However not enough to give a diagnosis of the situation. The main thing - to propose possible solutions that would, if not completely arranged all, or at least led to a balance of interests of all parties to the contract.
1. One possible solution - not to deny clients the right to treatment in a hospital. But you can limit the ability to use it to once a year for up to 10 days, or two hospitalizations to 5 days. 2. Another proposal may relate to the payment of insurance policies. The total participation of all university employees in the insurance can be provided, if all the costs of the policy of "Standard" will take over the university. This will solve the problem of adverse selection. At the same time employees must be granted the right to their own funds to pay extra for the opportunity to be insured under the program "Elite" with an extended range of medical services. It will at the same time signal allows to select a group of persons with an increased risk of disease.
3. Offering potential clients a "menu of contracts", insurers reasonably believe that risk- prefered clients will want more extensive coverage. Neither whose rights are not violated. Many insurance companies in such cases to spend their medical examination to have initially cut off the group of people for whom insurance policy in the near future will have to carry out payments. But the legality of these actions already questionable.
4. Customer retention with a low risk of the insured event is one of the tasks of the insurance company. This can be achieved by providing discounts after a sufficiently long-term
cooperation: for example, those for 2 years did not seek medical help. On the contrary, in certain situations, the possibility of charging penalties for early termination of the contract.
5. Finally, in some developed countries have the opportunity to appeal to the courts, which may limit the effect of adverse selection. In Russia, however, this practice is not widespread.
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