Chapter 5 Results
5.2 Findings
5.2.4 Can we design software to further develop levels of trust in on-line
regulation?
Team members risk some investment in a collaborative venture. This is based on the assumption that other parties will do likewise, and with a view to a long-term goal, success that is of greater value than the risk. Can initial trust (Hertel, 2004) more recently termed predispositional trust (Black, 2008) be nurtured through the use of the software? Social rules act as a contract. A set of behavioural
expectations are articulated and agreed upon. It has been shown that focus group participants have identified the value of Phreda in setting down the behaviours considered to be important to the team. Does using software that allows the creation and administration of these rules, further develop the levels of trust between individuals in the team?
The theoretical framework predicted that the rule module would be valuable because, via improvements in team trust, performance would benefit. Finding and surveying risk-taking behaviour (increased risk-taking implies increased trust, if the reward from participation remains constant) was not possible in the real-life venues. Given the limited value of the real-life studies, was there any indication in the discussions of the focus group participants that linked the rule module to the levels of trust in the team?
From the literature discussed in section 2.4, initial trust has been seen to occur
“when there is a common belief that others will make good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with commitments (explicit or implicit) and act honestly in negotiation of those commitments” (Hertel, 2004).
and that sustained trust emerges from team members witnessing behaviour that demonstrates that commitment. While trust was not addressed directly in the 12 questions set for the focus groups, key notions related to conflict, commitment and ownership were part of the reasoning given by the participants. These comments were coded.
Commitment was mentioned by five participants across all three focus groups. One other participant agreed directly that building the rules would encourage both ownership of and commitment to the process. All mention of commitment was in the context of the process of creating rules. Three of the questions addressed the process and the attendance rule (questions 4, 5, 6), the other three questions concerned whether the module would be used (questions 9, 10, 11). The words “committed” and the purchasing metaphors “ownership”, “accountable” and “buy in” were indicators of the concept under discussion. Commitment was seen to
lead to “endorsement”, “accepting responsibility” “submitting to rules”, being “mindful” of rules and trusting. Five examples follow, from three members of different groups.
P21_G1 Q6: … I think it would be essential to be part of the process it would provide some endorsement of the rules people would understand where the rules had come from and why being part of it provides ownership, they are more likely to be mindful of those rules and apply them.
P26_G2 Q4: it all works well if people have bought in to the process so if people don't buy into the process it doesn't work so I think the actual thing is um The team creating its own rules you are more likely to get people buying in and if you like submitting to those rules.
Q 10: I think a good leader would [use the rule
module], particularly if the rules had been decided upon by the group. If they didn't it would essentially be a violation of the group’s trust.
P12_G3 Q 4: If you have ownership of something then you are likely to be more happy with it so if you have been part of the process of setting up the rule then you have some ownership.
Q 11: Groups tend to respect and use rules which they have had a part in developing. This is because of a sense of ownership and because in developing the rules they have had a chance to tailor the rules to their own context.
The discussions recognised the value of the democratic design of Phreda in having participants obey the norms of behaviour set for the group, because the authority for setting the norms’ formalisms (the rules) came from every member of the group. The comments spoke of “peer pressure”, “democratic responsibility” and “submitting to those rules”.
One participant reasoned that it was likely to diffuse conflict that might arise further down the track.
Greater commitment by individual team members to the collective project implies greater trust between those members as work on the task progresses. Black’s findings indicate that as the project matures and commitment is demonstrated, benevolent trust (or affective, emotional trust) will increase, although trust in the skills (the abilities ) of other members does not necessarily increase. Greater trust within supply-chain partnerships, is demonstrated by managers investing less in checking up on whether other partners have met their commitments (Black,
2008). Greater certainty of shared behavioural expectations and commitment to those expectations should also increase trust, since acceptance of rules is really an agreement binding team members in the same way that agreements bind parties in a supply chain. The checking task can be relegated to the Phreda software rather than the managers of a supply chain, and the rules can be disabled as soon as it is felt that checking is no longer necessary.
Another viewpoint on loyalty, akin to commitment, is presented by Murphy (2004). Murphy’s argument is that virtual teams owe loyalty to design only, whereas face-to-face teams are loyal to each other and workplace teams are loyal to corporate goals. Sharing authority for a behavioural rule is a means of setting a teams’ corporate goal and the holders of loyalty (commitment) to this goal are the individuals who set it up. The software enables a process that extends the loyalty of members to more than the shared design of the task. The loyalty is to each other as individuals on an institutional not just an emotional level. It was
considered by one participant that this institutional sharing was also tied to trust. P26_G2 felt that, should a leader not use the module when formal rules had been created by the team members, that this would constitute a breach of trust. A willingness to be vulnerable to the uncontrolled and unmonitored acts of another party is going to operate at an emotional level (i.e. Black’s benevolent trust), not just an institutional one. The rule module can then be seen as a mechanism for extending loyalty and hence trust beyond the boundaries set by current on-line collaboration where allegiance is expected to be just to design. It extends loyalty to institutional and interpersonal levels as well.
What makes sharing this rule making process different from sharing the
construction of any other virtual process then? (Murphy’s boundaries could break down with any democratic decision-making.) Agreed process templates, such as the sequence of tasks and the format for a document, are just a series of steps in a design. Rules can be set to describe how these templates are used, to monitor how steps are actually taken. It is other team-member’s behaviour that provides the risk and in which an individual trusts. Having defined a template for a team
process is no statement of commitment on how that template will be used. Trust is about behaviour and Phreda is for democratically administering behaviour.
Increased commitment to behavioural norms leads to increased trust. Focus group participants see the process of using Phreda as increasing commitment, if the process is well managed.