Conclusion

The results of the previous section suggest that the level of transportation

technology in a system can play an important effect on whether or not a country chooses to instigate war. In some runs the effect of technology (or its component parts) is highly significant. In other runs it has little effect. In one run, Run 9, higher levels of

transportation technology was a significant predictor of warfare. The variations in these findings are consistent with the variable findings in the literature. This model presents evidence that both the post-19th _{century analyses (finding trade is associated with peace) and}

those that incorporate a larger time frame (finding that trade produces conflict) are correct, though the finding suggest a degree of spurious causation in the former.

This model provides support for several different streams of the political science literature. The significance of the Concentration of Trade variable provides support for the conclusion that countries that are highly dependent on a few countries for their welfare are more likely to be engaged in wars. (Barbieri, 1996)

The significance and sign of the variable, Unused Partners, suggests that countries are less likely to make war in an interconnected system because they have more opportunities to mitigate welfare losses due to the presence of untapped trading relationships. This runs counter to the pure Realist argument and questions the conclusions of those who take a dim view of the effect of trading relationships and peace. (Hirschman, 1945) Perhaps it is not the trading relationships themselves, but the presence of alternative partners in the international system that makes war less prevalent as the world is more interconnected.

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Appendix -Illustrative Example of Three Countries over Three Rounds

This appendix provides an example of the mechanisms involved in the model using an example of two countries who engage in trade in rounds T and T+1. In round T+2 a third country is introduced and the effect explained.

Round T

In Round T, Saudi Arabia and the US have the productive capacity to produce two things, food and oil (food, oil). SA has (1,11) the US (11,1) We assume these goods are compliments and that these two countries want to trade. They swap 5 oils for 5 foods then have the following SA (6,6) and the US (6,6).

A country can spend its consumption on butter or guns. It sets its guns consumption based on what its neighbor does. As this is the first round, they would both build their armies to be .2 the size of their own economy. In this example the army size is .2*6 = 1.2. The amount left over is the butter it consumes as:

GDP – Guns = Butter From Formula 1 we know that the butter is 4.8.

Round T SA US Productive Capacity 1,11 11,1 Amount Produced 1,11 11,1 Amount Traded 5 5 Total Amount to be Consumed 6 6 On Military 1.2 1.2 On Butter 4.8 4.8

Round T+1

In Round T+1 each country’s productive capacity grows by .03. So far so good. Now the question is what to do with the army size (.2*6.18 = 1.236). Applying Formula 1 again we see that the butter for each country is now 4.944.

Round T+1 SA US Productive Capacity 1.03,11.33 1.33,1.03 Amount Produced 1.03,11.33 11.33,1.03 Amount Traded 5.15 5.15 Total Amount to be Consumed 6.18 6.18 On Military 1.236 1.236 On Butter 4.944 4.944 Round T+2:

In order to provide a picture of the dynamics produced by introducing new trading partners, this round complicates the story by introducing a third country to the trade group: Germany. Germany is randomly assigned the ability to produce five units of food and one unit of oil.

At the beginning of Round T+2 every one grows again. Then, when SA looks to trade if first trades with Germany 2 oils for 2 foods. Now SA only has 3.3 oils to trade with the US, dramatically driving down the US’s overall consumption.

When setDefense is called, SA sets its army .2*5.36 = 1.27. Germany and the US match this 1.27 and 1.27. The result of building a larger army and consuming less through trade is that in this round in the US consumes 2.09 units of butter compared to 4.9 from the previous round. This reduction is approximately a 57% reduction in welfare from the previous round. This magnitude of reduction trips the 5% reduction threshold for the US when the makeWar action is run. Because this threshold is tripped, the US examines its

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chances of winning a war with both SA and Germany in the hopes of finding a weaker neighbor to capture resources from. Since the US is not 10% stronger than either neighbor it does not attempt to win a war and the round ends.

Round T+2 SA Germany US Productive Capacity 1.061,11.67 5, 1 11.67, 1.061 Amount Produced 1.061,11.67 5, 1 11.67, 1.061 Amount Traded 2 + 3.3 = 5.3 2 3.3 Total Amount to be Consumed 6.36 3 3.36 On Military 1.27 1.27 1.27 On Butter 5.09 1.73 2.09

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