The various case studies explored have provided an interesting insight into the nature of communication among actors engaged in various types of political violence. The goal of the thesis was to look at various examples of political violence, and the ways that actors engaged in political violence attempted to communicate with their adversaries and their supporters. This thesis has its origins in the idea that technology used to
communicate is related to the type of political violence in which the actors are engaged. The starting thesis was that different types of violence would require actors using different kinds of technology to deliver their message, and that the majority of these messages would be dedicated to recruitment. However, as the case studies suggest, this is not necessarily true. It seems prudent to briefly summarize the findings from each of the case studies, and then to analyze them as a whole.
Each of the three case studies have proven to be very interesting and useful. In the case of al Qaeda, which lined up very well with the ideal type set-up in the framework, what was found was that their communications focused on expressing their grievances to the enemy, and that the majority of their communications were directed at the adversary. Very rarely did there appear to be messages that were targeted towards potential
supporters. The KLA was very surprising; not only was there an effort to communicate to both potential supporters within Kosovo, the region in which the KLA would want to install the new ruling elite, but there was a concerted effort to attract the attention of international media in order to garner foreign support. What was more interesting is that
the communications made by the KLA did not seem to be meant to show that the KLA could be the ruling elite, but rather to gain support for the cause. Finally, the Tunisian Revolution showed that the Internet and social media proved to be very useful in planning and organizing protests, which are a major part of any revolution. The
revolutionaries in Tunisia directed their communication efforts at adversaries, to whom they expressed grievances, and to supporters, whom the revolutionaries wished to have support them, most likely by joining with the actors in protest.
The summation of the case studies has raised some very important points. First, there is only one case study for each type of political violence. The results that were gathered from each case study are heavily limited because of the lack of diversity in the number of case studies. Time has also proven to be a factor in the understanding of these cases, in that the technology available to the KLA was much more limited than the technology available to al Qaeda and the Tunisian revolutionaries. It is important to note the limitations of this research. Results that are reached in this conclusion are heavily dependent on the cases, and are thus limited. However, the cases that have been
researched and presented can be analyzed, and conclusions can be drawn from these three case studies showing there is merit to the idea that there are connections between
different types of violence and the media and communications that the involved actors produce.
Part of this thesis has been an attempt to understand the relationship between goals and communication, if there even was one. By having goals as one of the criteria by which the types of political violence were defined, the framework implied that each of the different types of political violence would have different types of goals. Most of this
research has been based on the assumption that, because of the different goals that each of the types of political violence had, actors involved in political violence would employ different technologies, have different messages, and target different audiences with their communications. However, looking at just these three cases, it seems that not all of this assumption has turned out to be true.
There is the technological aspect of communication, which is very much tied to the aspect of the target of the communication. In the beginning of the thesis, it was assumed that the technology used by the actors engaged in political violence would be based on the target of the communication. The target of the message is, in turn, based on the goals of the actors involved in the political violence. In this sense, all three aspects are connected. However, these three cases show that, in reality, actors are going to use whatever means they have available to them. The differences in the technology used by the KLA and those used by Tunisian revolutionaries and al Qaeda are really based on time, not so much goal or target audience. The Internet was not as developed in 1998 when the KLA was active. Whereas the Internet and social media were readily available to both the Tunisians and al Qaeda, the KLA had to make use with what might be
considered more traditional forms of media, those being radio, newspapers and television. However, both the Tunisian revolutionaries and al Qaeda welcomed attention from international media, as did the KLA. It is of course speculation to say that the KLA would have made use of the Internet and social media had their insurgency taken place in the 2000s rather than the 1990s, but it does not seem unthinkable, given that the KLA was interested in the support of both the local Albanian population and the international community.
One important relationship that can be drawn from the results of this research is between the type of political violence, specifically the means and goals, and the way that certain technologies are used to target different audiences, either adversaries or
supporters. In the case of revolution, there was a distinction where social media and the Internet were used for two purposes: to organize and plan protests, and to gain
international media attention by showing the struggles and plight of the revolutionaries. Once the international media began to pay attention, the revolutionaries used the
international media as a platform to further broadcast their struggle to an even broader international community. The international media, which include not only the Internet, but also all other forms of traditional media, were not used to plan protest. This suggests that there is a difference in the utility of traditional forms of media and the Internet. Another example is from the KLA case study. When the KLA reestablished Albanian language radio and television, the newly-revived forms of media had a limited reach. However, the international media were able to reach a much broader audience. The case of al Qaeda does not seem to show this much. The focus of al Qaeda’s communication was almost always to express the changes that they wanted, or their grievances, or to threaten violence. The target of al Qaeda’s communication was rarely supporters. The technology that al Qaeda used, the Internet and traditional media, were both suited to delivering these types of messages. All of this to say that there appears to be a connection between the goals and targets of the communication, and the medium or technology used to deliver it.
The contents of the messages sent out by the actors seemed to be very connected to the type of political violence. Al Qaeda’s messages mostly expressed grievances, but
never really seemed to be calling for support. The messages and communications from the KLA were often calling for the support of both the local population and the
international community, as well as expressing why the KLA should be the new
governing elite. What seems absent from the KLA’s messages were an attempt to show that it was capable of becoming the new ruling elite of Kosovo, which is not what was expected. Finally, the content of the messages of the Tunisians were usually two-fold. These messages expressed many of the grievances that the different groups had with the government, and the messages were often calls to protest against the government. Again, the content of the messages were very much tied to the goals of the actors, as well as the means that these actors used. Had the KLA been interested in changing the fundamental nature of society, they would have needed to have been able to draw large protests against the current nature of their society, and in turn would have required messages that called for protest. The means and goals of the involved actors heavily influence the content of the message.
Originally, this thesis presented a very simple idea: the type of political violence is directly related to a type of communication. The framework established in the
beginning of the thesis suggested that there was a very simple way to determine what kind of communication one could expect from actors, given that they were involved in a particular kind of political violence defined by goals, means, and organization. In reality, there seems to be two very complicated and messy relationships, one between goals and means and content of message, and another between the goals and target audiences. Goals and means are important aspects to the various types of political violence, at least as defined by the framework, and so there does seem to be some relationship between the
kind of political violence and the type and content of messages sent out by the actors. The organization also factors into the communication efforts and needs, but is also tied very much to the goals and the means of a given group of actors. The informal organization of the Tunisian Revolution meant there was a variety of communication efforts calling for protest from a number of sources. This organization, however, was a result of the widespread and diverse groups of people who were negatively affected by the Ben Ali regime, and thus had the goal of changing it. The strict militaristic organization of the KLA was a necessity in order to run a guerrilla campaign with any hope of success, and because such means were necessary for the goal, such organization became necessary. The cell structure of al Qaeda that functioned under one, somewhat larger, formal group was again a necessity born out of the way the group worked, which itself was born of the goals of the organization, although it is completely possible that the means developed out of the limited organization of the group, and the goals were then dictated by this
limitation.
This complex relationship between means, goals, and organization is mimicked in the relationships between the various goals, means, and organizations and the target audiences of the involved actors, the content of their messages, and the technologies used. Technology was originally believed to have played a much larger role in the process of communication. Especially given the malleable nature of the Internet to reach so many different audiences, it seems that the differences in the communication in the future will not be based on technology, but rather the content of the message. The relationship between communication and political violence is not as simple as X input generates Y output, and does not show vast differences in the types of communication
used by a given type of violence, but rather the relationship is a result of a complicated web of connections between various aspects of communication and political violence.
There are several things to consider now. The first is possible future research. The next step of this thesis would be to go back and adjust the framework, as it seems that it was not always correct in its assumptions. A major aspect that would need to be
contended with is revolution, and whether or not violence is actually inherent to revolution. Once the framework has been adjusted, the next step would be to research many more case studies for each type of violence. Ideally, this would mean looking at the rest of the Arab Spring events, other terrorist groups, and other insurgencies. It would be interesting to understand how this framework would apply to a case such as ISIS, which really does seem to have factors and qualities of all three types of violence, with its organization, means, and goals.
It also is important to address the practical application of this thesis. There are several ways that this thesis could be used. If this framework holds true over many case studies, one could take some generalities about the various types of violence and the media they use and apply them to national security and counterinsurgency concerns. Arguably, one could take this thesis and then use it to counter adversarial revolutions, insurgencies, or terrorism by way of blocking certain communication modes, as well as developing counter rhetoric to that of the actors engaged in violence. This thesis could also, in principle, be used in reverse. In a scenario where one has a group of actors dedicated to violence of an unknown type, with unknown goals and unknown means, yet which has been actively communicating with a variety of audiences, one could use the framework to work backwards, and so identify the type of political violence.