DISCUSSION: LIKELY EU-RELATIONS OF THE GI AND FE GROUPS

The introduction to the groups making up Generation Identity and Fortress Europe have revealed several features, which can help deduce their likely Europeanization strategies.

Material Resources: Limited for Both the GI and FE Groups

For one, it has been argued, and to a certain extent demonstrated, that none of the extra-parliamentary GI and FE groups have either the manpower, level of professionalization, or required financial means to set up offices at the EU institutions.

At the same time, the subcultural and groupuscular GI groups, the various PEGIDA protest groups, IVČRN’s small core organizational team, and NGO ISIS’ blog nature infer very informal and highly fragmented organizational forms, without high numbers of formal memberships, something that is also not conducive to the pursuit of insider strategies at the EU level. Hence, even though some of the GI groups (especially GI France, GI Austria, and GI Germany) have a rather professional, and to some extent, efficient media strategy, plus are very apt at political communication (see e.g. Castelli Gattinara & Froio 2018), they have neither the organizational capacity, nor the ideational interest, to take this professionalism to the EU-level.

Symbolic Resources: Mobilizing on Diffuse, Political, and Politicized Issues

Drawing on Islamophobic fears, the GI and FE groups deliver the same core message:

the so-called ‘Islamization’ of Western societies and the religion’s impact on the European culture, demography, society, and politics must be curtailed. They thus call for the maintenance of a culturally and ethnically homogenous autochthonous European civilization, whose culture is under threat by the Muslim ‘other’ (Hirsch-Hoefler & Mudde 2013). This mainly evolves around the perception that “Muslims are aggressively forcing their beliefs upon indigenous nations,” for instance, through the introduction of Sharia law together with the fear that “Islam” will soon “become the dominant religion in Europe” (Madisson & Ventsel as cited in Kasekamp et al.

2018: 8). Moreover, the actors making up both coalitions employ antiliberal and -establishment discursive appeals. In this way, they not only target Muslim immigrants and refugees but also the national and EU elites, who they blame for the problems

facing many EU Member States (see Ch. 6 and 7 for more on these blame attributions).

The groups’ mobilizing frames thus mainly evolve around opposition to Islam and third-country immigration, and these topics belong under the category of ‘diffuse’

interests (della Porta & Caiani 2009).

In addition, the frames consider a political campaign topic (Parks 2015), and thus, are most likely to lead to protest actions and other means of simultaneously addressing both the public and the decision-makers. This aligns with both the GI and FE groups’

more overarching ambitions of swaying public opinion rather than directly influencing the political decision-makers through lobbyism and other conventional means (such as is a frequent approach by interest groups, see e.g. Beyers 2004). The groups’ strong distrust in established politics, which particularly the FE protest groups express, is also likely to make them refrain from seeking personal contacts to EU representatives, aside from potentially far right MEPs.

Additionally, the topic of immigration has become a ‘hot topic’ in European politics in recent decades, and as a policy issue, it involves intense political conflicts and divisions, making it highly politicized (see e.g. Grande et al. 2018). In this sense, both the GI groupuscules and the FE extra-parliamentary groups largely equate the actors, which made up the transnational movements according to Monforte’s (2014) research.

They mobilize employing strongly politicized frames, and they have no interest in political processes and deliberations, just as they are unlikely to meet resonance in the EU setting due to their averse symbolic resources, both in terms of expression styles and content.

The GI and FE Groups’ Negative Stances on the EU

As all the groups hold negative perceptions of the EU, which is founded in an opposition to its supranational powers, and to its (perceived) bureaucratic, inefficient, and elitist nature, it is highly unlikely that any of the groups will want to take their demands to the EU buildings. All the groups at least state that they are proponents of democracy, but mainly advocate more direct democratic means, i.e. a larger inclusion of the public in the decision-making process.

The EU’s Negative Stance on the Far Right

At the same time, due to the GI and FE groups’ anti-liberal and xenophobic viewpoints and statements, there is absolutely no expectation that the EU is willing to either fund, or accommodate the work of these far right extra-parliamentary actors. As Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union states,

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are

common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (OJEU 2012)

These values clearly conflict with those expressed by both the GI and FE-groups. In fact, due to the European extreme right party group Alliance of European National Movements’ (AENM) racist and undemocratic worldview, it is already highly controversial that the EP provides funding for this group of actors (see e.g. Taylor 2012). Moreover, unlike in most national European parliaments, the anti-immigration discourse of the radical right parties has still not become part of the dominant discourse within the EP. In fact, “[a]t the EU level a powerful coalition of institutional actors and human rights activists have spearheaded anti-racist legislation and successfully contributed to the diffusion of anti-racist concerns in all European institutions” (Fella & Ruzza 2013: 20)¹¹⁸. Thus, there are numerous examples of groups and legislative initiatives, which attempt to counter the rise of xenophobic and anti-immigrant behaviour and pan-European CSOs, which attempt to exercise influence, when the EP is deliberating legislation on migration rights (like the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) or the European Network of Migrant Women (ENoMW)¹¹⁹. Hence, GI’s centring of “white identity as the primary cause for organizing political, social, and cultural life” (Donovan et al. 2018) is highly unlikely to draw support from any EU actors, just as the essentialist portrayal of Islam by both coalition’s groups juxtapose the EU’s framework on human rights (see e.g. European Commission n.d.).

118 Particularly the European Commission and the EP’s (usual) promotion of liberal and more progressive values and policies makes it highly unlikely that extra-parliamentary actors, which express protectionism and hostility towards liberalism, democracy and third country immigration, will be permitted a voice within the institutions. This has already been plainly visible in terms of the populist radical right MEPs, against whom a cordon sanitaire was imposed by the other EP fractions, as the grand coalition (S&D and EPP) assures that the radical right MEPs do not become successful with their policy proposals (Startin 2010). Populist discourse is similarly met with great condemnation by the EU leaders (consider, for instance, the Commission President, Jean Claude Juncker, who has strongly admonished Eurosceptic populist parties (see e.g. Juncker’s State of the Union, 2016: Europe faces “galloping populism”

(Ellyatt 2016), or the great criticism, which has been directed towards the Hungarian PM Victor Órban). Moreover, MEP activists have also created various groups against xenophobia and racism (e.g. EP Intergroups and the S&D group’s working group on extremism, populism, and xenophobia).

119 On the other hand, in their research on pro-migrant organizations and the EU, Giugni and Passy (2002) explain how the EU institutions’ own political agenda may also inhibit civil societal direct involvement in the EU institutions. They argue that the European Commission’s re-direction of focus on the EU’s external borders in the late 1990s-early 2000s meant that the EU doors ‘closed’ for pro-migrant organizations (Ibid.).

It can therefore be expected that the EU institutions impose a restraint on far right extra-parliamentary actors who are unlikely to be greeted with open arms by EU officials. The GI and FE leaders are thus unlikely to conceive EU access as a viable political and discursive opportunity. This assumption has already somewhat been affirmed by prior research, as “in the consultation of civil society during the EU constitutional process, a bias in favour of more ‘civilized’, moderate, often EU‐

sponsored civil society organizations has been noted” (Lombardo as cited in della Porta & Caiani 2009: 8). One should thus not expect that far right extra-parliamentary actors Europeanize through insider strategies at the EU-level.

Expected Europeanization Strategies

Returning to the framework introduced at the beginning of this chapter, and the analytical model introduced in the theoretical framework (see Figure 3.1), both the GI and FE extra-parliamentary groups lack the material resources to mobilize through insider strategies at the EU level. Moreover, their action repertoires and worldviews, i.e. their symbolic resources, do not align with the culture and ethos of the EU and its institutions, making any form of collective action at the EU institutions improbable, as the EU representatives are unlikely to respond to the actors’ demands.

Instead, the far right extra-parliamentary groups are expected to pursue more transnational avenues and indirectly target the EU institutions by attempts to influence the European public opinion (Monforte 2014). Together with their critical stance towards the EU, the politicized and diffuse nature of their mobilization issue, and their protest repertoires, they are more likely to form part of ‘transnational movements’ (Ibid.).