Developing a TNPO framework of analysis

As highlighted in the previous chapter, the thesis argues strongly in favour of using a comprehensive, integrative understanding of power. This is above all reflected in the definition of the TNPO concept (see above). However, in order to use such a comprehensive notion in view of our attempt to gain a more accurate, holistic understanding of the EU‟s power vis-à-vis Central Asia, it is necessary to integrate the concept into a framework of analysis. In embedding the TNPO concept into an analytical model, it is essential to incorporate the two main features of TNPO. On the one hand, this means that the framework needs to account for the distinction between the relational and the structural level on which power is exercised as well as for the interplay between the two levels (cf. the central premise of the present thesis). On the other hand, this means that the model needs to encompass the extent to which TNPO is made up of three structures with considerable overlap. To those ends, we will draw on insights86 from, amongst others, Hay (2002), Giddens (1995) and Young (1991) on the interplay between structure and agency, as well as on Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s (2008) concept of structural foreign policy. Let us start with considering the relationship between structure and agency, or in Hay‟s words, the relationship between „context‟ and „conduct‟ (Hay, 2002). Agency in the sense of „conduct‟ refers to political action (Hay, 2002: 95-96). By contrast, structure in the sense of „context‟ refers to the setting within which social, political and economic events occur and acquire meaning; as Hay explains, “by appealing to a notion of structure to describe context, political scientists are referring to the ordered nature of social and political relations - to the fact that political institutions, practices, routines and conventions appear to exhibit some regularity or „structure‟ over time” (2002: 94).

As pointed out in the previous chapter, the thesis‟s central proposition that the analysis of power, as a comprehensive account of power phenomena, should consider both the relational and the structural level on which power is exerted as well as the interplay between them, finds support in the structure-agency debate in the social sciences. Here Hay asserts that “what is required is a mode of analysis [...] capable of reconciling structural and agential factors within a single explanation” (2002: 113). To illustrate this point in the field of EU studies, it is useful to refer to Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s conceptual study of EU foreign policy (2008). Rather than studying the EU‟s external agency solely through their notion of

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structural foreign policy, they develop a comprehensive conceptual framework based on a „structural foreign policy - conventional foreign policy‟ continuum, which encompasses both conventional and „neglected‟ - i.e. structural - dimensions of foreign policy (2008: 19 & 335). In line with Hay‟s proposition, Giddens (1995) argues that agent-focused theories and structuralist approaches can be seen to be complementary: on the one hand, resources, treated as structural elements of social systems, are drawn upon by actors in the instantiation of interaction (1995: 49-50). The power relations sustained in the regularised practices constituting social systems can be considered as reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence in interaction (ibid.). Domination, on the other hand, understood here as the sway that actors have over others and over the material world they inhabit, then refers to the structured asymmetries of the resources drawn upon and reconstituted in such power relations (ibid.). This corresponds with Wendt‟s constructivist claim that the interests and capabilities of states are determined by the underlying social structure in which states are embedded and which, in Wendt‟s view, is “constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts” (1999: 97). As Holden points out, the proposition that agents and structures are co-constitutive is the essence of the „structuration principle‟ (2009: 12). This also includes the link between agency and purely structural power. To illustrate this, Holden refers to how the global economic system after the World War II was largely shaped by U.S. agency, notably via its development of international economic governance institutions, European integration (cf. Marshall plan) and Japan‟s economic recovery (ibid.). In other words, the U.S. developed a system “whose structural qualities would privilege” the role of the U.S. (ibid.). An additional theoretical insight in considering the relationship between structure and agency and how they interact, can be derived from Young (1991). As already mentioned, according to Young, the essential feature of what he labels „structural leadership‟ lies in the ability to translate structural power into bargaining leverage as a means of reaching agreement (1991: 288-289). Young adds that “it makes sense to view the link between structural power and bargaining leverage as stemming from the existence of asymmetries among the participants or stakeholders in processes of institutional bargaining” (ibid.). In addition, he asserts that “bargaining leverage is necessarily relational; the important thing is what an actor stands to lose or gain relative to what others stand to lose or gain from institutional bargaining” (ibid.). This serves to indicate that any examination of the outcomes in institutional bargaining “need to rest on an assessment of the relative, in contrast to the absolute, circumstances of the participants”, i.e. of the relational in contrast to the structural level (Young, 1991: 289).

As mentioned above, the juxtaposition of structure and agency is also overcome in Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s (2008) conceptual study of EU foreign policy, in particular

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through their understanding of how structural foreign policy complements and interacts with conventional foreign policy. However, their conceptual framework is also inspirational for the second key feature of TNPO, in that it identifies various structures, notably material structures (social-economic and security), institutional (political and legal), as well as mental (e.g. values, identity and culture) structures. Moreover, their framework enables an extension of the analysis of foreign policy beyond the (inter)state-level to include the transnational level, which involves, inter alia, business and civil society actors (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 25-29). In addition, their approach suggests that it is not a matter of possessing or not possessing structural power, but rather a matter of „gradation‟. That is, they see their framework as a continuum with several gradations of structural foreign policy and structural power. As Keukeleire (2002) puts it:

At one side of the continuum, an actor can possess structural power in the sense that this actor can indeed decide what the rules of the game are (with the other actor having only one option to choose). At the other side of the continuum an actor can possess only limited structural power in the sense that this actor can only influence to a limited extent the rules of the game that will be used by other actors.

Keukeleire and MacNaughtan‟s conceptual continuum ranges from a “high degree of structural foreign policy” to “absence of a structural foreign policy” (2008: 255-297). This conceptual gradation allowed them to observe that the intensity of the EU‟s structural foreign policy varies considerably from region to region, and that in some cases the extent of structural foreign policy towards these regions is rather limited or even completely absent.

Having outlined the propositions and approaches that we find insightful for developing the TNPO model, let us now set out the framework. This should be viewed as an initial attempt to depict the way in which TNPO might be considered to operate and will be further explored, developed and possibly refined in the subsequent empirical chapters. In this sense, the TNPO model introduced in this chapter forms a starting point for the empirical exploration of the EU‟s influence vis-à-vis Central Asia, as well as for any possible further theoretical development as a result of that empirical investigation, in accordance with the iterative research approach outlined in the introductory chapter. Above all, the TNPO framework should be helpful in demonstrating how an actor such as the EU can rely on its TNPO to obtain a favourable outcome from a partner country (or region), which in turn strengthens the EU‟s TNPO. The framework thus assumes that relational and structural power are complementary, or even mutually dependent. To recapitulate the definition of TNPO, the notion helps to assess the degree to which an actor in the international realm wields power over another actor through his/her control over a constitutive mix of material, institutional and

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ideational structures, which shape or set the context within which the other actor operates and in which the two relate with each other. As mentioned above, this definition only holds on the assumption that power, whether intentional or unintentional, active or passive, can be transnational in nature. This allows us to consider the observation that globalisation and interdependence have significantly blurred the divide between private and public, as well as between the distinct levels of governance (international, interregional, supranational, regional, national, local), to the point where transnational forces interact with or exist alongside traditional intergovernmental relationships. In turn, the word „degree‟ in the definition reflects an element of „variation‟. That is, the degree of TNPO that an actor wields may not only vary from country to country and from region to region, but is also likely to be subject to change over time. It follows that an actor‟s TNPO increases the more control s/he has across the three constitutive structures. Put differently, since TNPO consists of the combined effect of the actor‟s control over these three structures, his/her TNPO increases the more influential s/he is in each of them. By the same token, having only a limited control over a particular TNPO structure noticeably undermines the actor‟s overall TNPO. A further outline of the conditions under which TNPO occurs and operates is provided below. Let us now first have a look at the depiction of the TNPO model.

Figure 2: TNPO framework

(1) Exercise of TNPO Reinforcement of TNPO (2) -TNPO1 TNPO1-2 -TNPO2 TNPO1-3 -TNPO3 TNPO2-3 TNPO1-2-3

As depicted in the diagram (Figure 2), the TNPO framework identifies two broad phenomena of influence, thereby reflecting the production of a mutually enhancing effect. More in particular, the framework distinguishes between the relational (1) and the structural (2) sphere in which the power phenomena occur, whilst accounting for the interplay between the two spheres. Most centrally, the diagram depicts how an actor‟s TNPO derives from his

Transnational power over (TNPO) Obtaining concrete outcome

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control over a constitutive mix of three structures (TNPO1, TNPO2 and TNPO3) and from the

possible interaction between them (TNPO1-2, TNPO1-3, TNPO2-3 & TNPO1-2-3). The

phenomenon depicted by the upper arrow then indicates how the actor‟s TNPO enables him, in the relational sphere, to obtain a favourable outcome from another actor (cf. definition of relational power: A‟s ability to get B to do something he would otherwise not do). At the relational level, the actor thus relies on his TNPO as a resource in order to affect a (political) outcome. Put differently, TNPO is translated into relational power. Usually, this process will involve bargaining of some sort. In turn, the phenomenon depicted by the lower arrow indicates how the desired outcome subsequently reinforces A‟s TNPO over actor B. This occurs at the structural level, since A‟s favourable outcome seeks to influence the context - i.e. the TNPO structures - within which actor B operates and in which he relates with A. In sum, agency and structure are depicted as being mutually constitutive. This also implies an element of „gradation‟ in the sense that the extent to which the obtained outcome is favourable to actor A depends on the degree to which he wields TNPO over B. In turn, the extent to which A‟s TNPO is reinforced by the obtained outcome equally depends on the degree to which the outcome is favourable to A. Of course, it is possible that another - unidentified - variable also contributes towards the attainment of the desired outcome. For instance, the occurrence of an unplanned event, which may suddenly improve political relations between the two parties, and which may thus positively affect the mood during the bargaining process. Other such unidentified variables may include aspects related to specific features of those involved in the bargaining process, such as strong leadership capabilities or personal relationships between negotiators. However, in view of presenting insights that are to some extent generalisable, the thesis needs to abstract political reality and therefore rules out the possible enabling impact of unidentified variables, and thus assumes that all else is held constant.87 In other words, the thesis assumes that there is no enabling impact other than the effect of the identified independent variables.