The human right to enabled suicide as a generic right under the PGC

It has already been established that a Gewirthian generic right to enabled suicide establishes that the claimant and respondents of such a right are agents and this conception is, of course, derived from the PGC. Similarly, the object and nature of a generic right to enabled suicide, briefly set out in chapter 2 (see 2.6), are derived from the PGC. In terms of the object, generic rights are to generic conditions of action of agents (GCAs), which are established under stage 1 of the dialectically necessary method (DNM) and dialectically contingent method (DCM). In terms of their nature, the generic rights are on the will-conception because they are possessed instrumentally by each agent to further their own purposes. The basic constituent elements and nature of a generic right to enabled suicide is developed in this section, while

12_{Gewirth argues that self-regarding duties are valid under the PGC, but not the duty to continue one’s life that} is similar to the duty to refrain from taking the life of others defended under the sanctity of life view (Gewirth 1998, 134ff.).

the next section will develop the responsibility of UK State institutions to secure the generic right to enabled suicide.

As regards the object of a purported right to enabled suicide, the UK government must secure the generic right to life by interfering where an agent (A) acts to end another agent’s (B’s) life without his consent, since this destroys B’s capacity for action. It is clear that involvement in life-terminating action13 is impermissible only when such an action

contradicts agent B’s purposes. In Reason and Morality, Gewirth identified various

categories of needs which are based on the degree to which certain properties are necessary for an agent to act successfully (1978, 53ff.). Gewirth also identified two distinct elements within each category: those properties that relate to the freedom to carry out their purpose, and those properties which relate to their wellbeing (or ability) necessary to carry out a purpose. However, this thesis is concerned with the unusual instance in which an agent has a suicidal purpose, thus, in a sense, pitting wellbeing against freedom (Gewirth 1978, 137-78).

Since the PGC grants rights to the GCAs, and ‘death’ cannot be said to be an object of a

Generic Right, then the object of such a right is exclusively control over the continuation of agency.

The fact that death is not a GCA does not deny the possibility of a ‘right to enabled suicide’

under the PGC since the nature of the generic rights on the will-conception imply non-

interference with another agent’s control over his generic right to wellbeing. It is clear that

rights granted to agents under the PGC do not require of the duty bearer that the rights-

holder’s enjoyment of the GCAs be preserved against his will. The right to suicide is

therefore implied by protection of the generic right to life, which is inherently capable of waiver (see also 2.2.4).14 It should be emphasised that waiver will not necessarily amount to

the opposite of the generic right to life, or a generic right ‘to die,’ that is similar in structure

to the generic right to life. The generic right to life is a claim by an agent against others that they should not interfere with the continuation of his agency without his consent. This is the typical formulation of the generic right to life. The opposite of this – a generic right ‘to die’ –

as a right that other agents should interfere with the continuation of his agency without his

consent is nonsensical (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2007, 277). The Gewirthian approach to

a right to enabled suicide is that an agent’s choice as to when and how his agency should end

must be respected by respondents. The freedom-oriented nature of the right to commit suicide means that any action that might be required to enable suicide under such a right is confined to enabling freely chosen suicide, rather than enabling death. The relevant harm caused to the suicidal agent by denying suicide is not continued life but frustration of his interest in freedom, which is protected inherently by the PGC on the DCM (Beyleveld and Brownsword 2007, 277ff.).

The questions of the object and nature of a Convention right to enabled suicide, which the European Court of Human Rights struggled to address in Pretty v UK15 are thus straightforward under the PGC. The self-destructive aspect of a right to enabled suicide is not a cause for interest-based concerns with the protection of suicidal people, such as Pretty, from

‘themselves’. However, as the next section will demonstrate, the application of this right to

evaluate English law is not without nuance. The responsibility of the UK legislature to secure the generic right to enabled suicide by positing rules applicable to all agents under its jurisdiction means that there is a need to protect the generic rights of agents other than the suicidal claimant. The justifiability of restrictions on the exercise of the right to enabled suicide on the basis of the countervailing responsibility to other agent raises similar questions of proportionality, discrimination and lawfulness that were faced by the ECtHR in Pretty (see 3.6).

4.5 The responsibility to secure the generic right to enabled suicide in English law under