DEGREES OF EUROPEANIZATION: ISSUE, TARGET, PARTICIPANT, AND EVENT SCOPES

Europeanization theory argues that domestic collective actors have several protest strategies available to them in the multi-level polity, depending on their political and discursive opportunities and their resources (see e.g. della Porta & Caiani 2009).

Hence, depending on these variables, on the one hand, there will be ‘non-Europeanized’ domestic actors, solely active on domestic issues with domestic scopes (i.e. ‘domestic protests’) (Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015). Yet, on the other, there will be some actors, who Europeanize their contention by protesting around European issues, targeting European decision-makers with fellow, European contenders. Such cases indicate that the EU has supranationalized as a polity (Caiani & Graziano 2018).

In order to consider both the variation in national groups’ degrees of Europeanization, and to analyse their Europeanization paths, prior Europeanization studies have focused on four aspects of the actions, namely the scope of the protest targets, issues, participants, and events (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Caiani & Graziano 2018). The extent to which these various scopes are ‘European’ and/or ‘transnational’

gives a good indication about the various groups’ degrees and forms of Europeanization (see e.g. Caiani & Graziano 2018).

Scope of Issues

The ‘issue scope’ is a crucial aspect for collective actors’ Europeanization paths. It considers whether the given groups’ protest issue involves a problem that requires a

‘domestic’ or ‘European’ policy solution. Scholars exploring collective action have had difficulties to both define and determine the ‘issue scope,’ due to the intertwined nature of many domestic and European policy issues, making it hard to distinguish between an issue’s breadth (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; Hutter 2014a). As Hutter (2014a) states, one can only establish “a very crude measure, because most problems or goals can result from internationalization processes” (2014a: 178).

This study draws on Bourne and Chatzopoulou’s (2015) approach, and considers an issue scope as ‘domestic,’ if it can be “specifically linked to a domestic decision or a domestic political arena,” ‘European’ if it relates to the European or EU political arena, or a “combination of both,” if both levels are involved (2015: 50). Even though Hutter (2014a) distinguishes between ‘local,’ ‘domestic,’ and ‘transnational’ issue scopes, his conceptualization is still rather similar. He exemplifies it by looking at migration policies, stating that issues related to the entry of foreigners to a country are

‘transnational’ problems (i.e. ‘European’), while issues related to the integration of the immigrants are ‘domestic’ in scope (Hutter 2014a), including, for example, the housing of refugees. This implies that if a demonstration for instance both involves demands around the immi- and integration of third country immigrants and refugees, it involves a combination of European and national issue scopes.

Hence, even though the ‘refugee crisis’ largely involved discussions at the EU-level about the entry of the refugees to the different EU MS (for instance during the ‘quota’

debates), i.e. it had a ‘European’ scope, the domestic mobilization could also relate to the integration of said refugees, i.e. have a ‘domestic’ scope. In such cases, i.e. where the issue surrounds a ‘domestic’ policy topic, there is no expectation that the given group will Europeanize its contention, as it will want to take the claims to the appropriate level of decision-making, i.e. the nation-state (Tarrow 1998). This is why the issue scope is rather indicative for a collective actors’ (potential) mobilization strategy in terms of Europeanization (see Table 3.1 below).

Scope of Targets

As argued above, it is expected that the shifting level of decision-making (i.e. from the national to the EU-level) will infer that protests increasingly will target the EU with demands for political change (Tarrow 1998). Hence, Europeanization works from the assumption that protest organisers voicing political demands have a predefined target, or addressee, in mind when organising a demonstration or other protest event, depending on the political entity, they consider most apt to approach for attaining their goals. When the given group perceives a foreign or international actor to be most approachable, the targeting is expected to shift accordingly.

Europeanization research thus frequently focuses on whether protest “targets are principally domestic authorities, European authorities (including EU institutions and state authorities abroad), or both” (Bourne & Chatzopolou 2015: 39; see also Caiani

& Graziano 2018).

The exploration of the context-specific situation surrounding the ‘refugee crisis’ is expected to lead to the illumination of very different national responses by the different actors under investigation, not least the extent to which they target the EU in their mobilization. In terms of the different EU institutions and their roles regarding EU migration policy, then besides the European Commission and the European Parliament, the European Council is also an influential decision-making power as it sets the strategic priorities for the EU (Monforte 2014). As the institution consists of the EU MS’ ministers, it can be influenced on the national level, via pressures on the national governments. This entails that the various national extra-parliamentary far right actors have various available protest strategies available, depending on the specific EU institution they (potentially) target.

At the same time, collective actors may also target other European actors besides the EU. For instance, they may problematize the actions of, and thus target, other EU member states, especially if these have an impact on the collective actor’s own nation-state. This was, for example, seen during the anti-austerity protests in Greece where numerous groups targeted Germany (Van Gent et al. 2013: 153; see also Bourne &

Chatzopoulou 2015). Similarly, politicians from other EU MS may also be presented as part of the solution to a given problem (Monforte 2014).

Scope of Participants

In order to explore the breadth of the European protest arenas, Europeanization literature also focuses on the extent to which “movement actors take action predominantly alongside fellow domestic actors, fellow European actors or both”

(Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015: 39). While some studies have focused on the composition of the hosting organization(s) (i.e. the specific claim maker), and whether it/they consist(s) of domestic or transnational actors, or both (e.g. the domestic branches of transnational organizations, such as Amnesty International) (Ibid.), this study looks at the configuration of the protest participants at the various domestically organised demonstrations. This choice is based on the desire to more closely examine the extent of the transnationalization of the far right, including in the crowd, as such protest participation also can be conducive to the development of European identities (see e.g. Bourne & Chatzopoulou 2015; della Porta & Caiani 2009).

Research by scholars such as Schlembach (2011) shows that particularly the extreme right scene, especially neo-Nazis, fairly frequently have joint each other’s protest events abroad, especially around commemorative events, like the birthdays of historical figures, such as Hitler or Himmler. Prior research has also shown that activists from EDL and its European network frequently joined each other’s demonstrations, organized more or less European demonstrations in a particular European MS (e.g. the 2011 European Defence League demonstration in Aarhus, Denmark (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Brun 2013)) or participated as speakers at rallies abroad (Ibid.). Yet, despite this evident European cooperation at the street level, there has hardly been any research conducted that explores why the groups wish to partake in events abroad, plus the extent to which such border-crossing exchanges take place (see e.g. Schlembach 2011 for an exception). Hence, this study considers the composition of the crowd and/or the invited speakers and whether these actors are domestic, cross-border (i.e. from neighbouring countries), or European.

Scope of Events

The ‘event scope’ “refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the substantive mobilisation of the event” (Caiani & Graziano 2018: 1051). In Caiani and Graziano’s (2018) framework, these actions both include protests staged at the EU-institutions, or simultaneously in several EU MS. The latter draws on Imig and Tarrow’s (2000;

2001a) framework on ‘transnational contention,’ which refers to protests involving transnational actors, who go up against the EU (or other supra- or transnational actors)

“in response to EU policies” (2000: 86f).

These ‘ideal-types’⁵² involve two types of mobilization, which both are included in this study, namely:

 Cooperative transnationalism: Various national actors carry out parallel,

“in cooperative but recognizably separate acts” in their domestic settings against a shared target or antagonist (like the ones included by Caiani &

Graziano 2018)

 Collective transnationalism: A larger protest action in one particular setting, which involves transnational participation towards a shared European target.

These ‘transnational protests’ can take many different forms, ranging from a network of actors carrying out single-day coordinated protest events in each partaking actors’

domestic setting, to longer-lasting campaigns against European actors (della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Monforte 2014). Hence, their scopes may differ both in terms of geography, politics, and duration, but they can all be considered ‘European’ protest events (Caiani & Graziano 2018).

The inclusion of ‘event scopes’ to the Europeanization framework not only sheds more light on the role of the European space of contention, but several scholars also allude to the effects of protests for the collective identity formation amongst the activists, also at the transnational level (della Porta 2006; della Porta & Caiani 2009;

Tarrow 2005)⁵³. Hence, these joint protest actions may help foster a stronger sense of solidarity between the participating groups⁵⁴.

52 ‘International conflict’ is deliberately left out of this overview, as the targeting of

“competitors from other nations” is an unlikely strategy for collective actors that do not pursue economic goals (unlike e.g. farmers and fishermen who have carried out these types of protests in the past in order to ensure their fishing and farming rights) (Imig & Tarrow 2000: 87).

53 As such, protest participation “generates bonds between activists and builds up a shared history and memories that can sustain movements even in periods of low activity or abeyance”

(Flesher Fominaya 2010: 46). The closer bonds are created via protest actions, which

‘eventfulness’ has “cognitive, affective and relational impacts” on the participants in question, including far right groups (Caiani et al. 2012: 12; see also Busher 2016; Simi & Futrell 2010).

54 Moreover, there are also several other possible ways that extra-parliamentary organizations can transnationalise their contention and other political activities. This can for instance be through pan-European conferences, meetings, or social events, aimed at fostering closer links between the various participants. Yet, these types of actions are not included in the collective action examination (see Chapter 2 and Appendix B).