The Deliberate Force Plan in Action

W i t h t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s c o n t i n g e n c y p l a n s f o r protection of the safe areas and the formation of the over -a r c h i n g D e l i b e r -a t e F o r c e p l -a n , t h e i m p l e m e n t -a t i o n o f -a n y o f t h e m n o w a w a i t e d t w o e v e n t s t h a t h a d t o o c c u r b e f o r e a i r strikes could begin. One of the warring factions had to pull one of the so-called triggers, and NATO a n d t h e U N h a d t o t u r n t h e k e y s . Before the latter event could occur, the UNPF c o m m a n d e r d e c i d e d t h a t h e h a d t o c o m p l e t e l y r e d e p l o y h i s forces within Bosnia-Herzegovina i n o r d e r t o m i n i m i z e t h e possibility of a repeat of the earlier hostage taking of UN p e a c e k e e p e r s (following the May attack on Pale ). UNPROFOR c o m p l e t e d i t s r e d e p l o y m e n t , a n d G e n e r a l J a n v i e r , UNPF force c o m m a n d e r , w a s p r e p a r e d t o t u r n h i s k e y a f t e r 2 5 A u g u s t .^{2 7} T h e m a r k e t p l a c e m o r t a r i n g o n 2 8 A u g u s t s e r v e d t o p u l l t h e required trigger. Admiral Smith t u r n e d t h e N A T O key i m m e d i-a t e l y , i-a n d L t G e n R u p e r t S m i t h —commi-ander of UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina a n d G e n e r a l J a n v i e r ’s s u b o r d i n a t e — t u r n e d t h e U N key^{2 8} on 29 August. NATO aircraft flew their f i r s t m i s s i o n s a t t h e e n d o f t h a t t a s k i n g d a y .^{2 9}

At 0600Z on 29 August, COMAIRSOUTH and his staff from Naples arrived at the CAOC. Colonel Zoerb , AOC d i r e c t o r , a n d Col Steve Teske, CAOC Plans director, jointly oversaw the

p l a n n i n g, t a s k i n g , a n d t a r g e t e e r i n g p r o c e s s f r o m t h a t p o i n t o n . I n v o l v e d i n t h e s e p r o c e s s e s w e r e s e v e r a l s p e c i a l - p u r p o s e cells, each with its own area of expertise or responsibility and staffed mostly by US Air Force p e r s o n n e l o n t e m p o r a r y d u t y .

The first day’s planned operations derived mostly from Op-e r a t i o n s V u l c a n a n d D Op-e a d Op-e y Op-e S o u t h Op-e a s t . Initial SEAD a n d a i r s t r i k e s t a r g e t e d B o s n i a n S e r b IADS, C², and fielded forces.

F i v e a d d i t i o n a l w a v e s o f s t r i k e s w e r e p l a n n e d a g a i n s t t a r g e t s i n t h e s o u t h e a s t Z O A. P r e - a n d p o s t s t r i k e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , t a n k e r , a i r b o r n e e a r l y w a r n i n g, electronic intelligence, air -b o r n e -b a t t l e f i e l d c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l, a n d c o m -b a t a i r p a t r o l were integrated to provide 24hour coverage. This heavy reli a n c e o n s u p p o r t a s s e t s c o n t i n u e d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . T h e a c t u a l s o r t i e r a t e w a s n e a r l y d o u b l e t h a t a n t i c i -pated prior to Deliberate Force, requiring the rapid deploym e n t of additional SEAD , t a n k e r , a n d o t h e r s u p p o r t a s s e t s t o t h e t h e a t e r , m o s t f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .^{3 0} The F-16CJ w i t h t h e h i g h s p e e d a n t i r a d i a t i o n m i s s i l e t a r g e t i n g s y s t e m , f o r i n -s t a n c e , w a -s i n g r e a t d e m a n d , a -s w a -s t h e a i r b o r n e b a t t l e f i e l d c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l c e n t e r aircraft. The latter provided not only critical radio linkage between the CAOC a n d a i r f o r c e s that flew “feet dry” ( i . e . , o v e r l a n d ) b u t a l s o m u c h - n e e d e d C² c a p a b i l i t y . T h e h i g h d e m a n d f o r s u c h s u p p o r t i n g p l a y e r s w a s a l e s s o n l e a r n e d f o r a i r p l a n n e r s at all levels.

Because COMAIRSOUTH w a s e x t r e m e l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e possibility of fratricide a n d c o l l a t e r a l d a m a g e r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e b o m b i n g , h e p e r s o n a l l y s e l e c t e d e a c h t a r g e t a n d D M P I t h a t t h e a i r c r e w s u s e d t h r o u g h o u t D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e . H i s d i r e c t i n v o l v e m e n t , h o w e v e r , i n t r o d u c e d a n o t h e r e l e m e n t o f d e l a y into the air tasking message (ATM) p r o c e s s . F o r e x a m p l e , rapid retargeting of “shooter” missions required revision of the t a n k e r f l o w p l a n . E a c h t i m e a c h a n g e w a s i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e ATM c y c l e , t h e p l a n n i n g - t i m e c l o c k w o u l d r e s e t , w h i c h m e a n t t h a t p l a n n e r s were constantly trying to respond to new com -m a n d g u i d a n c e a n d b o -m b d a -m a g e a s s e s s -m e n t or otherwise be r e s p o n s i v e t o t h e U N.

According to doctrine and practice prior to Deliberate Force, the MAP w a s a s i n g l e - s o u r c e t a r g e t e e r i n g, w e a p o n e e r i n g, a n d s t r i k e - p a c k a g e c o n s t r u c t i o n t o o l t h a t s h o u l d h a v e c o n t r i b u t e d to production of the ATM. The latter should have been produced

b y 1 6 0 0 Z o f t h e d a y p r e c e d i n g t h e s t a r t o f t a s k i n g ( i . e . , 1 1 h o u r s b e f o r e t h e s t a r t o f t h e t a s k e d d a y ) . D u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f Deliberate Force, however, the MAP evolved from a working-level tool to a vital input to the ATM d u r i n g t h e f i r s t w e e k o r so. By the second week of operations, the MAP nearly took on a l i f e o f i t s o w n a n d w a s i s s u e d , a l o n g w i t h i t s o f t e n n u m e r o u s d a i l y c h a n g e s , a s t h e c o n c i s e a u t h o r i t y o n t a s k i n g s . T h e A T M w a s e s s e n t i a l l y r e l e g a t e d t o t h e s t a t u s o f a “ c o o k i e - c u t t e r ” style of planning d o c u m e n t s u b j e c t t o a n y n u m b e r o f c h a n g e s implemented by MAP a l t e r a t i o n s o r o t h e r r e a l - t i m e t a s k i n g s from CAOC c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n s .

The crisis action team produced the MAP after receipt of c o m m a n d e r ’ s g u i d a n c e , n e w l y a p p r o v e d t a r g e t s, and DMPIs , as well as any other specific guidance as to types of aircraft or o r d n a n c e t o u s e . A l t h o u g h p r e – D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e p l a n n i n g pro -c e d u r e s g e n e r a l l y a p p r o x i m a t e d t h o s e o f J o i n t P u b l i -c a t i o n (Pub) 3-56.1, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, a c t u a l p r o c e d u r e s a f t e r t h e f i r s t c o u p l e o f d a y s d i d n o t . U s i n g cookie-cutter ATMs a n d t a n k e r p l a n s , f a x i n g t h e M A P a n d i t s n u m e r o u s c h a n g e s t o u n i t s i n l i e u o f a d h e r i n g s t r i c t l y t o a p l a n n i n g c y c l e , a n d e m p l o y i n g s i m i l a r w o r k a r o u n d s w e r e d e -vised to account for the dynamic and politically sensitive na-t u r e o f na-t h e o p e r a na-t i o n .

G i v e n t h e a b u n d a n c e o f f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e a n d t h e r a t h e r l i m -i t e d t a r g e t s e t , s o m e o n e o u t s -i d e t h e o p e r a t -i o n m -i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o a s k w h y i t w a s s o d i f f i c u l t t o a d h e r e t o a t a s k i n g c y c l e w i t h a m i n i m a l n u m b e r o f c h a n g e s a n d t u r b u l e n c e . A n example may serve to show the pressures on COMAIRSOUTH a n d t h e C A O C staff. During the first week of the operation, p l a n n e r s t a r g e t e d a n a m m u n i t i o n - s t o r a g e d e p o t , w r o t e t h a t attack into the ATM , a n d t a s k e d a m i s s i o n o f e i g h t s t r i k e a i r c r a f t p l u s a l l t h e n e c e s s a r y s u p p o r t t o d e s t r o y t h e d e p o t . Shortly before mission takeoff, the CAOC r e c e i v e d w o r d t h a t a c o m p a n y o f F r e n c h p e a c e k e e p e r s w a s c l o s e t o t h e t a r g e t . R a t h e r t h a n c a n c e l i n g t h e m i s s i o n o u t r i g h t , p l a n n e r s r e t a s k e d it within the same planning cycle for a different target. That c h a n g e t h e n r i p p l e d i n t o t h e t a n k e r - f l o w p l a n a s w e l l a s i n t o t h e t a s k i n g f o r a l l o t h e r a s s e t s p l a n n e d t o s u p p o r t t h e s t r i k e mission. These types of mission changes were relatively com -m o n p l a c e a n d a f f e c t e d t h e e n t i r e d a y ’ s s c h e d u l e .

The reason for canceling the original mission in the above example is fairly straightforward: to avoid the potential for frat-ricide in the mission area. The rationale for dynamically re-t a s k i n g re-t h e m i s s i o n , r a re-t h e r re-t h a n r o l l i n g re-t h e re-t a r g e re-t i n re-t o re-t h e n e x re-t ATM cycle, is more complex. An undercurrent of apprehension existed within the CAOC s e n i o r l e a d e r s h i p t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l leadership of the UN and NATO m i g h t h a l t t h e o p e r a t i o n b e f o r e t h e m i l i t a r y d e e m e d t h e j o b a c c o m p l i s h e d a n d o b j e c t i v e s achieved. Thus, the CAOC felt pressure to prosecute all poten -tial targets a s r a p i d l y a s p o s s i b l e j u s t i n c a s e t h a t o c c u r r e d .

C o n s t a n t l y c h a n g i n g t h e t a s k i n g f o r s o m a n y o f t h e CFACC’s a s s e t s h a d t h e e f f e c t o f s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o m p r e s s i n g t h e o r i g i n a l 2 4 - h o u r p l a n n i n g / t a s k i n g c y c l e . T h e A T M a n d MAP u n d e r w e n t m a j o r m o d i f i c a t i o n s , b u t b e c a u s e o f c o m m u -nications deficiencies, the CAOC h a d t o f a x t h e c h a n g e s t o u n i t s ; t h e l a t t e r o f t e n d i d n o t h a v e t h e l a t e s t m e s s a g e . T h i s compression of the cycle was also evident in a subcycle called the reconnaissance attack cycle (RAC). During the RAC , p l a n -n e r s i d e -n t i f y r e c o -n -n a i s s a -n c e r e q u i r e m e -n t s a -n d a s s i g -n a i r c r a f t , b a s e d o n t h e g r o u n d c o m m a n d e r ’ s n e e d s . T h o s e a i r c r a f t t h e n a t t a c k t h e t a r g e t s and (if necessary) fly poststrike reconnais -s a n c e. Having to re-spond to the UNPROFOR commander’-s s t a t e d n e e d s a n d t h o s e o f t h e R R F c o m m a n d e r a t o n e p o i n t compressed the RAC t o s i x h o u r s .^{3 1}

A s s h o u l d b e a p p a r e n t , t h e t h e a t e r s t r a t e g y t o a c h i e v e N A T O a n d U N objectives in the Balkans was essentially an air strategy.

S i n c e t h e o b j e c t i v e w a s t o c o e r c e a n e n e m y i n t o a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n o f b e h a v i o r r a t h e r t h a n d e s t r o y o r d e f e a t h i m , c o m m a n d e r s m a i n t a i n e d a v e r y s h o r t l e a s h o n e m p l o y m e n t m e a s -u r e s i n o r d e r t o s t o p t h e o p e r a t i o n r a p i d l y a t a n y t i m e .

The ability to measure the effectiveness of an air campaign is often elusive. Moreover, in an operation in which one can-n o t q u a can-n t i f y t h e s u c c e s s o r l a c k t h e r e o f i can-n t r a d i t i o can-n a l t e r m s ( e . g . , b o d y c o u n t s , e n e m y - u n i t c o m b a t - e f f e c t i v e n e s s r a t i n g s , a i r c r a f t s h o t d o w n , e t c . ) , e s t a b l i s h i n g m e a s u r e s o f m e r i t proves particularly difficult. In addition, subdivision of the c a m p a i g n i n t o p h a s e s a l l o w e d p r o s e c u t i o n o f t h e v a r i o u s e s -t a b l i s h e d -t a r g e -t s e -t s -to be measured. Al-though no-t explici-tly d e f i n e d b y b e g i n n i n g a n d e n d p o i n t s , t h e p h a s e s c o r r e s p o n d e d t o t h e t a r g e t s e t s t h a t s u p p o r t e d t h e i d e n t i f i e d B o s n i a n S e r b

C O G. A n a l y s t s m e a s u r e d t h e o v e r a l l p r o g r e s s o f t h e a i r c a m -p a i g n -p r i m a r i l y a g a i n s t t h e d e s i r e d e n d s t a t e .

T h e a i r c a m p a i g n b e g a n w i t h a n i n t e n s e p o u n d i n g o f t h e B o s n i a n S e r b IADS o n 3 0 A u g u s t . T a r g e t s w e r e s e l e c t e d t h r o u g h o u t s o u t h e a s t B o s n i a t o e n s u r e f r e e d o m o f m o v e m e n t for NATO a i r c r a f t o p e r a t i n g t h e r e . S t r i k e t a r g e t s i n c l u d e d k e y c o m m u n i c a t i o n s n o d e s a n d l a r g e a m m u n i t i o n s t o r a g e f a c i l i -t i e s . O n 1 S e p -t e m b e r -t h e U N r e q u e s -t e d -t h a -t N A T O “ p a u s e ” t h e o p e r a t i o n .

The turning off of the UN “key” h a d b e e n a n t i c i p a t e d b u t w a s n o t w a r m l y g r e e t e d . T h e p a u s e p e r m i t t e d i n t e n s i f i e d d i p -lomatic efforts by both the UN a n d A m b a s s a d o r H o l b r o o k e ’s t e a m . D u r i n g t h e p a u s e t h e U N and NATO s p e l l e d o u t t e r m s t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s would have to meet in order to forestall r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e c a m p a i g n . P o o r w e a t h e r hampered NATO m o n i t o r i n g o f c o m p l i a n c e , b u t b y t h e m o r n -i n g o f 5 S e p t e m b e r , -i t w a s o b v -i o u s t h a t t h e B o s n -i a n S e r b s w e r e n o t m e e t i n g t h e U N -NATO d e m a n d s , s o D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e resumed. The very fact that NATO r e s t a r t e d t h e a i r o p e r a t i o n w a s i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d t h e s i n g l e m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e c i s i o n m a d e during the entire course of Deliberate Force.^{3 2} A m b a s s a d o r Holbrooke o b s e r v e d t h a t t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n w a s t h e “ m o s t c r i t i c a l m o m e n t o f t h e b o m b i n g ” a n d t h a t “ i f t h e b o m b i n g h a d n o t r e s u m e d t h a t d a y , t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s w o u l d have been very adversely affected.”^{3 3}

W h e n t h e c a m p a i g n r e s u m e d o n 5 S e p t e m b e r , C O M A I R SOUTH w a s d e t e r m i n e d t o i n t e n s i f y t h e p a c e a s m u c h a s p r a c -tical. Although the target list was not long, very poor weather d i m i n i s h e d t h e s u c c e s s o f m a n y m i s s i o n s o r f o r c e d t h e m t o abort. The ROE required positive identification of the assigned DMPI b e f o r e d r o p p i n g b o m b s , a n d t h a t w a s n o t a l w a y s p o s s i -ble because of bad weather. D e s p i t e t h e p r o b l e m s e n c o u n t e r e d , t h e o p e r a t i o n p r o c e e d e d s o s m o o t h l y t h a t b y 7 S e p t e m b e r CINCSOUTH apprised SACEUR o f s u b s t a n t i a l p r o g r e s s :

a . Attack of the IADS i n t h e s o u t h e a s t e r n Z O A h a d b e e n l a r g e l y s u c -c e s s f u l . I t s r o b u s t n e s s a n d r e d u n d a n -c y , h o w e v e r , m a d e -c o n t i n u e d s u p p r e s s i o n n e c e s s a r y .

b. Responsive CAS a n d R R F a r t i l l e r y c o n t i n u e d t o p o u n d t a r g e t s in a n d a r o u n d t h e S a r a j e v o a r e a . T h e s y n e r g i s m o f t h i s c o o r d i n a t e d a i r l a n d r e s p o n s e h a d p r o v e n v e r y s u c c e s s f u l i n s u p p r e s s i n g B o s -n i a -n S e r b shelli-ng of Sarajevo .

c. A systematic attack of fielded forces continued, including C³ as well a s d i r e c t a n d e s s e n t i a l m i l i t a r y s u p p o r t .

d. Targeting of multiple choke points and bridges had begun. NATO closely coordinated with UNPROFOR to achieve the desired effect y e t p r e s e r v e r o u t e s t h a t c o u l d s u s t a i n r e s u p p l y a n d h u m a n i t a r i a n relief of Sarajevo .^{3 4}

At the same time, COMAIRSOUTH r e a l i z e d t h a t h e w a s q u i c k l y f a c i n g a t a r g e t i n g dilemma. Even with the forced slow -d o w n i n o p e r a t i o n s -d u e t o p o o r w e a t h e r , t h e a p p r o v e -d t a r g e t list f r o m t h e 1 4 A u g u s t J o i n t T a r g e t i n g B o a r d w a s a l m o s t e x h a u s te d . O n t h e o n e h a n d , G e n e r a l R y a n w a n t e d t o p r o s e-c u t e t h e t a r g e t s a s r a p i d l y a s p o s s i b l e i n e-c a s e o f a n o t h e r h a l t . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , h e b e c a m e v e r y c o n c e r n e d a b o u t r e a c h i n g t h e e n d o f t h e a p p r o v e d o p t i o n - t w o t a r g e t s before achieving t h e e n d s t a t e .

S o m e o f t h e t e m p o r a r y p e r s o n n e l t h a t h a d a r r i v e d t o a u g-m e n t t h e C A O C cag-me equipped with both a good ability to t h i n k “ o u t s i d e t h e b o x ” ( u s i n g a f r e s h a p p r o a c h t o t h e s a m e p r o b l e m ) a n d a c o m p u t e r s y s t e m c a l l e d t h e J F A C C P l a n n i n g Tool.^{3 5} A t a b o u t t h i s t i m e , u s i n g t h e J F A C C P l a n n i n g T o o l a n d w o r k i n g a p a r t f r o m t h e o n g o i n g D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s , a s m a l l t e a m d e v e l o p e d o p t i o n s f o r a t t a c k i n g t a r g e t s in the option-three category. Although the likelihood of ever r e c e i v i n g c l e a r a n c e t o p r o s e c u t e t h o s e t a r g e t s w a s r e m o t e b e -cause of the likelihood of collateral damage , p l a n n i n g f o r t h a t contingency continued nonetheless. COMAIRSOUTH h a d a lr e a d y i d e n t i f i e d h i s t a lr g e t i n g plredicament to CINCSOUTH ; folr -t u n a -t e l y , -t h e -t e a m n e v e r h a d -t o p u r s u e o p -t i o n -t h r e e . A s a consequence, AIRSOUTH b e c a m e e v e n m o r e s e l e c t i v e a b o u t t h e t a r g e t s i t w o u l d s t r i k e . T h e p l a n n e r s h o p e d t o w e a r d o w n t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s b y c o n t i n u i n g t o s t r i k e t h o s e f e w r e m a i n i n g t a r g e t s t o e n s u r e t h e i r t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n .

O n 1 4 S e p t e m b e r A d m i r a l S m i t h a n d G e n e r a l J a n v i e r agreed that NATO h a d s u b s t a n t i a l l y a c h i e v e d t h e m i l i t a r y o b -jectives a n d t h a t t h e y n e e d e d a n o t h e r p a u s e t o d e t e r m i n e t h e a c t u a l c o m p l i a n c e o f t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s w i t h t h e i r a g r e e -m e n t s .^{3 6} A t t h a t t i m e o n l y e i g h t t a r g e t s of the original 56 had escaped destruction. Following an extension of the original 7 2 - h o u r p a u s e f o r a n o t h e r 7 2 h o u r s , t h e t w o c o m m a n d e r s

i s s u e d a j o i n t s t a t e m e n t o n 2 0 S e p t e m b e r , d e c l a r i n g s u c c e s s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a n d a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e e n d s t a t e .

C o n f o r m i t y t o a n d D e v i a t i o n f r o m P l a n n i n g D o c t r i n e a n d P r a c t i c e

M a n y s i m i l a r i t i e s e x i s t e d b e t w e e n p l a n n i n g d o c t r i n e a n d t h e practical experience of Deliberate Force due to the credibility and influence of existing US (Air Force a n d j o i n t ) d o c t r i n e.

Experience diverged from doctrine, however, as a result of c o n f l i c t s b e t w e e n t h e u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n s o f e x i s t i n g d o c -t r i n e a n d -t h o s e -t h a -t f r a m e d D e l i b e r a -t e F o r c e .

O f p a r t i c u l a r i m p o r t a n c e t o t h e c o m m a n d e r f i g h t i n g t h e b a t -tle is clarity of the objective. Without a clearly defined objective f o r o p e r a t i o n s a n d a d e s i r e d e n d s t a t e , t h e m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r m a y f l o u n d e r i n u n c e r t a i n t y . N u m e r o u s p e r i o d s o f u n c e r t a i n t y a b o u t s t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s e x i s t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t w o a n d o n e -half years of NATO involvement in the Balkans leading up to Deliberate Force. The CINCSOUTH/ FC UNPF m e m o r a n d u m o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f 1 4 A u g u s t 1 9 9 5 c l e a r l y e s t a b l i s h e d c o n d i-tions for the initiation of hostilities and strategic objectives.

However, the evolution of operational objectives during the w e e k s p r e c e d i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n d o e s i n d i c a t e s i g n i f i c a n t c h a n g e s i n t h e d e s i r e d e n d s t a t e . F o r e x a m p l e , c o m p e l l i n g t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s t o n e g o t i a t e w a s a d d e d t o t h o s e o b j e c t i v e s .^{3 7}

Another similarity between Deliberate Force experience and U S d o c t r i n e i s t h e a s y m m e t r i c n a t u r e o f t h e s t r a t e g y t h a t NATO e m p l o y e d . W i t h o u t e f f e c t i v e a i r o p p o s i t i o n f r o m t h e B S A, NATO e s t a b l i s h e d a i r s u p e r i o r i t y q u i c k l y a n d w a s t h r e a t e n e d o n l y b y g r o u n d b a s e d a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m s . H a v i n g c h a r -a c t e r i s t i c s s h -a r p l y -a s y m m e t r i c f r o m t h o s e o f t h e f -a c t i o n u n d e r attack, the NATO a i r a r m a d a r e m a i n e d f r e e t o s t r i k e a t t a r g e t s o f i t s c h o o s i n g . F o r e x a m p l e , a l t h o u g h t h e B S A enjoyed signifi -c a n t a d v a n t a g e s i n ( g r o u n d - b a s e d ) h e a v y w e a p o n s o v e r t h e f e d e r a t i o n f o r c e s , t h o s e w e a p o n s w e r e o f l i t t l e u s e a g a i n s t NATO airpower. Although attacking individual artillery tubes proved too difficult for NATO to conduct economically, in d irectly a t t a c k i n g t h o s e w e a p o n s t h r o u g h s t r i k e s o n a m m u n i t i o n -storage, repair, and weapon-storage facilities largely negated

t h e B S A a d v a n t a g e . T h e s u p r e m a c y o f s p a c e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n capabilities on NATO ’s p a r t l i k e w i s e o v e r w h e l m e d t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s , d e n y i n g t h e m a n y s e c u r i t y o f o p e r a t i o n s o r i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t t h e i r e n e m y .

The selection of target sets by AIRSOUTH p l a n n e r s i n d i-c a t e d a i-c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f d i r e i-c t - a n d i n d i r e i-c t - t a r g e t i n g s t r a t e g i e s . F e w o p t i o n - o n e a n d - t w o t a r g e t s directly affected t h e B o s n i a n S e r b C O G, t h u s r e q u i r i n g a n i n d i r e c t s t r a t e g y . For example, AIRSOUTH h a d a s s e s s e d t h a t t h e B S A’ s a d v a n -t a g e i n h e a v y w e a p o n s hinged on i-ts abili-ty -to shif-t a small n u m b e r o f h i g h l y t r a i n e d p e r s o n n e l f r o m o n e b a t t l e t o a n -o t h e r , u s i n g e q u i p m e n t s t -o r e d i n d i s p e r s e d l -o c a t i -o n s . W i t h d e v a s t a t i n g a i r a t t a c k s o n t h e m e a n s o f C² o f t h o s e p e r s o n n e l r a t h e r t h a n d i r e c t a t t a c k s o n t h e e q u i p m e n t o r p e r s o n n e l , t h e B S A c o u l d n o l o n g e r e f f e c t i v e l y c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l t h e m a n d r e s p o n d t o r a p i d c h a n g e s o n t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . T h u s , i n d i-r e c t l y a t t a c k i n g t h a t s t i-r e n g t h b y a t t a c k i n g t h e s u p p o i-r t i n g C² nodes greatly reduced its effectiveness.

T h e t o p o g r a p h y a n d w e a t h e r i n t h e m i s s i o n a r e a m i l i t a t e d a g a i n s t s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t a c k i n g i n d i v i d u a l a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s o r t a n k s . M o r e o v e r , i t m a d e l i t t l e s e n s e t o a t t a c k t h e t u b e s t h a t the UN d e m a n d e d t h e S e r b s remove from the total-exclusion z o n e s . T h e S e r b s c o u l d h a v e c l a i m e d , w i t h s o m e j u s t i f i c a t i o n , t h a t t h e y w e r e b e i n g p r o h i b i t e d f r o m w i t h d r a w i n g t h e i r a r t i l -lery by NATO a i r s t r i k e s . T h i s e x a m p l e o f a s y m m e t r i c a n d i n d i r e c t a t t a c k s e r v e d t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e B S A.

Although Deliberate Force incorporated many of the doc t r i n a l c o n c e p t s f o u n d i n U S j o i n t d o c t r i n e and NATO p r o c e dures (such as they were), the operation diverged in signifi

-cant areas as well. Of special concern was the “friendly” C²

arrangement. Although the military forces assigned to NATO a n d t h e U N h a d w o r k e d t o g e t h e r f o r n e a r l y t h r e e y e a r s , t h e r e w a s n e v e r a s i n g l e c o m m a n d e r o v e r a l l a i r a n d l a n d f o r c e s . Yet, even after the UN t u r n e d i t s k e y a n d D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e began, CINCSOUTH had to coordinate with the force com -mander of UNPF (as a de facto “land component com-mander”) a n d R R F a n d r e s p o n d t o t h e i r c o n c e r n s . T h e i n i t i a l 2 4 - h o u r

“ p a u s e ” o n 1 S e p t e m b e r t h a t s t r e t c h e d i n t o f o u r d a y s i s a prime example of the fragility of that C² a r r a n g e m e n t . T h e p a u s e h a d e m a n a t e d f r o m o u t s i d e C I N C S O U T H ’s change of

c o m m a n d a n d r e q u i r e d i n t e n s i v e c o o r d i n a t i o n t o e n s u r e t h a t no operational military problems developed. Yet another ex -ample of fragile C² occurred between the CAOC and RRF . They e s s e n t i a l l y r e v a l i d a t e d t h e t a r g e t s e a c h n i g h t d u r i n g t h e p l a n -n i -n g p r o c e s s .^{3 8} A l t h o u g h t h e A u g u s t J o i n t T a r g e t i n g B o a r d h a d g i v e n e x p l i c i t a p p r o v a l t o p r o s e c u t e t h e o p t i o n t w o t a r -g e t s , t h e U N r e v i e w e d a n d a p p r o v e d t h e m a n e w e a c h d a y .

Even within the NATO c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e , s i g n i f i c a n t c h a l-lenges existed. For instance, a simple yet telling change had to b e m a d e i n t e r m i n o l o g y a n d p r o c e d u r e . F o r y e a r s , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s and NATO h a v e i s s u e d t o f l y i n g u n i t s a n a i r t a s k i n g order , the directive coordinating all flying activities of the com m a n d . O n e o f t h e c o a l i t i o n p a r t n e r s , h o w e v e r , r e f u s e d t o a c -cept “orders” from NATO , t h u s n e c e s s i t a t i n g a n a m e c h a n g e t o

“air tasking message.” Although not significant at first glance, the distinction highlights a potential area for exploitation by a future adversary. Of more significance, however, is the seem -i n g l a c k o f a d e q u a t e a u t h o r -i t y , p l a n n -i n g, a n d -i n t e g r a t -i o n o f s e a r c h - a n d - r e s c u e a s s e t s o f t h e m e m b e r n a t i o n s . W h e n a F r e n c h M i r a g e 2 0 0 0 (call sign Ebro 33) w a s s h o t d o w n ( t h e only NATO aircraft lost during Deliberate Force), NATO m a d e r a t h e r f a l t e r i n g a t t e m p t s t o l o c a t e a n d r e s c u e t h e a i r c r e w . B o t h U S J o i n t S p e c i a l O p e r a t i o n s T a s k F o r c e ( J S O T F ) forces a n d N a v y r e s c u e t e a m s p a r t i c i p a t e d b u t n o t i n c o o r d i n a t i o n .^{3 9}

Another doctrinal area from which Deliberate Force signifi -c a n t l y d e v i a t e d h a d t o d o w i t h t h e -c o n -c e p t o f s y n e r g y — a k e y tenet of aerospace power. Although AIRSOUTH achieved cer -tain internal synergies at the tactical level, it realized little p l a n n e d e x t e r n a l s y n e r g y . I n t e r n a l s y n e r g y , t h r o u g h u s e o f c o m p o s i t e f o r c e p a c k a g e s t h a t c o n t a i n e d a l l e l e m e n t s n e c e s -s a r y t o a c c o m p l i -s h t h e -s t r i k e m i -s -s i o n , e n -s u r e d f o r c e -s e c u r i t y by utilizing the full range of capabilities of airpower platforms.

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , a l t h o u g h t h e A i r / L a n d O p e r a t i o n s C o o r d i-n a t i o i-n D o c u m e i-n t s e t f o r t h o p e r a t i i-n g p r o c e d u r e s f o r l a i-n d a i-n d air forces, it merely provided deconfliction of operations. The p r i m a r y p u r p o s e o f t h e a g r e e m e n t w a s t o a v o i d c o l l o c a t i n g a n a r t i l l e r y r o u n d a n d a n a i r c r a f t i n t h e s a m e p i e c e o f s k y . I t neither established nor fostered synergistic effects of the RRF and NATO air forces.

Airpower, however, did achieve one unintended synergy with land forces. Because of the simultaneous nature of Deliberate Force and the BiH /Croatian Defense Council (HVO) federation ground offensive, both operations seem to have benefited from the battlefield successes of the other. COMAIRSOUTH t o o k g r e a t pains to avoid even the appearance that NATO had somehow coordinated operations with the federation. The fact remained, however, that the BSA was severely pressed from the western offensive, was being hurt by the bombing, and was unable to exercise effective C² over its forces as a result. NATO d e t e r m i n e d that it had been so successful in this regard that at one point General Hornburg suggested providing Gen Ratko Mladic (the BSA commander) with a cellular phone and some satellite pho-tos, thinking that Mladic did not have a clue as to what was happening to his forces.^{4 0} Thus, ground and air forces achieved de facto synergies with each other’s operations that undoubtedly propelled both toward achievement of their respective objectives.

Whereas political and military strategic objectives during t h e c o l d w a r f o c u s e d o n t h e w a r - w i n n i n g n a t u r e o f m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , p l a n n e r s a n d c o m m a n d e r s h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d s o m e t h i n g o f a v a c u u m w h e n i t c o m e s t o c l e a r s t r a t e g i c g u i d -a n c e i n o p e r -a t i o n s o t h e r t h -a n w -a r ( O O T W ) . Even the definition of OOTW and the differentiation between it and “war” have proven difficult to establish. To strategic-level planners a n d decision makers (e.g., at NATO h e a d q u a r t e r s a n d t h e U N in New York), Deliberate Force was an OOTW. B u t t o a i r c r e w s d r o p p i n g b o m b s a n d d o d g i n g S A M s over Bosnia-Herzegovina , t h e o p e r a t i o n l o o k e d e v e r y b i t l i k e a w a r . N o t h a v i n g a c l e a r , warlike focus from strategic decision makers placed opera -t i o n a l - a n d -t a c -t i c a l - l e v e l w a r r i o r s i n a -t e n u o u s p o s i -t i o n . T h e p r e s s u r e t o i m p l e m e n t w a r l i k e a i r a c t i o n s w h i l e r e c e i v i n g OOTW-like political and military guidance seemed to culmi-nate at the CAOC . A s o u r n a t i o n ’ s h i s t o r y h a s s h o w n , m i l i t a r y a n d p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s o f t e n c o m p e t e d u r i n g U S u n i l a t e r a l action. The problems can (and likely will) be exacerbated in a c o a l i t i o n e n d e a v o r s u c h a s D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e i n w h i c h m e m b e r n a t i o n s h a v e d i f f e r e n t a g e n d a s t o a d v a n c e a n d i n w h i c h n a -t i o n a l m i l i -t a r y d o c -t r i n e a n d p r a c -t i c e m a y n o -t c o i n c i d e . A n u m b e r o f f a c t o r s , s u c h a s l a c k o f c o a l i t i o n c o n s e n s u s , a c t i v e involvement of the UN, or diffused influence of other bodies

( e . g . , t h e C o n t a c t G r o u p) can further complicate the effective e m p l o y m e n t o f a i r p o w e r .

Clearly, existing NATO military doctrine—specifically, air p o w e r d o c t r i n e—is woefully inadequate to give proper guid -ance to NATO m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d e r s e n g a g e d i n U N - s p o n s o r e d NATO missions. Because of NATO’s historic focus on self-de-f e n s e r a t h e r t h a n a n y o u t - o self-de-f - a r e a e m p l o y m e n t, little in the way of useful doctrine h a s a r i s e n t o s u p p o r t s u c h “ n e w w o r l d order” activities. Each member nation’s citizenry and leader -s h i p m u -s t w r e -s t l e w i t h t h e q u e -s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t N A T O should involve itself in out-of-area activities. T h e q u e s t i o n r e-m a i n s i e-m p o r t a n t f o r e-m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s b e c a u s e o f t h e p o t e n t i a l u n c e r t a i n t y i t c a n l e n d t o t h e i r i m p e n d i n g m i s s i o n a n d t h e political will supporting it. Although several member nations, i n c l u d i n g t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s , h a v e b r o u g h t r e c e n t o p e r a t i o n a l experience to the alliance, the NATO b u r e a u c r a c y s t i l l s e e m s m i r e d i n a h i s t o r i c a l r u t .

Grasping the differences in the relative sophistication of US and NATO p l a n n i n g p r o c e s s e s a n d m e c h a n i s m s i s k e y t o u n -d e r s t a n -d i n g w h y D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e l o o k e -d s o m u c h l i k e a U S effort. Due in large measure to its relatively large military force s t r u c t u r e , t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s w a s b e s t s u i t e d f o r t h e l e a d e r s h i p r o l e i n t h e o p e r a t i o n . M a n y a l l i e s h a d t a k e n p a r t i n U S t r a i n -i n g o f o n e s o r t o r a n o t h e r , g -i v -i n g t h e m a b a s -i c u n d e r s t a n d -i n g o f t h e U S m e t h o d o f p l a n n i n g, t a s k i n g , a n d — i n s o m e c a s e s — c a m p a i g n p l a n n i n g .^{4 1} Y e t , e v e n w i t h t h a t v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t cross-flow of information and expertise, COMAIRSOUTH f o u n d h i m s e l f w i t h a l i m i t e d n u m b e r o f p l a n n e r s i n w h o m h e h a d c o n f i d e n c e t o c o n d u c t t h e i m p o r t a n t p l a n n i n g f o r D e l i b e r a t e Force. General Ryan a l s o k n e w t h a t h e h a d t h e o p t i o n a t a n y t i m e o f a s k i n g h i g h e r U S h e a d q u a r t e r s f o r s u p p o r t i f h e n e e d e d i t — a n d h e e x e r c i s e d t h a t o p t i o n . A l t h o u g h D e n y F l i g h t/Deliberate Force most definitely remained a NATO e f-f o r t , n o o n e h e s i t a t e d t o r e q u e s t u n i l a t e r a l a s s i s t a n c e f-f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s —which did not hesitate to provide it.

E v e n w i t h i t s l o n g h i s t o r y o f p e a c e k e e p i n g i n v o l v e m e n t a r o u n d t h e w o r l d , t h e U N h a s n o d o c t r i n e of airpower employ-ment. Until Deny Flight enforcement actions began in Ap ril 19 9 3 , t h e U N had not had any significant air force at it s disposal—

certainly not one with a “shooter” capability. Correspondingly,

prior UN o p e r a t i o n s t y p i c a l l y h a d b e e n c o m m a n d e d a n d c o n -trolled by land-force commanders, some with little experience o r f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h a i r p o w e r t h e o r y a n d d o c t r i n e. T h e r e s u l t i n g l a c k o f d e t a i l e d u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f a i r p o w e r m i s s i o n s a n d c a p a -bilities, therefore, is not surprising. Throughout the early days of peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia , small c e l l s o f a i r f o r c e p e r s o n n e l a t t h e i n - t h e a t e r h e a d q u a r t e r s m a n a g e d t o b r i n g s o m e “ a i r s e n s e ” t o t h e U N o p e r a t i o n . B u t b e c a u s e t h e U N s e c r e t a r y - g e n e r a l , h i s s p e c i a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , a n d t h e U N P F f o r c e c o m m a n d e r m a d e m o s t o f t h e c r i t i c a l decisions driving the UN operation, their collective lack of un-d e r s t a n un-d i n g o f a i r p o w e r o f t e n r e s u l t e un-d i n c o n s t r a i n t s t h a t e f-fectively hobbled its potential impact.

D u r i n g t h e h e i g h t o f t h e c o l d w a r , SACEUR’s General De-fense Plan sought to defend NATO a g a i n s t a t t a c k i n t o t h e alliance’s territory, meet force with force, reestablish the bor d e r s , a n d f o r c e t h e W a r s a w P a c t to desist in its military opera -t i o n s . S u c h w a r p l a n n i n g e n g e n d e r e d a n a -t -t i -t u d e o f s -t e a d i-n e s s — a s e i-n s e t h a t i-n o t h i i-n g w o u l d e v e r c h a i-n g e a i-n d t h a t t h e c o r r e l a t i o n o f f o r c e s c o n t r i b u t e d s t a b i l i t y t o t h e E u r o p e a n c o n t i n e n t . I n t h e p a s t , w h a t p e o p l e h a v e c o n s i d e r e d N A T O “doc -t r i n e” h a s a c -t u a l l y b e e n l i -t -t l e m o r e -t h a n p r o c e d u r e . I n -t h e J o m i n i a n t r a d i t i o n , t h e d e f e n s e o f C e n t r a l E u r o p e w o u l d b e r a t h e r m e c h a n i s t i c — f r o m b o t h t h e g r o u n d a n d a i r p e r s p e c t i v e s . D e c i s i o n p r o c e s s e s c o u l d a f f o r d t o b e s l o w a n d m e a s -u r e d . H o w e v e r , t h e i n h e r e n t i n s t a b i l i t y a n d r e q -u i r e m e n t f o r rapid responsiveness in OOTW p u t s t r e s s o n t h e N A T O civilian a n d m i l i t a r y b u r e a u c r a c y , f o r c i n g i t t o s h i f t i t s o p e r a t i o n a l f o c u s t o w a r d a m u c h m o r e f l u i d “ m a n e u v e r w a r f a r e ” s t r a t e g y . Further, competing national interests of NATO m e m b e r n a tions can sometimes negatively affect the achievement of alli -a n c e g o -a l s . N o l o n g e r c -a n m e m b e r n -a t i o n s f o c u s o n d e f e -a t i n g a c o m m o n e n e m y ; n o w t h e y m u s t s t r i v e t o a c h i e v e s o m e w h a t less defined objectives against less clearly identified adversarie s .

Due to the lack of solid NATO , U N, or other coalition doc t r i n e f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n a l e n v i r o n m e n t o f t h e B a l k a n s , com m a n d e r s a n d p l a n n e r s h a d t o f a l l b a c k o n t h e i r n a t i o n a l d o c -t r i n e a n d p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e . Y e -t , e v e n -t h a -t d o c -t r i n e w a s i n c o m p l e t e , s o t h e y h a d t o d e v i a t e f r o m i t w h e n t h e s i t u a t i o n d e m a n d e d . T h e u n i q u e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f t h e t h e a t e r r e q u i r e d

CAOC and AIRSOUTH p l a n n e r s to exercise considerable origi-n a l t h i origi-n k i origi-n g i origi-n d e v i s i origi-n g a w o r k a b l e a origi-n d a c c e p t a b l e s t r a t e g y f o r i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .

Of first priority in Air Force doctrine is control of the air.^{4 2} Some modern airpower advocates, such as Col Phillip Meilinger, have gone so far as to equate air superiority with victory.^{4 3} Colo-nel Meilinger calls into question the usefulness of air superiority, however, if the enemy believes that his opponent will not exploit it or if there is nothing that air superiority can effectively exploit.

NATO unequivocally achieved air superiority almost immediately on 30 August, yet overall success remained in question even after the final bomb fell on 14 September. The nature of the operation did not lend itself to final solution through the appli cation of airpower although such application absolutely facili -tated success. Perhaps a redefinition of victory in the OOTW context would be appropriate for the future.

In contrast, prior to Deliberate Force some people main -tained that airpower could not be decisive. In an interview, A m b a s s a d o r H o l b r o o k e p o i n t e d t h i s o u t , s a y i n g t h a t m a n y p e o p l e b e l i e v e d , “ a l m o s t a s a M a n t r a , t h a t y o u c a n n o t u s e a i r p o w e r u n l e s s i t ’ s b a c k e d u p b y g r o u n d t r o o p s . ”^{4 4} H e b e -lieved that an ambivalence existed concerning the capability of airpower to achieve the objective without the introduction of significant ground forces. Airpower, however, overcame that s k e p t i c i s m i n t h e e n d .

A l t h o u g h t h e i m p a c t o f e x i s t i n g d o c t r i n e w a s s u b s t a n t i a l , d e v i a t i o n s f r o m i t e n s u r e d s u c c e s s i n t h i s n o n t e x t b o o k o p e r a -t i o n . B e c a u s e d o c -t r i n e has evolved over -the decades -to enable a i r f o r c e s t o c o n t r i b u t e t o w a r w i n n i n g , i t i s l e s s t h a n o p t i -mally suited for OOTWs. But if one views doctrine a s g u i d a n c e rather than as “Holy Writ,” the tenets of flexibility and versatil -i t y c a n e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e m a c h -i n e s t h e m s e l v e s t o t h e A -i r Force p l a n n e r s and commanders who direct their employmen t.

A s d e s c r i b e d i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r , U S j o i n t d o c t r i n e p u b -l i c a t i o n s h a v e s o u g h t t o -l a y c o m m o n f o u n d a t i o n s u p o n w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e r v i c e s c a n b u i l d t h e i r d o c t r i n e . S u c h c o m m o n a l i t y h a s a d v a n t a g e s b u t c a n d r i v e i n a p p r o p r i a t e d e c i -sions if one follows it too rigidly. For example, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, a s s o c i a t e s a C O G with a “military force.” That is cer

-t a i n l y -t r u e i n m o s -t s c e n a r i o s , b u -t i n B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a -t h e C O G w a s t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s ’ m e n t a l a t t i t u d e — t h e i r f e a r o f domination. That attitude extended well beyond the force to t h e p o p u l a c e a n d c i v i l i a n l e a d e r s h i p .

Although AIRSOUTH d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e “ h i s t o r i c B o s n i a n S e r b fear of domination” was the COG t o a t t a c k , i t w a s e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t t o d e f e n d t h e B o s n i a n - g o v e r n m e n t C O G —the city of Sarajevo. M o r e t h a n a n y o t h e r l o c a t i o n i n B o s n i a - H e r z e g o v i n a , that city symbolizes the core issue for Bosnian Muslims . L o s s of Sarajevo w o u l d h a v e l e d t o t h e f a l l o f t h e f e d e r a t i o n a n d t h e end of Bosnia-Herzegovina a s a u n i t a r y , s o v e r e i g n n a t i o n . Thus, protection of the “friendly” COG was every bit as impor -t a n -t -t o -t h e o v e r a l l s u c c e s s o f -t h e o p e r a -t i o n a s w a s a -t -t a c k o f the “enemy” COG . C u r r e n t d o c t r i n e i s v i r t u a l l y s i l e n t a b o u t the issue of defending friendly COGs.

O n a m o r e p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , t h e “ s t a n d a r d ” 2 4 - h o u r t a s k i n g c y c l e h a s g i v e n m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s a s c h e d u l e t i e d t o t h e s u n a n d t h e i r c i r c a d i a n r h y t h m s . H o w e v e r , r i g i d a d h e r e n c e t o such a cycle may detract from the very flexibility that airpower a f f o r d s t h e c o m m a n d e r . T h e n e e d t o r e s p o n d r a p i d l y t o c h a n gi n g s gi t u a t gi o n s r e q u gi r e d m a s s gi v e d a gi l y c h a n g e s t o c u r r e n t o p -e r a t i o n s t a s k -e d b y t h -e C A O C . M o r -e r -e s p o n s i v -e s y s t -e m s , b o t h h a r d w a r e a n d m a n a g e m e n t , w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e t o b r e a k i n g t h a t reliance on a 24-hour cycle and getting inside an adversary’s observe -orient-decide-act loop^{4 5} or his tasking cycle.

J o i n t P u b 3 - 5 6 . 1 p r o v i d e s j o i n t a i r c a m p a i g n p l a n n e r s a n e x c e l l e n t t o o l t o h e l p t h e m o r g a n i z e a n a i r o p e r a t i o n s p l a n . AIRSOUTH a n d t h e C A O C p l a n n e r s used elements of the five-p h a s e a i r c a m five-p a i g n five-p l a n n i n g five-p r o c e s s d e s c r i b e d i n s e c t i o n t h r e e o f t h a t p u b l i c a t i o n ( a n d c h a p . 3 o f t h i s b o o k ) p r i o r t o a n d d u r i n g D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e . T h a t p r o c e s s , n o t l i n e a r b u t i t e r a t i v e i n n a t u r e , h a s e x c e l l e n t a p p l i c a b i l i t y a c r o s s t h e s p e c t r u m o f w a r a n d O O T W . The first phase, “Operational Envi -r o n m e n t R e s e a -r c h , ” w h i c h w a s c o n d u c t e d c o n t i n u o u s l y , a f f e c t e d t h e o t h e r f o u r p h a s e s . T h e t o o l , h a v i n g n o f i x e d l e n g t h , c a n b e c u s t o m i z e d f o r t h e c o n t i n g e n c y ; i t i s a l s o r e -s u l t -s - o r i e n t e d a n d r e -s p o n -s i v e t o t h e f o g a n d f r i c t i o n o f w a r f a r e (or of OOTW). Too few planners in the CAOC and AIRSOUTH were familiar with either this doctrinal tool or the training a v a i l a b l e i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n .^{4 6}

T h e p h y s i c a l a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n a l l a y o u t o f t h e C A O C, a s p r e v i o u s l y d e s c r i b e d , d i d n o t a d e q u a t e l y s u p p o r t p l a n n i n g r e -q u i r e m e n t s f o r a d y n a m i c o p e r a t i o n s u c h a s D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e . The CAOC l a c k e d a c e n t r a l c o m m a n d f a c i l i t y , a n d a s e n s e o f u n i t c o h e s i o n d i d n o t e x i s t b e c a u s e o f t h e s h o r t - d u r a t i o n , t e m p o r a r y - d u t y a s s i g n m e n t s o f p e r s o n n e l . F u r t h e r , i t l a c k e d a d e q u a t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s m e a n s , a n d c o m p e t i n g n a t i o n a l a n d p a r o c h i a l s e r v i c e i n t e r e s t s w e r e a b u n d a n t .

F o r e x a m p l e , b e c a u s e t h e p h y s i c a l l a y o u t o f t h e C A O C buildings and lack of office space prevented collocation of the command’s various cells, they had to work very hard to coor -dinate their work. The JSOTF , h e a d q u a r t e r e d a t S a n V i t o d e i Normanni AB , Italy (the joint US Special Operations Forces [SOF] c o n t i n g e n t ) , h a d p o s t e d l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s i n t h r e e s e p a r a t e locations at the CAOC: t h e c o m b i n e d r e s c u e c o o r d i n a t i o n c e n -ter, the CAS cell, and intelligence (C-2). These liaison officers had different reporting chains for their SOF specialty area. A special-operations liaison element did not exist in the CAOC, t h u s e n s u r i n g a p i e c e m e a l a p p r o a c h t o t h e p r o v i s i o n o f U S S O F to the CFACC. JSOTF d i d n o t h a v e a s t r o n g a d v o c a t e f o r i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d , t h e r e f o r e , w a s u n d e r u t i l i z e d — o r , i n a t least one instance, utilized incorrectly. The CAOC’s strategic p l a n s were formulated at “Fort Apache, ” n i c k n a m e f o r t h e t e m p o r a r y f a c i l i t y o u t s i d e t h e m a i n b u i l d i n g . M o s t d e c i s i o n s a b o u t t a s k i n g w e r e w o r k e d b e t w e e n F o r t A p a c h e a n d t h e c o m -mander’s office. Thus, inadequate facilities and competing pri-o r i t i e s r e s u l t e d i n l e s s - t h a n - pri-o p t i m a l S O F e m p l pri-o y m e n t .

I n a t l e a s t o n e i n s t a n c e , t h e u s e o f A C - 1 3 0 g u n s h i p s i n a p u r e l y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r o l e n e a r l y r e s u l t e d i n t h e l o s s o f 1 5 a i r c r e w m e m b e r s .^{4 7} D u r i n g t h e f i r s t w e e k o f t h e c a m p a i g n , g u n s h i p s w e r e t a s k e d t o c o n d u c t r e c o n n a i s s a n c e o f r o a d s a r o u n d S a r a j e v o , l o o k i n g f o r m o v e m e n t s o f B o s n i a n S e r b h e a v y w e a p o n s . The gunships were retasked and flew five successive nights following the same general flight profile. On t h e f i f t h n i g h t , t h e a i r c r a f t c a m e u n d e r a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y (AAA) and SAM fire. After the AAA exploded above the aircraft and flares defeated the SAMs, the AC-130 r e c o v e r e d w i t h o u t f u r t h e r i n c i d e n t . A l t h o u g h g u n s h i p s h a v e a n a r m e d r e c o n -n a i s s a -n c e role, the CAOC d e c i d e d t i m e a -n d a g a i -n t o u s e t h e AC-130 i n a p u r e l y r e c o n n a i s s a n c e r o l e , r a t h e r t h a n e m p l o y

o t h e r s p e c i a l - o p e r a t i o n s a s s e t s t a i l o r e d t o t h e t a s k i n g . T h i s highlights the lack of a viable special-operations advocate on the CAOC p l a n n i n g a n d o p e r a t i o n s s t a f f . B e c a u s e S O F r e p r e -s e n t a t i v e -s , -s u c h a -s a -s p e c i a l - o p e r a t i o n -s l i a i -s o n e l e m e n t , w e r e not involved in initial targeting d e c i s i o n s , v e r y s c a r c e a n d high-value assets suffered from less-than-optimal employmen t .

T h e p r a c t i c a l o u t g r o w t h o f t h e p l a n n i n g process—the Delib -e r a t -e F o r c -e a i r c a m p a i g n p l a n — a n d t h -e w a y i n w h i c h i t w a s e x e c u t e d a t t h e o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l d r a m a t i c a l l y a l t e r e d t h e t a c t i -c a l -c o n d u -c t o f t h e o p e r a t i o n . I n m o s t w a r s a n d O O T W s , t h e r e a c t i o n o f t h e e n e m y w i l l d i c t a t e c h a n g e s t o o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h r e e m a j o r e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s i n f l u e n c e d t h e c o n d u c t o f D e l i b e r -ate Force even more profoundly. First, force protection was of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e t o C O M A I R S O U T H, CINCSOUTH , a n d t h e U N c o m m a n d e r s . O n t h e N A T O side of the Adriatic , t h e o p i n i o n t h a t n o t a s i n g l e t a r g e t was worth the life of one aircrew member typified the concern for force protection. As for the UN, it was unwilling to turn its key until all UN forces redeployed to more defensible cantonments. After Deliberate F o r c e s t a r t e d , a n y U N movement usually affected NATO t a r -geting a n d o f t e n r e s u l t e d i n m i s s i o n c a n c e l l a t i o n s o r c h a n g e s . The second major external factor, the avoidance of fratricide, p r o v e d n e a r l y a s i m p o r t a n t a s f o r c e p r o t e c t i o n . P l a n n e r s m a d e every effort to prevent striking targets i n p r o x i m i t y t o k n o w n U N or other friendly personnel. Third, because of NATO ’s ex-t r e m e c o n c e r n f o r c o l l a ex-t e r a l d a m a g e , p l a n n e r s v i e w e d ex-t h e s e-lection of each DMPI through the filter of potential collateral d a m a g e . C o m m a n d e r s w e r e e x t r e m e l y c o n c e r n e d t h a t e v e n o n e s t r a y b o m b m i g h t k i l l i n n o c e n t c i v i l i a n s a n d t h e r e b y u n -d e r m i n e w o r l -d s u p p o r t f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n . R a t h e r t h a n e x t e n - di n g t o t h e p o l di t di c di a n s a n d C o n t a c t G r o u p negotdiators, thdis con -cern for collateral damage a p p e a r s t o h a v e b e e n a c o n s t r a i n t self-imposed by NATO.^{4 8}

C o n c l u s i o n

A s w e h a v e s e e n , t h e D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e a i r c a m p a i g n w a s c a r e f u l l y p l a n n e d a n d e x e c u t e d t o a c h i e v e b o t h e x p l i c i t a n d implicit objectives that emanated from the NAC a n d t h e U N

S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l over the course of years of involvement in the B a l k a n s . The air objective established by COMAIRSOUTH for h i s c o m m a n d w o u l d c a u s e t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s , a s n o t e d a b o v e , to “sue for cessation of military operations, comply with UN m a n d a t e s , a n d n e g o t i a t e . ”

T h i s c h a p t e r h a s e n d e a v o r e d t o e x a m i n e t h e n a t u r e o f D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e ’ s r e m a r k a b l e s u c c e s s , w h i c h w a s l a r g e l y u n p r e -m e d i t a t e d a n d r e s u l t e d f r o -m t h e u n f o r e s e e n i -m p a c t o f t h e s t o p p i n g a n d r e s t a r t i n g o f t h e a i r c a m p a i g n . T h e r e s t a r t o f 5 S e p t e m b e r s h o c k e d t h e B o s n i a n S e r b l e a d e r s h i p a n d f o r t h e first time convinced General Mladic of NATO’s r e s o l v e . T h e c h a p t e r a l s o e x a m i n e d t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a i r p o w e r d o c t r i n e to t h e p l a n n i n g a n d c o n d u c t o f D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e . C l e a r l y , t h e o p e r a t i o n b o t h d e v i a t e d f r o m e s t a b l i s h e d a i r p o w e r d o c t r i n e in c e r t a i n k e y a r e a s a n d a d h e r e d t o i t i n o t h e r s . A v a c u u m e x i s t s in the area of good doctrine for OOTW in US joint and service d o c t r i n e.

When Admiral Smith a n d G e n e r a l J a n v i e r i s s u e d t h e i r j o i n t s t a t e m e n t f r o m Z a g r e b o n 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 d e c l a r i n g a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e e n d s t a t e , D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e e n d e d .⁴⁹ T h e o p e r a t i o n r e a l i z e d a l l t h e a t e r a n d a i r o b j e c t i v e s a n d e s t a b-lished preconditions for the eventual Dayton Peace Accord t a l k s . A l t h o u g h a i r p o w e r h a d n o t o p e r a t e d i n i s o l a t i o n f r o m o t h e r c o m p o n e n t s , i t w a s d e c i s i v e . P e r h a p s f u t u r e c o n t i n g e n -c i e s w i l l f e a t u r e n a v a l o r l a n d f o r -c e s m o r e p r o m i n e n t l y t h a n air forces. As Gen Ronald Fogleman , former chief of staff of the US Air Force observed, “Joint warfighting is not necessarily an e q u a l o p p o r t u n i t y e n t e r p r i s e . ”^{5 0} Airpower doctrine a n d p l a n -n i -n g m u s t s u p p o r t t h e f u l l r a -n g e o f a e r o s p a c e o p e r a t i o -n s a s w e l l a s s u p p o r t a n d c o m p l e m e n t t h e c a p a b i l i t i e s o f o t h e r c o m -p o n e n t s . B u t s u c h d o c t r i n e a n d -p l a n n i n g m u s t e n a b l e t h e s t r a t e g i c a n d i n d e p e n d e n t e m p l o y m e n t o f a i r p o w e r .

N o t e s

1. Extracted from briefing, Lt Gen Michael Ryan, COMAIRSOUTH and c o m m a n d e r , S i x t e e n t h A i r F o r c e , t o U S A i r F o r c e C o r o n a C o n f e r e n c e , s u b -ject: Operation Deliberate Force, February 1996. [Secret] Information ex-t r a c ex-t e d i s u n c l a s s i f i e d .

2. Maj Gen I. B. Holley Jr., USAFR, Retired, “Of Saber Charges, Escort Fighters, and Spacecraft,” Air University Review, S e p t e m b e r 1 9 8 3 , 4 .

3. Briefing, Maj Gen Hal Hornburg, director, 5 ATAF CAOC, Vicenza,

1 7 . A s u s e d h e r e , t h e M A P i s r o u g h l y e q u i v a l e n t t o t h e m a s t e r a i r a t t a c k

i m m e d i a t e l y r e t u r n e d t o h i s h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Z a g r e b p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i o n o f t h e

44. Holbrooke interview.

45. Col John R. Boyd, “A Discourse on Winning and Losing,” briefing slides, August 1987, available at Air University Library, Maxwell AFB, Ala.

46. Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine Research and Educa-t i o n a Educa-t M a x w e l l A F B , A l a . , c o n d u c Educa-t s a c o u r s e a p p r o p r i a Educa-t e l y n a m e d Educa-t h e J o i n Educa-t Doctrine Air Campaign Course.

4 7 . D u r h a m , t r i p r e p o r t .

4 8 . A m b a s s a d o r C h r i s t o p h e r H i l l , U S S t a t e D e p a r t m e n t d e p u t y c h i e f negotiator, interviewed by Lt Col Rob Owen, Washington, D.C., 27 February 1 9 9 6 .

49. Joint Statement by Adm Leighton W. Smith, CINCSOUTH, and Lt G e n B e r n a r d J a n v i e r , F C U N P F , Z a g r e b , C r o a t i a , 2 0 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5 .

50. Gen Ronald R. Fogleman, US Air Force chief of staff, speech to the Air and Space Doctrine Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Ala., 30 April 1996.

E x e c u t i n g D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e , 3 0 A u g u s t – 1 4 S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 5

Lt Col Mark J. Conversino

N e w s o f t h e m o r t a r a t t a c k o n t h e M r k a l e m a r k e t p l a c e in Sarajevo o n 2 8 A u g u s t 1 9 9 5 f i n a l l y m o v e d t h e W e s t t o a c t . S i n c e F r e n c h g e n e r a l B e r n a r d J a n v i e r , U n i t e d N a t i o n s P r o t e c -tion Force (UNPROFOR) c o m m a n d e r , w a s o n v a c a t i o n i n F r a n c e to attend his son’s wedding, Adm Leighton W. Smith , commander in chief of Allied Forces Southern Europe (CINC -SOUTH), c o n t a c t e d B r i t i s h l i e u t e n a n t g e n e r a l R u p e r t S m i t h , the acting UN c o m m a n d e r . A d m i r a l S m i t h confirmed in a let-t e r let-t o G e n e r a l S m i let-t h let-t h a let-t , i n let-t h e i r “ c o m m o n j u d g m e n let-t , ” let-t h e Mrkale s h e l l i n g r e p r e s e n t e d a n a t t a c k a g a i n s t a s a f e a r e a a n d t h a t a i r s t r i k e s w o u l d c o m m e n c e a s s o o n a s U n i t e d S t a t e s A i r F o r c e (USAF) lieutenant general Michael E. Ryan , c o m m a n d e r o f A l l i e d A i r F o r c e s S o u t h e r n E u r o p e ( C O M A I R S O U T H ), d e e m e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s s u i t a b l e . A d m i r a l S m i t h a l s o w r o t e t h a t Ryan w o u l d d e l a y t h e s t a r t o f h i s a i r c a m p a i g n u n t i l m i d n i g h t , 29 August, to allow UN f o r c e s o n t h e g r o u n d t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e i r m o r e i s o l a t e d o u t p o s t s a n d t h u s p r e c l u d e a n o t h e r e m b a r r a s s i n g r a s h o f h o s t a g e t a k i n g b y t h e S e r b s , a s h a d o c -curred during the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) bombing of Pale the preceding May. Nevertheless, the UN a n d NATO h a d t u r n e d t h e i r “ k e y s , ” a n d t h e m o s t i n t e n s e m i l i t a r y operation in the history of NATO w a s a b o u t t o g e t u n d e r w a y .¹

I n d e e d , A d m i r a l S m i t h h a d a l r e a d y t a k e n s e v e r a l a c t i o n s t o r e a d y h i s f o r c e s . S p e c i f i c a l l y , h e h a d a l l o w e d u n i t s b e l o n g i n g to participating NATO c o u n t r i e s u n d e r t h e a l l i a n c e ’ s o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l t o r e t u r n h o m e o n a n “ o n c a l l ” s t a t u s a n d r e -q u e s t e d a d d i t i o n a l a i r c r a f t , i n c l u d i n g F - 1 6 C / D s a n d F - 4 G

“Wild Weasels” a r m e d w i t h h i g h - s p e e d a n t i r a d i a t i o n m i s s i l e s (HARM), t o c o u n t e r t h e S e r b i n t e g r a t e d a i r d e f e n s e s y s t e m (IADS). U p o n i s s u i n g t h e o r d e r t o i n i t i a t e D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e , Admiral Smith also recalled his on-call tactical forces, inclu d i n g

t hree Mirage F1CTs , one Mirage F1CR , t w o J a g u a r s , four Mi -r a g e 2 0 0 0 C s , and six Mi-rage 2000D/Ks f-rom rance; fou-r F-16As and two F-16Rs (reconnaissance ) from the Netherlands; 10 F - 1 6 C / D s from Turkey; four GR-7 Harriers from the United Kingdom ; and six F-4G Wild Weasels , four EA-6Bs, five KC-10 s , two C-21s, t w o M C / H C - 1 3 0 s , t w o a i r b o r n e c o m m a n d a n d control center (ABCCC) EC130Es , and two EC130H Com -p a s s C a l l electronic-warfare (EW) a i r c r a f t f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s . A s a r e s u l t o f t h e i n i t i a l s u c c e s s o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , CINCSOUTH w o u l d c a n c e l t h e r e q u e s t s f o r t h e F - 4 G s , t h e t w o E C - 1 3 0 H s , a n d o n e o f t h e E C - 1 3 0 E s.²

T h e s u d d e n i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n a n d e x p a n s i o n o f a i r o p e r a t i o n s a c t u a l l y r e q u i r e d f e w s u b s t a n t i v e o r g a n i z a t i o n a l c h a n g e s f r o m t h o s e a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d f o r t h e o n g o i n g D e n y F l i g h t o p e r a t i o n , o f w h i c h D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e a c t u a l l y c o n s t i t u t e d a p a r t i c u -l a r -l y i n t e n s e p h a s e . A s h e h a d f o r D e n y F -l i g h t, U S g e n e r a -l G e o r g e J o u l w a n, S u p r e m e A l l i e d C o m m a n d e r E u r o p e (SACEUR), delegated operational control o f t h e i m p e n d i n g D e -liberate Force activity to Admiral Smith , w h o i n t u r n d e l e g a t e d o p e r a t i o n a l c o n t r o l for all theater-level air forces to General Ryan . Lt Gen Andrea Fornasiero of the Italian air force, com -mander of the 5th Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF), would e x e r c i s e c o m m a n d a n d c o n t r o l ( C²) of Deliberate Force opera -t i o n s -t h r o u g h -t h e c o m b i n e d a i r o p e r a -t i o n s c e n -t e r ( C A O C ) a -t Dal Molin Air Base (AB), Vicenza, Italy . US Air Force major g e n e r a l H a l H o r n b u r g , director of the CAOC, o v e r s a w b o t h t h e c e n t e r ’ s d a y - t o - d a y o p e r a t i o n s a n d — t h r o u g h U S A i r F o r c e c o l o n e l D o u g l a s J . R i c h a r d s o n , h i s c h i e f o f c u r r e n t o p e r a t i o n s (C-3)—those of Deliberate Force as well. As the CAOC d i r e c t o r , G e n e r a l H o r n b u r g u s e d t h e c a l l s i g n C h a r i o t to identify him -self to NATO a i r c r e w s . S i n c e b o t h D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e a n d D e n y F l i g h t were coalition efforts, representatives from the NATO n a t i o n s w e r e a l s o a s s i g n e d t o t h e C A O C .³

A s w a s t h e c a s e w i t h D e n y F l i g h t, NATO ’s Deliberate Force o p e r a t i o n s a n d c o m m a n d s t r u c t u r e r e m a i n e d w e d d e d t o t h e U N’ s . A s t h e c o m m a n d e r o f U N P R O F O R , G e n e r a l J a n v i e r s e r v e d a s A d m i r a l S m i t h ’s c o u n t e r p a r t . G e n e r a l S m i t h a l s o would work closely with General Ryan. The course eventually t a k e n b y D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e r e s u l t e d f r o m t h e c o o r d i n a t i o n a n d p l a n n i n g a m o n g t h e s e m e n i n p a r t i c u l a r . L i a i s o n o f f i c e r s from

NATO and 5 ATAF s e r v e d w i t h t h e U N h e a d q u a r t e r s i n Z a g r e b , Croatia . Further, a NATO liaison officer w a s a t t a c h e d t o U N-PROFOR ’s air operations control center (AOCC) in Kiseljak (near Sarajevo) as well as to the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF).⁴

I n t h e m e a n t i m e , u p o n h e a r i n g o f t h e S e r b a t t a c k , G e n e r a l J a n v i e r h u r r i e d b a c k t o h i s p o s t i n Z a g r e b , t a k i n g t h e k e y f r o m G e n e r a l S m i t h ’ s h a n d s a n d s e t t l i n g f i n a l s t r a t e g y w i t h Admiral Smith , who pressed for an “indirect” use of his air

-power to take out the “anthill” of Serbian logistics and C²

facilities, rather than the “ants” of the offending artillery and o t h e r h e a v y w e a p o n s themselves. UN intelligence e s t i m a t e d t h a t t h e 2 4 0 - s q u a r e - m i l e z o n e a r o u n d S a r a j e v o c o n t a i n e d s o m e 2 5 0 S e r b h e a v y w e a p o n s. F i n d i n g a n d d e s t r o y i n g t h e s e t a r g e t s with any consistency would be well-nigh impossible.

G e n e r a l J a n v i e r a g r e e d t h a t t h e S e r b s s h o u l d b e p u n i s h e d , b u t h e w a s a n x i o u s t o k e e p D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e o n a s h o r t l e a s h — h e w a n t e d t o “ i n f l i c t p a i n b u t n o t d e a t h . ” A f t e r s o m e t e n s e h a g g l i n g , t h e A m e r i c a n a d m i r a l a n d t h e F r e n c h g e n e r a l c a m e t o a n a g r e e m e n t b y 2 1 3 0 o n 2 9 A u g u s t . D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e w o u l d s t a r t w i t h t h e O p e r a t i o n D e a d e y e target list, which in c l u d e d 2 5 a i r t o g r o u n d t a r g e t s a n d 1 5 o t h e r s o n M o u n t I g -m a n o u t s i d e S a r a j e v o d e s i g n a t e d f o r s h e l l i n g b y g u n s o f t h e Anglo-French-Dutch RRF . The attack would begin in roughly f i v e h o u r s — a t 0 2 0 0 o n 3 0 A u g u s t . I n t h e w a n i n g m o m e n t s o f calm, UN p e a c e k e e p e r s b l e w u p t h e i r b u n k e r s a n d s l i p p e d away to safety.⁵

The air fleet at General Ryan ’s d i s p o s a l r e p r e s e n t e d a f o r m i-dable collection of NATO a i r a s s e t s . A t t h e o u t s e t o f D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e , h e w o u l d h a v e a v a i l a b l e m o r e t h a n 2 8 0 a i r c r a f t f r o m t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s (Air Force, Marine Corps , and Navy), France , Britain , T u r k e y, t h e N e t h e r l a n d s , Italy, Spain , a n d G e r m a n y.

NATO a l s o p r o v i d e d e i g h t E - 3 A a i r b o r n e w a r n i n g a n d c o n t r o l system (AWACS) aircraft. With the arrival of on-call aircraft and the inclusion of additional nonNATO assets, COMAIR SOUTH would ultimately have nearly 350 aircraft at his dis -posal. Although most of the units flew from bases in Italy, D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e s o r t i e s a l s o l a u n c h e d f r o m b a s e s a s f a r a w a y as Britain , G e r m a n y, a n d F r a n c e .⁶

By far, the single largest concentration of allied aircraft was at Aviano AB , north of Venice, Italy . T o a c c o m m o d a t e t h e

i n f l u x o f p e o p l e a n d a i r c r a f t a s t e n s i o n s r o s e o v e r t h e s u m m e r , Col Charles F. Wald , the newly arrived commander of Aviano’s 3 1 s t F i g h t e r W i n g, a s s u m e d c o m m a n d o f a n e w p r o v i s i o n a l o u t f i t — t h e 7 4 9 0 t h W i n g. O n a n i n s t a l l a t i o n d e s i g n e d f o r 4 2 F - 1 6 s a n d 1 6 C H - 4 7 helicopters, Wald ’s s t a f f e v e n t u a l l y h a d t o b e d d o w n a t o t a l o f 1 4 0 a i r c r a f t , i n c l u d i n g 5 2 F - 1 6 s , 1 6 CH-47s , 1 2 U S M a r i n e C o r p s F/ A-18s, 12 A-10s, t h r e e B r i t i s h E-3Ds , 1 0 S p a n i s h E F - 1 8 s , 1 0 F - 1 5 E s , 10 EA-6Bs f r o m t h e carrier USS Roosevelt , n i n e C - 1 3 0 s of various types, and six E F - 1 1 1 s . Of these, 114 were in place when Deliberate Force o p e n e d o n t h e n i g h t o f 2 9 – 3 0 A u g u s t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , a s c o m mander of the 7490th Wing (Provisional), Wald did not exer -c i s e -c o m m a n d a u t h o r i t y o v e r t h e n o n - U S A F u n i t s .⁷

O v e r s e e i n g t h i s v a r i e d a r r a y o f a i r a s s e t s w a s t h e D e n y F l i g h t o p e r a t i o n s c e n t e r , w h i c h s t o o d u p i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e p r o v i s i o n a l w i n g a n d s u p e r s e d e d a s p a r s e l y m a n n e d D e n y F l i g h t c o o r d i n a t i o n c e l l a l r e a d y o p e r a t e d b y t h e 3 1 s t W i n g.

Becoming fully operational just days before the initiation of D e l i b e r a t e F o r c e , t h e c e n t e r s e r v e d a s A v i a n o’s primary C² center for the impending aerial activity. Manned by aviators o n t e m p o r a r y d u t y t o A v i a n o a n d c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e 3 1 s t Fighter Wing’s l o g i s t i c s a n d m u n i t i o n s p e r s o n n e l i n t h e l o g i s -t i c s c o n -t r o l c e n -t e r , -t h e o p e r a -t i o n s c e n -t e r w o r k e d d i r e c -t l y w i -t h the CAOC in Vicenza . D e s p i t e s p o r a d i c l i n e s o f c o m m u n i c a -t i o n s be-tween Vicenza a n d A v i a n o , senior officers a-t Aviano b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r a i r o p e r a t i o n s c e n t e r w a s i n s t r u m e n t a l i n the wing’s ability to meet its taskings.⁸

Against NATO a i r p o w e r , t h e B o s n i a n S e r b s c o u l d c o u n t o n an efficient and well-developed IADS. T h e B o s n i a S e r b a r m y (BSA) a l s o p o s s e s s e d a s m a l l a i r f o r c e , e s t i m a t e d a t a c o u p l e o f dozen combat aircraft of limited military capability. Bosnian S e r b aircraft had flown against Croatian forces earlier in Au -g u s t i n a d e s p e r a t e a t t e m p t t o h a l t Z a -g r e b ’s spectacular fived a y c a m p a i g n t o r e c l a i m t h e S e r b h e l fived K r a j i n a region of Croa -tia . U s i n g c l u s t e r m u n i t i o n s , five Serb aircraft killed four c i v i l i a n s a n d w o u n d e d 1 4 i n S l a v o n i a . D u r i n g t h e a t t a c k , t h e S e r b s l o s t t w o a i r c r a f t t o C r o a t a i r d e f e n s e s a n d d i d n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n f u r t h e r e n r a g e t h e C r o a t i a n s .⁹

The real threat to NATO airpower lay in the BSA’s inventory of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and antiaircraft artillery (AAA) .

NATO a i r p l a n n e r s e s t i m a t e d t h a t i n l a t e A u g u s t t h e B S A p o s s e s s e d s e v e n S A - 2 , six SA-6 , and 12 SA-9 SAM batteries, u n k n o w n n u m b e r s o f m a n - p o r t a b l e m i s s i l e s , a n d n e a r l y eleven hundred pieces of AAA ranging in caliber from 20 milli m e t e r s ( m m ) t o 7 6 m m . A i r p l a n n e r s a l s o c o n s i d e r e d t h e p o s -s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e B o -s n i a n S e r b -s c o u l d c o u n t o n i n f o r m a t i o n from the Republic of Yugoslavia ’ s a i r d e f e n s e n e t w o r k , t h e m a i n t a r g e t o f t h e D e a d e y e portion of the Deliberate Force plan. In the region of Sarajevo , t h e a r e a o f m o s t i m m e d i a t e c o n c e r n t o G e n e r a l R y a n a n d h i s s t a f f , t h e B S A m u s t e r e d t h r e e c o r p s — t h e R o m a n j a , D r i n a , a n d H e r z e g o v i n a — n u m b e r -i n g s o m e 1 5 – 2 0 , 0 0 0 p e r s o n n e l b a c k e d b y a n e s t -i m a t e d 2 5 0 h e a v y w e a p o n s, i n c l u d i n g m o r e t h a n 5 0 t a n k s . A s m e n t i o n e d previously, however, Deliberate Force would not seek to en -g a -g e a n d d e s t r o y t h e s e w e a p o n s u n l e s s n e c e s s a r y .^{1 0}

B o s n i a n S e r b l e a d e r s m a d e c r u d e a t t e m p t s t o c o u n t e r t h e p e r c e p t i b l y g r o w i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a l o u t r a g e a t t h e m o r t a r a t t a c k o n S a r a j e v o . Radovan Karadzic , f o r e x a m p l e , b l a m e d t h e M u s -lim government of Bosnia f o r t h e a t t a c k , s t a t i n g t h a t h e h o p e d t h e “ i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o m m u n i t y w o u l d n o l o n g e r b u y t h a t k i n d of story,” and called for an international investigation. Likely, h e w a s h e a r t e n e d b y M o s c o w ’s o p e n s k e p t i c i s m r e g a r d i n g Serb culpability for the attack. Momcilo Krajisnik , c h a i r m a n o f t h e S e r b R e p u b l i c A s s e m b l y, p e r s o n a l l y c o n d e m n e d t h e a t -t a c k , s -t a -t i n g -t h a -t “ i -t m e a n s n o g o o d f o r S e r b s , M u s l i m s , or C r o a t s , a n d i t i s n o t g o o d f o r t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n o f t h e p e a c e p r o c e s s e i t h e r . ”^{1 1} Yet, the cries of “foul” by the Serb leadership fell on deaf ears—at least outside of Russia . A r m e d w i t h t h e earlier UN assessment of Serb responsibility for the Mrkale at-tack and convinced of the need to back NATO’s threats with force, the Western alliance finally moved toward decisive actio n .

A w a r n i n g o r d e r o f 2 9 A u g u s t d e f i n e d t h e c o m b i n e d l a n d / a i r o p e r a t i o n a n d s e t t h e C A O C into motion. NATO p l a n -n e r s a -n d c o m m a -n d e r s h a d -n o i d e a h o w l o -n g t h e N A T O a -n d U N authorization keys , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e U N’s, would remain t u r n e d o n a n d t h u s p l a n n e d t o h i t a s m a n y t a r g e t s a s p o s s i -b l e , a s q u i c k l y a s p o s s i -b l e . A s a p r e p a r a t o r y s t e p , G e n e r a l H o r n b u r g c a n c e l e d m o s t o f t h e p r e p l a n n e d D e n y F l i g h t mis -s i o n -s -s c h e d u l e d a f t e r 1 4 0 0 c e n t r a l E u r o p e a n t i m e ( C E T ) . T h e air tasking message (ATM) f o r t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h a t d a y , a s

w e l l a s f o r t h e n e x t , w a s c h a n g e d t o i m p l e m e n t t h e a i r - s t r i k e plan, initially codenamed Vulcan b u t s o o n c h a n g e d t o D e l i b -e r a t -e F o r c -e . A s p l a n n -e d , t h -e i n i t i a l a t t a c k i n c l u d -e d D -e a d -e y -e t a r g e t s a n d t h o s e a r o u n d S a r a j e v o i n c l u d e d i n Bouton D’or— a n e a r l i e r p l a n . O n t h e m o r n i n g o f 2 9 A u g u s t , G e n e r a l Ryan arrived at Vicenza t o t a k e a m o r e d i r e c t r o l e i n t h e execution of the impending operation. Particularly concerned that even a single incident of collateral damage c o u l d u n d e r m i n e o r e v e n h a l t t h e a i r c a m p a i g n a n d c o n v i n c e d t h a t c o m -manders were ultimately responsible for all the actions of their forces, Ryan intended to personally select all targets a n d d e s i r e d mean points of impact (DMPI) (i.e., aiming points) for attack. If

In document Deliberated Force (Page 134-160)