Structural power of the EU

Although widely accepted as seminal in IR and IPE, Strange‟s theory of structural power has attracted only a scattered number of academic followers in the field of EU studies, including in the subfield of EU‟s international involvement (e.g. Holden, 2009; Keukeleire, 2002; Tayfur, 2003).24 In fact, structurally integrative approaches as a whole remain largely underexplored in studies of European integration.25 Fully aware of this latent gap in the literature and convinced of the explanatory potential of a more structure-oriented perspective, Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008) and Holden (2009) have both greatly enriched the field in this regard by highlighting the importance and usefulness of Strange‟s conceptual distinction between relational and structural power. Both studies are based on the assertion that the predominant approaches for analysing power and foreign policy remain inadequate to

23 _{In his seminal work „Power: A Radical View‟, Lukes (1974) claimed that power had a third dimension,}

arguing that, beyond the decision- and non-decision-making processes, power may also stem from the actions or inactions implicated in the shaping and manipulating of other actors‟ preferences.

24 _{Studies from IR and IPE that have drawn on Strange‟s theory of structural power are e.g. Burges (2009),}

Helleiner (2005) and Payne (1994). It is worth adding here that various scholars have sought to review and reflect upon Strange‟s work, often from their own theoretical and/or ontological viewpoints. See e.g. Cox (1996), May (1996) and Tooze (2000).

25 _{Compared to structurally integrative approaches, structuralist approaches have an arguably more established}

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examine less obvious and observable aspects of the EU‟s power (Holden, 2009) and foreign policy (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008). The latter claim that, despite many IR scholars readily acknowledging the complexity of present-day international relations, foreign policy is still predominantly studied against a conventional, one-sided understanding of the notion; as a result, other - less obvious - dimensions of foreign policy tend to be overlooked or neglected (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 19).26 In introducing a more updated and inclusive notion of foreign policy and largely inspired by Strange‟s theory, Keukeleire & MacNaughtan argue strongly in favour of a structural approach, albeit as part of a comprehensive framework, which accounts for both a „conventional‟ understanding of foreign policy and a „structural‟ understanding of foreign policy. As such, they seek to illustrate that the capacity to „structure‟ the global environment and influence long-term developments has become at least as important as the ability to strengthen capabilities (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 26). They define structural foreign policy as a foreign policy that “conducted over the long-term, seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures” (2008: 25).27

Keukeleire & MacNaughtan thus identify five structures, with the latter structure representing immaterial issues. By adding this fifth structure, they highlight that foreign policy must look beyond the material realm of military security or economic well- being to account for less tangible aspects, such as culture, beliefs and identity and legitimacy, as these “shape the perception and behaviour of actors, influence how they define their interests and what kind of role they want to play in the international system” (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 25). Applied to the case of the EU, conventional foreign policy captures those policies that fall under the „intergovernmental approach‟ of EU foreign policy-making (cf. Pillar II), while structural foreign policy stands for those policies that are decided upon according to the „Community approach‟ (cf. Pillar I) (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008: 11- 12 & 29-30). Hence, in practical terms, the former encapsulates the EU‟s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while the latter encompasses the vast array of the EU‟s external relations policies.

Holden (2009), in turn, focuses on one particular strand of that vast array, notably EU aid policy. He seeks to demonstrate that the EU‟s various aid policies can be understood as an attempt by the EU to gain structural power. More generally, he contends that the EU has

26 _{See Appendix 3.1. for an overview of both the dominant and the other dimensions of foreign policy as}

identified by Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008).

27

The notion of structural foreign policy has also been conceptualised by Telò, who defines it as a policy that affects “particularly the economic and social structures of partners (states, regions, economic actors, international organisations, etc.) [and] is implemented through pacific and original means (diplomatic relations, agreements, sanctions and so on), [of which the] scope is not conjunctural but rather in the middle or long range” (Telò, 2001: 26).

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always possessed structural power to an extent, and that its external policies serve to further develop this (Holden, 2009: 30). Holden‟s use of the notion of structural power is in several ways the result of his search for both a conceptual tool that can capture “a deeper sense of power than direct, easily observable (and measureable) definitions” (2009: 5), and a conception of power that is stronger than those offered by social constructivist approaches, which he suggests tend to underplay the issue of power (2009: 10). In importing Strange‟s theory of structural power to the field of EU studies, he asserts that the concept - albeit in a slightly adapted version - is very well-suited for analysing the EU‟s external relations policies, not least since it captures the complexity and fragmentation that characterise the EU, as well as the depth and comprehensiveness of its external involvement (2009: 3-5 & 7-8). In Holden‟s view, the concept also offers a stronger and more nuanced alternative to social constructivist tools to study EU influence. Echoing the point we made in the introductory chapter, Holden explains that the constructivists‟ excessive focus on the EU‟s spread of norms and values risks blinding us to the importance of other - including more material - configurations of power and the broader political impact of the EU‟s engagement with third countries, such as the economic effects of its aid (Holden, 2009: 2 & 9-10 & 30).28

Moreover, central to Holden‟s analysis of EU aid policy is the principle that there are two forms of structural power, namely an agent-focused type and a purely structural one (see supra). In relation to the EU, Holden describes the former type as the capacity of the EU to gain institutional leverage or economic and political weight, enabling it to shape the decisions of partner countries, while the latter type of structural power would eventually result in a wholesale liberalisation and Europeanisation of the targeted country or region (Holden, 2009: 22 & 29). Interestingly, as a starting point for his analytical framework, Holden (2009: 10) draws on Barnett and Duvall‟s comprehensive understanding of power as “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett & Duvall, 2005: 42). In essence, this definition has two strengths. On the one hand, it opens up the scope of power analysis to include non-traditional and/or non-coercive forms of power, such as economic and discursive power. Importantly, it does so without being too broad as to lose its analytical applicability. On the other hand, the definition also allows for a wider range of the potential outcomes that result from the exercise of power. That is, it goes beyond the neorealist understanding of power as the ability to control and obtain certain outcomes (e.g. Baldwin, 1979) to encapsulate the ability to determine the conditions or terms of reference for other actors, which neatly captures that

28 _{It is important to note that sociological (or constructivist) institutionalism, along with the rational-choice and}

historical variants, arguably dominates the contemporary study of European integration (see e.g. Pollack, 2004: 153-4).

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subtler sense of power that Holden (2009) seeks to grasp in relation to the EU‟s aid policies. Holden (2005) implicitly refers to this form of EU influence in his empirical study of the EU‟s aid programmes in the Southern Mediterranean, especially when arguing that via the conclusion of association agreements with Mediterranean partner countries “the EU has set the agenda, the rules of the game and the discourse beforehand, […] and holds all the cards in terms of inducements of aid and trade” (Holden, 2005: 25). In Holden‟s view, the conclusion of association agreements thus enabled the EU to direct these countries along the path that the EU had devised (2005: 27). As Holden (2009) asserts in his ensuing monograph on EU aid policy, it is in shaping and controlling this path of political and economic liberalisation that the EU seeks to increase its structural power through aid (Holden, 2009).