Intersection: understanding the base ‘burden’

Although the preceding sections of this chapter detail narratives of difference and distance between officials in Tokyo, Washington, and Okinawa, there are still others that serve as intersection points between the PBD and the ABD. The first of these acknowledges the bases as a ‘burden’ on prefectural residents, describes an earnest interest in minimising the impact of this ‘burden’, and details means by which officials in the central governments can support the local economy to be less reliant on base-related revenues. Teare, for example, claims that the disapproval of the US presence ‘did not have so much to do with troop behavior […] as with our continued heavy presence on Okinawa. Our use of land, our exercising, artillery fire over traveled highways, even marines jogging along the road as part of their training’.193 _{A former MOFA official continues: ‘It’s the “Not In My}

Backyard” syndrome of people, same as nuclear power […] [T]here’s an argument from the people of Okinawa who say “well, having the US bases here, doesn’t that actually make us a target?”’.194

Officials are also wary, given their understanding of these tensions and the central government’s role in maintaining the USM presence, of how the possible ramifications that any major accident or incident, especially involving Futenma, might be felt not only within the prefecture, but also within the alliance. ‘We have to go with the original plan or we will lose

193 _{O’Neill 1998, p. 184.}

everything’, says a former MOFA official. ‘Statistically, another major accident at Futenma is bound to happen, whether next year or ten years from now—and when it does, it might shut down Futenma and there would be no replacement facility for it’.195 _{Schoff also acknowledges that ‘a big,}

big accident could be a game-changer, especially if it involves US military negligence’.196 _{In fact, in a}

meeting between Roos, former SDP President Mizuho Fukushima and then-Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transportation Senior Vice Minister (VM) Kiyomi Tsujimoto in December 2009, Tsujimoto cautioned: ‘the FRF will be the "Achilles heel" of the Alliance and while the base may ultimately get built, it will be like "lighting a fire" of opposition to all of the other bases in Okinawa’.197

In the face of these local challenges to the PBD, the central government in Tokyo has recently taken very public steps towards not simply alleviating the ‘burden’ through expanding its subsidy programme, but also by increasing its investment into alternative industries. The 2012 and 2013 Diplomatic Bluebooks both detail the creation of multiple-entry visas for Chinese tourists visiting Okinawa, of which there were over 25,000 in 2013 (out of nearly 300,000 total from across northeast and Southeast Asia).198 _{‘We as a whole of Japan are now trying to increase the [number of]}

travellers from all over the world, and if Okinawa can be a kind of window,especially for Southeast Asia and other Asian areas’, says one current MOFA official, ‘that can be good for Okinawa’s economy’.199 _{In his first talks with Nakaima after being elected PM, Abe similarly expressed that}

‘"[i]nvestment in Okinawa is an investment in the future”’ and called Okinawan development ‘a matter of interest for the whole country’.200 _{Still, says one current Diet adviser, more should be done}

to aid those residents in the prefecture outside of the construction and tourism industries: ‘if you are just a farmer, you don’t have any reason to accept [the subsidy]. That will not affect your income’.201

Just as officials acknowledge the language of ‘burden’ with regards to the day-to-day living situation alongside military bases, they recognise that the historical differences in identities between Okinawa and the mainland are sometimes significantly felt. ‘Before coming to Okinawa, I thought Okinawa is, of course, part of Japan, so Okinawan people [are], how to say—their minds [are] fully

195 _{Anonymous 2014l.} 196 _{Schoff 2014.}

197 _{John Roos, ‘“Forcing the Henoko Plan Will Damage the Alliance”: Ambassador and SDP Head Fukushima} Discuss FRF’, Wikileaks, Wikileaks cable:09TOKYO2917. 22 December 2009g. Available online at:

https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TOKYO2917_a.html.

198 _{MOFA 2012, 2013; ‘Number of tourists to Okinawa reaches new high in first half of fiscal 2013’, The Ryukyu}

Shimpo, 16 October 2013, available online at: http://english.ryukyushimpo.jp/2013/10/25/12045/. 199 _{Anonymous 2014e.}

200 _{‘Abe keen to support Okinawa's development in 1st talks with governor’, The Mainichi Shimbun, 9 January} 2013e, available online at:

http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130109p2g00m0dm024000c.html. 201 _{Anonymous 2014b.}

Japanese’, says one current MOFA official. ‘But after coming here, I understand that the history and the culture [are] very different from the mainland, so their way of thinking is sometimes very different [as well]’.202 _{A former official concurs, remarking that this is because}

203

It is not only war memory, however, that separates the Okinawan experience from that of mainland Japanese residents. Then-MOFA DG Chikao Kawai, for example, remarked to former US Navy (USN) Secretary Donald Winter in September 2006 that ‘progress’ on the FRF project ‘was more problematic […] given the prevailing sentiment among most residents of Okinawa that they had been sacrificed for the benefit of Japan's four main islands "for centuries”’.204 _{The former official}

further observes that following the handover of Okinawa to USM administration after WWII, ‘there’s a sense [of:] […] Why was Okinawa not allowed back into Japan when the rest of Japan had enjoyed independence and was growing […] as well? Why had it allowed Okinawa to become part of US control for so long?’ O’Neill adds: ‘We euphemistically referred to "U.S. administration" but, in fact, the senior U.S. official in Okinawa during that period was an Army lieutenant general, called the high commissioner for the Ryukyu Islands. A State Department officer was his political advisor […] but there was no doubt that the Army was in charge’.205