The defence of all or the defence of some

What has complicated this already complex debate over not only the specifics of the FRF, but also over whom bears responsibility for its implementation, is a more fundamental

disagreement over how to convey the purpose of the USM presence in Okinawa. ‘You have to frame what’s going on in Okinawa against the context of what Tokyo believes to be in their best interest nationally around the region and around the world’, the Senate staffer tells me144_{; looking at}

previous internal discussions between officials in Tokyo, these duelling narratives about security are apparent. Moriya, meeting with Schieffer in 2006, stated: ‘We have a good plan for Futenma, and more importantly, it represents a promise made by the government of Japan to the government of the United States […] [we will] work with the Environment Ministry to secure permission for survey work at Camp Schwab if the next Okinawa Governor refused to sign required permits’.145

Takamizawa expressed a similar willingness to go over the prefectural authority or democratic will in Okinawa if need be, telling Schieffer in 2008 that although the GOJ has a ‘desire to be seen by the Okinawan people as listening to their concerns’, he still asked ‘for the U.S. to "remain tough" on statements regarding realignment’.146

In my interviews with current and former defence officials, however, another narrative emerged: that of many Okinawans actually being more ‘realistic’ about certain ‘threats’ to national security than their mainland Japanese counterparts.147 _{‘When the North Korean missile flew over the}

Okinawan islands [in December 2012], and Okinawan people even insisted that for missile defence, like the PAC-3 – they [the GOJ] [should] pay for the third system to be located [in Okinawa] and it should protect Okinawan people’, says one MOD researcher. ‘So in these past two or three years, Okinawan people’s perceptions vis-a-vis missile defence or so-called “extended deterrence” has

144 _{Anonymous 2014k.}

145 _{Thomas Schieffer, ‘JDA AVM Moriya on Defense Budgets, Transformation, Leaks’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks} cable:06TOKYO5515. 25 September 2006c. Available online at:

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06TOKYO5515_a.html.

146 _{Thomas Schieffer, ‘Ministry of Defense DG Takamizawa on Force Realignment’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks} cable:08TOKYO363. 12 February 2008a. Available online at:

https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08TOKYO363_a.html. This desire to be ‘seen’ as ‘listening to their concerns’ is also evident in joint statements and official strategy documents. For example, PM Hashimoto stated that ‘both governments are making sincere efforts to reduce the burden on the Okinawan people, by paying the utmost consideration to the Okinawan people’ in his 1996 joint press conference with Clinton, while the MOD has said that it will ‘exert itself to the utmost to realize mitigating the impacts [of Futenma] as much as possible so that the people of Okinawa can actually feel it [emphasis added]’ (MOFA 1996e; MOD 2014b, p. 4). These impact mitigation measures include, according to the document, ‘the relocation of the KC- 130 squadron from MCAS Futenma to MCAS Iwakuni as well as implementation of the MV-22 Osprey training outside of Okinawa Prefecture’.

changed dramatically’.148 _{Within this narrative, actors in defence sites distinguished between so-}

called ‘realistic’ and ‘idealistic’ Okinawan residents depending on the degree to which their conceptualisations of ‘threat’ and ‘security’ align with those of their own. For example, another researcher comments:

149

In its attempt to extend this kind of ‘security awareness’ across the prefecture, the MOD has relied on the efforts of its local branch, the Okinawa Defense Bureau (ODB), located in Kadena. The main roles of the bureau have historically been: to ‘tacitly’150 _{maintain support for a stable USM}

presence through coordination with local leaders in Okinawa; to negotiate with the USG, US armed forces, and anti-base Diet members; to interact with mass and local media; and to handle vaguely- described ‘leftist opposition movements’.151 _{It has been responsible for addressing complaints from}

residents about noise pollution, with one MOD official telling me that the bureau, for example, ‘measures the noise and gives out subsidies for soundproofing windows and air conditioning’ upon request.152 _{The ODB also looks after the paperwork for distributing rent to local landowners on}

behalf of the GOJ, oversees base relocations, closures, and land returns, though as one MOD researcher tells it: ‘they are not policymakers, they are just implementing government policy’.153

However, even in carrying out orders from the top-down, says another MOD researcher, gaps remain in record-keeping: ‘many years ago, the two governments agreed to close that Naha Pier and move it somewhere else. But nothing has been done […] And when I went there, I asked the

148 _{Anonymous 2014j. The PAC-3 is an upgrade to the MIM-104 Patriot surface-to-air missile system used by} the US primarily as part of its anti-ballistic missile system. It has also been sold on to Japan and is used by their Air Self Defense Forces.

149 _{Anonymous 2014f. Nobuhiro Kubo, however, reports public opinion on one of these ‘remote’ islands,} Yonaguni – where a new military radar station is being built – as divided over this development, with those in favour of the station ‘looking forward to hosting [it] […] because of the economic boost it will bring’, and those opposed concerned that it may ‘become a target should Japan end up in a fight’ (‘Japan expands army

footprint for first time in 40 years, risks angering China’, Reuters, 19 April 2014, available online at:

http://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-military-yonaguni-idUSBREA3I05X20140419).

150 _{Alexander Cooley, ‘Response to Daniel P. Aldrich’s review of Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S.} Military Overseas’, Critical Dialogues, 7:2 (2009), 391-392, p. 392.

151 _{Kimura 2013, p. 5.}

152 _{Anonymous, personal interview, 28 April 2014h, Ministry of Defense, Japan.} 153 _{Anonymous 2014f.}

… in one sense, you can say that their [Okinawans’] security awareness is very real

and substantial. Because ... the Senkakus, actually, are part of Okinawa. And the fact that the Chinese fishing boats and Chinese law enforcement agencies’ vessels come into various islands of Okinawa—that’s a huge concern for Okinawa fishermen because, for obvious reasons, they don’t want to see Chinese competitors in their own waters […] So that’s why in the remote islands of Okinawa, some people are very, very, very supportive of more rigorous, assertive responses from the Japanese Coast Guard in dealing with those Chinese vessels, government and private vessels. So ... in that sense, yes, some Okinawans are very much aware of security problems […] But ... that is somewhat detached from broader strategic interests, as you can imagine.

MOD office […] how often does the US military use this port? And they didn’t have any idea. That shows something’.