Dehio

2.3.2.1 Dehio 2.3.2.1 Dehio 2.3.2.1 Dehio

As Goldstein (1988:111-112) notes, the German historian Ludwig Dehio was one of the first authors to write about the recurrent attempts of certain European powers to achieve world domination (depending of course on what constituted ‘the world’ at the time). Although he

cannot be strictly categorised as belonging to the long cycle school, and is indeed placed in the realist tradition by Goldstein (1988:124) as depicted in Figure 2.1 (on page 20), due to his emphasis on politico-military predominance, in this study his work is placed in the long cycle school due to his contributions to the development of this approach, especially with regards to the role of sea power. It should be clearly noted however that Dehio was writing as a historian, not as a political scientist, and he never assigned a cyclical component to this recurrent drive for domination. Yet, his work is insightful as it shed new light on the relationship between war and hegemony.

Dehio (1962:5) placed his primary emphasis on states. Throughout European history there have been recurrent attempts by Continental powers to achieve politico-military predominance in the world, yet in each instance that attempt was thwarted by an island power (at the head of a “grand coalition”) (Goldstein, 1988:112; Dehio, 1959:17). For Dehio (1962:25), this distinction between Continental and island (or insular) powers is significant, since this feature of their geography placed states on different paths of development. In short, insular powers are either partially or totally surrounded by water (such as the Dutch Republic and Great Britain respectively) or, as in the case of the United States, happen to be a continent-sized power also isolated by water.

These insular powers differed on several counts from Continental ones, such as France, which was forced, due to its long frontiers with other Continental States, to give priority to the development of its army instead of its navy, although it borders both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, with access to the North Sea via the English Channel. In essence, while Continental states tended to feature absolute monarchies, strong bureaucracies, grand foreign policy strategies, and perhaps most significantly, raised large armies to achieve greatness, insular powers were in many ways characterised by the opposite features (Dehio, 1962:70). In insular states, the monarchy was generally kept in check, and government by the people was emphasised over government by the bureaucracy since, as Garst (1985:479) notes, decentralised and indirect methods of revenue extraction were generally more efficient than those found in absolute monarchies with their associated direct taxation (often exempting the wealthy), which in turn allowed insular states to consistently finance “the naval buildup necessary for world-wide commercial expansion.”

The cause of this dichotomy between land and sea powers (apart from the obvious role of geography) is well summarised in the work of Fox (1971), who explored the underlying cause of the European maritime-Continental dualism, which features centrally in Dehio’s arguments. Essentially, to trace the roots of the dichotomy, Fox investigated the towns of early modern Europe, and concluded that although all towns engaged to some extent in the exchange and distribution of goods, there was a clear distinction between those that were oriented primarily to local trade or barter, and those that were involved primarily in the long-distance trade of commodities (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:36). As a consequence, two categories of towns can be identified – agrarian towns were those specialising in the circulation of produce at the local level, and were most likely to be found on the flanks of the central corridor formed by the urban trade route that connected Italy and the Mediterranean with the North Sea and Baltic; and commercial towns, which were located near, and consequently integrated into, the larger trade network that ran through the

“heartland of the old Western Empire” (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:30,36-37).

The political units of early modern Europe were, in turn, influenced by the class of town which predominated within them. This is not to say that pure categories of commercial and agricultural political units ever existed, but it can aid in explaining the dominant character of European states in the early modern world, in that, as Rasler and Thompson (1989:37)

observe, agriculturally dominated units were “apt to encompass large conglomerations of a number of small, largely self-sufficient economic units,” and in order to maintain political cohesion between those units, “a political system evolves that emphasises military force, an administrative chain of command, and a marked propensity for concern with territorial control and expansion.” Meanwhile, since commercially dominated units are more interdependent given the network of urban trading centres to which they belong, “the interest in territorial jurisdiction is minimal,” while the involvement of wealthy merchants in this long-distance trade network means that “the dominant political emphasis is more likely to favor negotiation and consensus, both within the commercial city [and the government of the political unit to which it belongs, hence the diminished power of the monarchy] and between the various cities in the larger network” (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:38).

The differences in character between these agriculturally and commercially oriented units mean that “agricultural units [are] predispose[d] … toward continuing conflict with other agricultural units as well as with the commercial units,” and that the wealth of the commercial units “poses a constant temptation for nearby agricultural societies” (Rasler and Thompson, 1989:38). Following from Fox’s agrarian-commercial dichotomy, a number of comparative statements about the “structures and behaviors associated with preindustrial societies in which one or the other type of town predominates” can be posited, as is done in Table 2.2. Although Rasler and Thompson (1989:38) caution against creating ideal type dichotomies that “risk exaggerating the types of abstract characteristics that must ultimately be applied to the real world,” Fox’s work nevertheless helps to expand the understanding of the underlying cause of the maritime-Continental dichotomy that forms the foundation of the work of scholars such as Dehio, and which features centrally in this study.

Table Table Table

Table 2222....2222. Fox’s Societal Dichotomy. Fox’s Societal Dichotomy. Fox’s Societal Dichotomy . Fox’s Societal Dichotomy

Source: Rasler and Thompson (1989:37).

Turning to Dehio once again, he concludes that since insular powers developed strong navies, they could act as intermediaries between different regions and cultures of the world (Dehio, 1962:25). This, for instance, allowed the British to acquire their formidable overseas empire, while the Continental powers were more preoccupied with battling each other for dominance of the European continent (Dehio, 1962:15). In times of war, this global reach was used to the great advantage of the insular powers (who acted to maintain the balance of power), since they could rely on the territories outside of the European continent for assistance in the fight against the Continental powers seeking supremacy (Dehio, 1962:264).

Insular powers, particularly Britain, could also use their naval strength to ‘quarantine’ the European continent with the aim of preventing any Continental power from breaking out onto the world stage during their quests for supremacy (Dehio, 1962:85). Naval blockades, and the ability to land troops at any location on the Continent’s coast, were also significant advantages for insular powers during times of war (Dehio, 1962:168).

For Dehio (1962:55) the great wars of European history can be condensed into a confrontation between two ways of life (which have their roots in Fox’s societal dichotomy as discussed above). On one end lay the Continental powers, characterised by the rigid authority of the military and the bureaucracy, and by strict rule that was imposed from above (Dehio, 1962:136). In the insular powers, on the other end of the spectrum, faith and tradition were elastic and fluid, and there existed space for new innovations without risk of chaos (Dehio, 1962:135). In fact, Dehio (1962:272) goes so far as to say that the insular powers were endowed with the free spirit of humanity, which was protected by a “shield of insularity.” Insular powers, like the Dutch Republic, were furthermore marked by general religious tolerance, unlike the Continental powers, and cultural life in insular powers was marked by a flourishing of art and science. This confrontation, Rasler and Thompson (1989:28) maintain, has taken place “in iterative fashion over the past 500 years because their interests [those of the insular, commercial, sea powers on the one hand, and those of the Continental powers on the other] have diverged on how best to organize and manage the global political system and world economy” – the very issues that are decided in a Great Power War.

Among the insular powers, Dehio (1962:25,49-50,55,239) counts Venice (as the prototype), the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States. Dehio remarks however, that the Dutch still had to focus some of their attention on defending a land frontier, and that consequently their advantage was less marked. This ‘amphibious’ setting in which the Dutch found themselves nevertheless proved to be vital in the long struggle for independence from Spain, since they were better able to resist Spanish advances (and those of France in 1672).

Dehio (1962:51) also remarks that although the Portuguese were the first to initiate long-distance oceanic trade with Asia, their glory was “as fleeting as a meteor,” since they lacked an insular position, and were eventually absorbed by Spain in 1580.

Among the Continental powers that launched bids for world domination are Spain (under Charles and Philip), France (under Louis XIV and later Napoleon), and Germany (during World War I and II). In each Great Power War a single ocean battle crippled the Continental powers’ attempts to expand beyond the Continent, and forced them to turn inwards, placing them on the path to eventual defeat (Dehio, 1962:78). Goldstein (1988:113-4) summarises these turning points as the defeat of the Spanish Armada (1588), the defeat of the French fleet of Louis XIV (1692), the defeat of the French fleet at Aboukir (1798), and a further defeat of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar (1805). In the case of the German attempt to invade Britain in World War II however, the decisive battle took place primarily in the air (the Battle of Britain). Indeed, this fact has led Dehio (1962:281) to

remark that with the dawning of the aircraft, “the sea has begun to lose its importance as a protective belt.” This reflects the contemporary need for both a strong navy and air force during wartime, as shown by the British in World War II.