Control

In the previous section, the variations of interactivity levels amongst the four different categories of robotic artefacts were explored. I have suggested that the more interactive the robot, the more likely it will be able to portray unpredictable behaviour, resulting in illusions of autonomy. I have noted that robotic artefacts in the fourth category (AIBO) display an almost perfect illusion of autonomy, as the robot has the ability to ‘think’8

. Nevertheless, it is possible that children may also construe this as similar to the autonomy of computational artefacts (the third

8 _{When considering machines, ‘thinking’ is referred to as the ability to ‘process information from} sensors and other sources, such as an internal set of rules either programmed or learned, and to make some decisions autonomously’ (Lin et. al., 2011)

70 category). In this section I will explore different manifestations of the perceived locus of control being within the robot.

Throughout this section I use the term ‘control’ to indicate the extent to which an action is an intentional behaviour rather than a reaction to a stimulus. A robot user might relate to a robotic artefact as though it is an autonomous agent because it displays characteristics that appear to constitute ‘personality’ or ‘free will’. For example, when the AIBO offers its paw to a stranger, this provides a friendly aura and suggests that the AIBO has the ability to decide whether it likes you or not. However, the perception of locus of control within a robot can go much further than this. A robotic artefact can exert power over its user by demanding attention and expressing a constant need for ‘care’ even though users can redirect their attention at any moment. The constant attention that children are required to give a Tamagotchi in order for it to ‘survive’ suggests that the Tamagotchi is exerting an element of control over the child. If the child does not address the state of the Tamagotchi, it will ‘die’. The Tamagotchi was so popular throughout the world that some schools found the toy interrupted everyday school schedules. Consequently, many

establishments implemented rules so that no custodian activities for the Tamagotchi were allowed during class hours. Other institutions adopted a more stringent policy, where the Tamagotchi was not allowed on school grounds (Bloch and Lemish, 1999). ‘This was an automatic ‘death sentence’ for the Tamagotchi as it cannot survive a full day without care’ (Bloch and Lemish, 1999:297). The Tamagotchi elicited a level of real control over the user, as the user is obliged to play with the toy in order for the game to continue.

71 As the Tamagotchi became popular, some of its users developed ‘an almost cult like devotion’ (Bloch and Lemish, 1999:286). In his book, ‘Love and Sex with Robots9_’, Levy discusses Japanese Tamagotchi owners who:

‘postpone or cancel meetings so as to be able to feed their Tamagotchi and attend to its other essential needs at appropriate times; a passenger who had boarded the flight but feels compelled to leave the aircraft prior to take off and vowed never to fly with that airline ever again because her flight

attendant insisted she turned off her Tamagotchi which the passenger felt was akin to killing it’ (Levy, 2007:92–93).

This anecdotal example is not presented as rigorous evidence of how all Tamagotchi ownerstreat their toys. Instead, it presents an extreme case scenario. In order to relate to this user’s experience, I purchased a Tamagotchi. After playing with my toy for three days, I found myself in a similar situation. As the toy ‘beeped’ – an indication that it is in need of something– I felt obliged to attend to its needs. Despite knowing how the Tamagotchi works and being fully aware that my pet can be easily re-set, the ‘sad’ feeling expressed by my Tamagotchi elicited a response from my emotional side. Additionally, I felt slightly competitive, as I wanted to see how long I could keep my pet without ‘killing it’. Furthermore, the ‘beeping’ sound that indicates the Tamagotchi requires care will not stop until its ‘needs’ are

addressed. Eventually the sound became tedious and repetitive and so the toy got my attention because I wanted the ‘beeping’ to discontinue.

9

Levy’s book, ‘Love and Sex with Robots’ borderlines fiction in his prediction of the future of robotics.

72 In contrast, the perception of the locus of control being within the robot does not necessarily lead to a sense of being controlled by the robot. For example in one of Turkle’s studies a child was confused about why an electronic game always seemed to win. The child ultimately decided that the game was cheating, but cheating requires intention (Turkle, 1984). This example suggests that the interactive nature of the electronic game provided the illusion of personality and free will, and thus also the ability to decide to cheat. Pressure groups believe that the Tamagotchi and similar programmed toys and robots fool children into thinking that the toys are alive and have human-like characteristics such as personality, prompting unhealthy

emotional attachments(Plowman, 2004).

In the case of AIBO, the issue of control is ambiguous. To reiterate my definition of control, I stated that ‘the user relates to the robotic artefact as though it is an

autonomous agent because it displays characteristics that appear to constitute personality or free will’. Even though AIBO is programmed, it is capable of adaptive and learning behaviour. AIBO provides the illusion of control, but is also somewhat in control of its actions as it is capable of selecting a small number of actions without human intervention (direct input).

Throughout this section, I have suggested that the interactivity of robotic artefacts influences the patterns of children’s thinking about the locus of control. Less technical robotic artefacts such as robotic dolls, clockwork and remote-controlled toys may be viewed by children as solely governed by their users. However, with software-programmable toys, ‘intelligent robots’, and interactive toys, ambiguity

73 about control exist. I would argue that as children gain more experience interacting with intelligent technologies they may develop new ways of thinking about this form of technology. Today’s robots actively respond to their respective environments, suggesting a level of intelligence and control. As a result, they are increasingly treated like living entities, which supports Turkle’s findings that children treat computational objects as ‘sort of alive’. As the actual locus of control in robotic artefacts such as the AIBO is at least in part contained within the robot because it is able to adapt its behaviour, the robot’s control over itself is no longer fully an illusion.

A new technological genre may be emerging that encompasses autonomous and adaptive robots. Thus, we may require a new ontological category – one that breaks down the dichotomy between animate and inanimate (Khan, et al., 2006). The following section explores how people respond to these blurred entities.