states that “economic, social, and cultural rights are indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.” (Art.22). The right bearer in both First and Second Generation rights are, in essence, individuals. Third Generation rights build on a collective dimension and concerns the rights of “peoples” and grants them to freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources. (The African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981, Art. 21 (1))257According to Donnelly , this International Human Rights regime treats internationally recognized human rights holistically, as an indivisible structure in which the value of each right is significantly interrelated. As Art. 5 of the 1993 Vienna Declaration puts it: “All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated.” 258 Just as human rights are both negative rights, in as they require forbearance on the part of others, as well as positive rights, in as they require others to provide goods, services or opportunities, 259 so ought states uphold them at home and promote them abroad. Obviously, this raises foreign policy issues, notably whether it is either practicable or prudent to make compliance with human rights law a touchstone of one’s foreign relations.260
255ipid, pp. 15-16
256John Baylis and Steve Smith, The Globalization of World Politics, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2001) p. 600
257ibid, p.600 258
Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, p.27
259ibid, p. 30
There seems to be an inescapable tension between human rights of individuals and state sovereignty. As Vincent argues: “Their constituents are different. The society of all humankind opposed to the club of states, and one of the primary rules of the latter has been to deny membership to the former.”261Nonetheless, since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, human rights have become a significant part of foreign policy, thus challenging the principle of state sovereignty and gradually eroding the sanctity of the boundaries of domestic jurisdiction. In fact, numerous international agreements and conventions on human rights, initiated a process by which the assumed sovereignty of the territorial state has given way to shared authority and power between the state and international organizations and the promotion and protection of human rights across borders has inevitably becomeius cogensbetween states.262Authoritative texts on human rights, such as most notably the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 263 established both legally binding global human rights regimes with treaty-reporting and monitoring mechanisms through the UN, as well as a legitimate duty for governments to incorporate human rights in their foreign policy considerations. Hence, according to the conventions of positivist international law, by their explicit agreements and by custom and practice, foreign offices are essentially bound to pay attention to human rights. 264 According to Hill, in the international political system it is not enough to announce a new principle; it 261R.J. Vincent, Universal Human Rights and International Relations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 2001), p.129
262Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, Roger A. Coate, The United Nations and Changing World Politics
(Oxford, Westview Press, 2001), p. 141
263seeInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification
and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966,entry into force23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966entry into force3 January 1976, in accordance with article 27;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965,entry into force4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979,entry into force3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1); Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984,entry into force26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1); Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49
has to become internalized and achieve a consensus before it will appear in actions. That happens dialectically through the slow process of interaction between governments, some keener than others, and private groups.”265
The international law of human rights actually provides a legal duty for governments to show concern for human rights violations in other countries.
The concept of implementing moral concerns in foreign policy predates contemporary declarations and covenants. There are several normative traditions, which support the concept of human rights. Particularly Kant and Locke’s treatises on rights represent arguably the most authoritative accounts that present us with a defence of inalienable natural rights.
Similar to civil or political rights, Kant’s international rights of nations conceived within the legal framework of a federation of states are based upon shared laws to which each member state is subject. According to Kant, the nature of international rights
[...] involves not only the relationship between one state and another [state] within a larger whole, but also the relationship between individual persons in one state and individuals in the other [state]or between such individuals and the other state as a whole.266
Kant’s categorical imperative ultimately demands that states ought to conduct “foreign affairs” as if they were moral persons since “on the cosmopolitan level… whatever reason shows to be valid in theory is also valid in practice.” 267 Hence, the underlying nature of republican constitutionalism and the federal contract between states, ultimately implies that “ a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere, the idea of a cosmopolitan rights is therefore not fantastic and overestimated; it is a necessary complement to the unwritten code of political and international right, transforming it into a universal right of humanity. “268 As far as the contemporary human rights discourse is
265Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy, (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p.
179
266Immanuel Kant, H. S. Reiss (ed.) Kant: Political Writings (Cambridge, Cambridge University, 1991), p.
165
267ibid, p. 92 268ibid, pp. 107-108
concerned, Kant’s ethical absolutism and his rigorous insistence on an egalitarian state of international relations with inherent moral precepts and formal principles for states to observe would be expressed in terms of today’s idea of human rights diplomacy. Since Kant’s concept of human rights as well as today’s notion of human rights are both grounded on the same principle of morality and the duty to defend those rights, 269 diplomats charged with the promotion and protection of human rights essentially aim to realize this vision of human beings as equal and autonomous individuals living in states that treat citizens with equal concern and respect. Human rights diplomacy then promotes principles that are widely accepted as authoritative within the society of states. Efforts to protect human rights emphasize individual liberty and state restraint, thus safeguarding individuals from arbitrary rule. In line with contractarians, such as Locke and Kant two principal dimensions of the human rights strategy of control over the state can be identified:
1. Negatively, it prohibits a wide range of state interference in the personal, social and political lives of citizens, acting both individually and collectively
2. Positively, human rights place the people above and in positive control of their government. Thus, political authority is vested in a free citizenry endowed with extensive rights of political participation (i.e. rights to vote, freedom of association, free speech, freedom of religion etc.)270
In the “Second Treatise” Locke argues that “voluntary union” of men “gives […] political power to governors for the benefit of their subjects.” Accordingly, a legitimate civil government is instituted by the explicit consent of those governed. Those who make this agreement transfer to the civil government their right of executing the law of nature and judging their own case. Essentially, each individual cedes his or her right to this authority to protect his or her right from being abused.271
269seeKant’s principle of obligation, Marcus G. Singer, “The Categorical Imperative”, The Philosophical
Review, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Oct. 1954), p. 882
270Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights – in Theory and Practice, p. 35 271
Patrick Riley, “Locke on “Voluntary Agreement” and Political Power, The Western Political Quarterly, Vol.29, No.1 (March, 1976), p. 137;see alsoRuth Grant, John Locke's Liberalism, (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 133-117
Kant’s debt to Lockean contractarianism is particularly evident in Rechtslehre, in which he argues that “the legitimate [or sovereign] authority can be attributed only to the united