Modelski

2.3.2.2 Modelski 2.3.2.2 Modelski 2.3.2.2 Modelski

George Modelski, whose work is highly representative of the long cycle school, follows Toynbee’s reformulation of Wright’s fifty-year war cycles (Goldstein, 1988:126). Modelski (1978) traces the origins of the modern global political system to around 1500. However, in his work, Modelski has stressed that global political processes are autonomous from economic processes, which distinguishes this approach from that of the world-economy school, and which explains why Modelski has been depicted in a neo-Realist light, as mentioned earlier.

For Modelski, ‘world powers’ are those states which “monopolize the function of order-keeping in the global system” (Goldstein, 1988:126). However, Modelski prefers to use the term ‘world leaders’ when referring to these states which, although carrying the same fundamental meaning as Wallerstein’s preferred moniker hegemon, is intended to emphasise cooperative instead of exploitative aspects of the relationship between the leader and the other states in the interstate system, which places Modelski in the liberal tradition (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:3).

Modelski identifies four states that have occupied this world leadership role since 1500, namely Portugal, the Dutch Republic, Britain, and the United States (Goldstein, 1988:126).

Each of these powers remained dominant for roughly a century, forming part of the

‘leadership cycle’. A fundamental difference between the approaches taken by Dehio and Modelski is where the focus of each lies – for Dehio it is with the states that failed in their bids for supremacy, while Modelski stresses those powers that were successful. However, Modelski shares with Dehio one of the key features of the long cycle approach – a respect for sea power. Here, Modelski follows in the tradition of Alfred Mahan (1890), who wrote about the topic of sea power at the end of the nineteenth century (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:4).

For Modelski, it is this facet of world leadership, namely naval strength, which forms the cornerstone of the explanation of why certain states, and not others, have managed to become ‘world leaders’. The reason for this, simply and eloquently stated, is because “there can be no global system without global reach” (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:3). Having a strong command of the sea is thus an inescapable requirement for a state to carry, or

‘project’, its power over long distances and large areas. Since the only states capable of exercising this global reach are those possessing superior navies, the study of sea power (the use and command of the sea) must form an integral part of the endeavour to understand how world leadership (and hegemony) comes about.

Modelski and Thompson (1988:11-12) identify four reasons why sea power proved to be the crucial ingredient in creating (and preserving) world order. The first reason is because states with powerful navies are able to contain or destroy the navies of their opponents, severely limiting the reach of the latter. Secondly, navies protect the home bases of states possessing them, while enabling direct attacks on the territories of their opponents. This ties in directly with Dehio’s argument that Continental powers were at a disadvantage against insular powers. Thirdly, powerful navies protect lines of communications and trade, while disrupting those of enemy states. Lastly, navies help to cement coalitions and to protect links between allied states. This was particularly clear in World War II, when the oceanic ‘lifeline’

between Britain and the United States helped the former to resist German attacks.

Modelski and Thompson (1988:17) make the proposition that those countries which rise to world leadership are those which acquire preponderant naval strength in the course of global (Great Power) war. For this reason, Modelski classifies all global wars as naval wars (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:18-19). The reason for this is because these wars were contests for world leadership and, as previously mentioned, there can be no world leadership without sea power. The five contests which Modelski classifies as global wars are the Italian and Indian Ocean Wars, the Dutch and Spanish Wars, the Wars of Louis XIV, the Napoleonic Wars, and the First and Second World Wars. Like Dehio, Modelski identifies crucial ocean battles in each war (see Table 2.3). Although not ending the fighting directly, these battles created the “preconditions of final victory” (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:22). Furthermore, no power could launch a successful bid for world supremacy if it did not control the oceans, which leads Modelski to also classify all global wars as “containment wars.” Naturally, as Table 2.4 demonstrates, the world leaders identified by Modelski (1988:133) have also been the major naval innovators of the modern world.

Table Table Table

Table 2222....3333. Modelski’s Global Wars and their Key Sea Battles. Modelski’s Global Wars and their Key Sea Battles. Modelski’s Global Wars and their Key Sea Battles. Modelski’s Global Wars and their Key Sea Battles³³³³

Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:21).

Another concept central to Modelski’s argument is that of long cycles (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:97). These long cycles of world leadership refer to the fluctuations in the concentration of global reach capabilities, which as seen above, refer specifically to naval capabilities. Between the bouts of global war mentioned above, there occur fluctuations in the concentration of naval power. During global wars, naval capabilities become highly

3 Although not explicitly identified as such by either Modelski or Wallerstein, the Spanish-Ottoman Wars of the sixteenth century, which culminated in the sea battle of Lepanto (1571), can be regarded as an integral part of the Dutch-Spanish, English-Spanish, and French-Spanish Wars of the same era.

Table Table Table

Table 2222....4444. Naval Innovations by Various World Powers. Naval Innovations by Various World Powers. Naval Innovations by Various World Powers. Naval Innovations by Various World Powers

Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:25).

concentrated, and this concentration lasts for a finite amount of time after the war, providing the state with the highest concentration the foundation for executing its world leadership.

However, as time progresses, naval capabilities become increasingly deconcentrated, as the dominant naval power begins to shift its priorities away from maintaining its navy. This opens up space for future challengers to expand their navies. Then, when the next global war erupts, one state succeeds in obtaining a superior navy to its adversaries, which lays the foundation for the next post-war international order.

For Modelski, this naval-power concentration is a useful measuring tool to identify the state that can be classified as the world leader at any one time. Specifically, states qualify as world powers when they possess 50% or more of the total naval capabilities in the world (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:105). This constitutes what Modelski calls a “monopoly of seapower” and according to him, four states have held this position since 1500, namely Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain, and the United States (Modelski and Thompson, 1988:133). This reinforces Modelski’s view that these four powers can be classified as world leaders, and that sea power is one of the key ingredients of world leadership.

Modelski and Thompson (1988:248) also support Dehio’s argument that Continental states struggled to create powerful navies due to the fact that they had to concentrate their resources on the army. The reason for this was because Continental states had to prioritise the defence of their borders, and were constantly jostling with their powerful neighbours.

Island states (or insular states on the fringes of the European continent), did not have to divide their focus or resources between the army and the navy, and could therefore gain a significant advantage over their Continental rivals, whose sailors lacked sufficient experience and sustained momentum and support to allow them to compete on the same level as the insular powers.

Finally, in order to understand what underpins the long cycle of world leadership, Modelski turns to long waves (Goldstein, 1988:129). Goldstein (1988:6-7) identifies a long wave as an economic cycle lasting around fifty years (recall Wright’s fifty year cycles in the concentration of wars). Long waves, also known as Kondratieff waves, are composed of alternating economic phases, an expansion phase (or upswing), and a stagnation phase (downswing). Goldstein notes that the cycle repeats roughly every fifty years, and that it is synchronous across borders, which is indicative of a systemic-level phenomenon. The leadership cycle of one hundred years was thought to be connected with pairs of long waves, with innovation acting as the driving force (Goldstein, 1988:129).

Originally, Modelski tied each one of the four phases of the leadership cycle to either an upswing or downswing in the long wave, with global war occurring on the first upswing, the establishment of world power on the first downswing, delegitimisation occurring on the

Table Table Table

Table 2222....5555. Years During Which a Single State Possessed 50% or More of the World’s Naval . Years During Which a Single State Possessed 50% or More of the World’s Naval . Years During Which a Single State Possessed 50% or More of the World’s Naval . Years During Which a Single State Possessed 50% or More of the World’s Naval Capabilities

CapabilitiesCapabilities Capabilities⁴⁴⁴⁴

Source: Modelski and Thompson (1988:105)

second upswing, and deconcentration taking place on the second downswing. However, Modelski later moved away from the close linkage between the leadership cycle and the long wave, citing that due to fundamental dissynchronisation these phenomena should be treated as separate albeit related processes (Goldstein, 1988:133).