Defence of Stage 1 of the dialectically necessary method, as relevant to the dialectically contingent method

4.3.1 Introduction

The success of the contingent method relies on the success of stage 1 of the dialectically necessary method. This stage is widely accepted, but not uniformly so. The key criticisms will be set out below, referring to the aspect of the first stage of the dialectic that is objected

to. The discussion relies heavily on Beyleveld’s discussion of key criticisms and his defence

of Stage 1 in The Dialectical Necessity of Morality (1991).

4.3.2 (1) “I am an agent,” (1a) “I do X voluntarily from purpose E that I have chosen,” (2)

“E is good.”

Is action, and thus agency, a plausible starting point for a fundamental moral principle? One objection is that action cannot be fundamental as a moral principle, because it is not generic to human existence as Gewirth claims it is; rather, it is some other facet, such as living which

should be considered to be fundamental (Den Uyl 1975). However, ‘living,’ though clearly of

value to most people, does not necessarily provide the basis for evaluation of what is a foundational moral concept; when morality is understood in terms of practical precepts directing behaviour, such as human rights, then what is fundamental is what is logically necessary for agents to take into account if they are to respond to practical precepts such as human rights (Beyleveld 1991, 67). An alternative objection is that practical precepts, such as human rights, need not direct behaviour; this definition of practical precepts was inherent in the definition of morality in 2.2, but this was a stipulative definition at that stage and does not demonstrate that it is logically necessary to regard human rights (as moral precepts) as directing behaviour. However, this argument denies the premise of an agent who can ask the

Within the context of the question guiding his enterprise, Gewirth’s definitions

of agency and related concepts are not arbitrary, but logically necessary. Now, although there are various metaphysical theses, like determinism, which might disqualify this enterprise, unless these metaphysical theses can be proven, their

“logical possibility” merely places limits on Gewirth’s argument, which render its possible validity “transcendental” rather than “transcendent” in the way in

which Kant intended this distinction. (Beyleveld 1991, 68)

Therefore the dialectically necessary nature of the Gewirthian starting point of agency and valuing means that it is for the contradicting thesis to prove that an agent must, logically necessarily, adopt another view of moral precepts.

Another objection is that even if action is a valid starting point for a fundamental principle of

morality, the assumption that it is ‘voluntary’ is false. This argument rejects the supposition

that it is possible for a person to choose to act freely for a reason by reference to some

process that is ‘internal’. On this view there are no agents and therefore it is illogical for a person to make the statement “I am an agent”. The ability to evidence another mind

empirically with the capacity for voluntariness is questionable (Beyleveld and Pattinson 2000, 41ff.; see further 5.2); however, questions as to the empirically demonstrable existence of voluntary purposiveness does not affect the dialectically necessary statement “I am an

agent” (I possess human/generic rights), but rather denies that it can be demonstrated to an

agent that other agents exist (others possess human/generic rights; see Beyleveld 2011, 9-10).

Finally, objections have been raised as to the claim that an agent must, logically necessarily, regard his purposes as good. One objection is that an agent may not value his purposes if he is acting to fulfil a gratuitously self-harming purpose; for example, addiction (Bond 1980, 43-

44). However, such behaviours are not controlled by an agent’s unforced choice and therefore are not actions of the agent. It may further be objected that the agent’s choice is not entirely

forced, but still the result of a powerful inclination or appetite, but, as Gewirth has observed, in this circumstance the agent who is choosing to fulfil the appetite must regard doing so as having value (1980, 140). The crucial point is that voluntary action upon a desire necessarily involves a commitment to judge it positively. This judgement holds even if, taking other

criteria into account, the agent ultimately regards the course of conduct he has pursued as one he ought not to have taken (Beyleveld 1991, 70).

4.3.3 There are: (3) Generic Conditions of Agency (GCAs) so I must (dialectically)

necessarily claim that: (4) “Possessing these GCAs is good for my purposes”; that is: (4a) “categorically instrumentally good”; that is: (4b) “a necessary good.”

There are various objections to the necessity of a human agent regarding the GCAs as necessary goods on the basis that it is possible to possess a self-destructive purpose (Bond 1980, 47-8). However, this is a misunderstanding of the nature of the value that is necessarily accorded by the agent to his purposes. An agent does not necessarily value his agency as good or bad in general, but merely as a means to his purpose. Therefore, if an agent purposes to commit suicide he remains committed to the GCAs despite the fact that his end is self- destructive (Beyleveld 1991, 77). This is vital to the plausibility of a right to enabled suicide under the PGC.

An alternative objection is that it is impossible to specify the nature of generic conditions of action in real terms since agents have vastly differing levels of wellbeing/freedom to fulfil their purposes when compared with each other and compared throughout an agent’s lifespan (Narveson 1980, 659). However, the GCAs are not valued in terms of a particular experience of wellbeing/freedom, but as a generic dispositional valuing of purposes which is directed towards particular experiences of wellbeing/freedom associated with the purpose (Beyleveld 1991, 86). In other words, in Gewirthian terms the relevant valuing of the GCAs is the valuing of the capacity to have purposes, rather than the particular experiences of purposes and the freedom associated with such a purpose. The fact that the particular experiences of a human agent differ throughout his lifespan is irrelevant for the identification of freedom/wellbeing that is instrumental to purposing.

A related objection is that generic conditions of agency cannot be empirically known and therefore that they are not capable of being used to guide action (Brooks 1981, 293). This objection clearly overstates its case, since many facets of the existence of a human agent

of such facets of existence include GCAs that are necessary for our existing at all, or capable of fulfilling even very basic purposes, such as the externally manifested biological processes that are associated with the existence of the mind (Beyleveld 1991, 88-89).

4.3.4 Conclusion

There is no decisive objection to stage 1 of the dialectically necessary method above (see 4.2). Therefore the interpretation of human rights as premised on agency under the dialectically contingent method should be accepted as valid. The various facets of human

development and continuation of agency, such as ‘vital signs,’ considered to be significant

under duty-based theory should therefore be rejected. This is particularly significant for the human right to enabled suicide under the PGC since the current disposition of an agent towards his fundamental interests is crucial to the justifiability of his suicide;12 arguments that a person has a near-absolute duty to themselves to continue living, as under the sanctity of life view, are therefore comprehensively rejected on that basis. The implications of the dialectically contingent method advanced above in terms of the Hohfeldian elements and nature of a human right to enabled suicide are considered below.