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Conclusion

In document 2019_Field.pdf (Page 89-93)

The “Chinese Dream” is the vision of a powerful military, one which under the

leadership of the CCP, can rejuvenate the Chinese nation by reclaiming territory lost to foreign powers during “the Century of Humiliation” and by the collapse of China’s imperial tributary state system. More specifically, the “Chinese Dream” seeks to mobilize the Chinese people in support of the PLAN’s actions in the South China Sea and normalize its expansionist activities as being within China’s indisputable sovereign territorial rights. Under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s administration, the preexisting foundation of external-oriented Chinese nationalism, cultivated through decades of “patriotic education,” has been reinforced through coordinated nationalism campaigns and shifted into its expansionist form. Since Xi Jinping assumed power, China’s legislature has approved the addition of nationalistic anniversaries and holidays, increased the numbers of “national heroes” and “martyrs,” and limited the legal paths of dissent and de-

escalation. The new holidays serve to institutionalize anti-Japanese and anti-Western sentiments, promote Chinese nationalism, and ensure loyalty to the Party by celebrating the CCP’s role in halting any future national “humiliations” and defeating Imperial Japan. These national observances are designed to encourage nationalistic feelings and celebrate all those who died resisting foreign invaders during the “Century of Humiliation,” and rebrands modern Chinese nationalism as one linked to resistance rather than expansion.

Xi’s government has passed numerous regulations that bolsters China’s existing legal censorship framework to include online challenges made to the Party’s distorted narrative of history. This has allowed the government to take steps to secure Weibo as a beneficial escalatory mobilization tool to broadcast and promote the Party’s expansionist agenda. Moreover, as the CCP is able to control the degree in which the Chinese public is able to access information and

alternative news sources, its narrative of indisputable sovereignty of the South China Sea remains resolute. Xi could easily use the CCP’s narrative of history and Chinese collective memory issues surrounding the “Century of Humiliation” as tools of mobilization, and the CCP’s ever growing control over Weibo could force the social media platform to assume this escalatory mobilization role. Furthermore, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands protests could serve as a possible model for the future online mobilization of anti-American and anti-Western sentiments. The “patriotic education” campaign has taught generations of the Chinese populace that the South China Sea falls under Chinese sovereignty, and as a result of surging expansionist nationalism, the Chinese people are more willing to defend this claim, even by force.

The most extreme expansionist voices continuously force the CCP to take ever more strong and confrontational positions to not appear “weak” against perceived foreign incursion to its territory in the South China Sea. Furthermore, as China has already successfully constructed several artificial island military bases in the South China Sea, the CCP would greatly “lose face” if it suddenly abandoned them and seemingly accepted the unfavorable UNCLOS arbitration tribunal ruling. China’s broader political environment of surging anti-foreign sentiments and public support for expansionism is not compatible for seeking any concessions, and therefore, China is largely entrenched in both its strategic and political positions. I encourage the United States to continue its freedom of navigation operations, especially with the backing of a broader European and Southeast Asian nation coalition. I would also suggest that these operations’ stated objectives be reoriented from solely claiming to protect the maritime flow of trade to also

serving as a demonstrated commitment to and support for our security partners and allies within the region. However, as the overall objective is regional stability and peace, I would warn against engaging in naval or aerial brinkmanship. As any collisions, or near-collisions, as seen with the

USS Decatur, will likely result in Chinese claims of Western provocation and could even provide a pretext for justifying combative actions taken against foreign ships in the name of defense.

Translation: “Released a headline article: ‘The South China Sea may become a hot spot in Sino- American Relations,’ the US guided missile destroyer “(USS Decatur)” cruised through the South China Sea one day before the 69th National Day of China.”

Figure 8:10/1/2018 Weibo post with an article link about the incident with the USS Decatur

Returning to the September 30, 2018 incident between the USS Decatur and the Lanzhou,

many American media sources referenced the ongoing US-China trade war as an explanation for the Chinese destroyer’s aggressive maneuvering. While Western sources explained the incident through the broader context of the trade war, Chinese Weibo sources cited the proximity to National Day. Western sources neglected to mention that the incident occurred the day before Chinese National Day, and therefore was likely a result of both the trade war tensions and

Chinese nationalism. Moreover, by referencing the short temporal distance between the day of the incident and National Day, this likely implies that the Chinese populous views the timing as intentional, and therefore, an extreme act of provocation. Signifying that Chinese media sources, and citizens alike, on Weibo have begun perceiving the very intentions behind Sino-American interactions within a schema of nationalist outrage.

The most extreme nationalistic voices have pushed the CCP to adopt increasingly more aggressive and assertive postures in responding to international incidences. I worry that when the next major international crisis erupts, the Chinese de-escalatory voices may be drowned out, censored, or will simply not be present on Weibo to defuse and combat the online calls for war. My greatest fear is that the CCP will continuously be pushed and pulled by the most extreme expansionist voices of its populous, and may stumble into or be pressured into a “hot” war in the South China Sea by the very expansionist nationalism it created.

In document 2019_Field.pdf (Page 89-93)