Direct Control and Responsible Autonomy

Friedman (1977) builds upon Marx’s work by theorizing about different kinds of control strategies managers needed as a result of changes to the labour process and/or worker resistance in the context of monopolistic capitalism. According to Friedman (1977, 2000), managers exercise their authority over workers through strategies of direct control or responsible autonomy. Together, these strategies constitute a rough continuum of direct and indirect managerial control (Friedman, 2000). Both strategies have been found throughout capitalism’s history (Friedman, 1977). Responsible autonomy strategies are typically used to manage privileged white-collared workers (i.e., middle managers, professionals, clerks), whereas direct control strategies are primarily used to manage workers in low or no-skilled jobs.

Direct control involves close supervision, coercive threats, and minimal

responsibility of workers (Friedman, 1977). A scientific approach reflects a direct control strategy because the labour process is fragmented in ways that result in routine tasks and

involves little-to-no skill (see Braverman, 1974; Taylor, 1947). In the context of

monopoly capitalism, firms were growing in size and complexity. According to Friedman (1977), scientific management approaches enabled firms to improve their productivity and competitiveness in the market. Over time, however, workers became increasingly dissatisfied with being treated like machines and resisted in an organized manner, making them difficult to replace. Although capitalism was not overthrown, managers responded to the resistance by shifting away from direct control strategies to responsible autonomy strategies.

Responsible autonomy is an indirect way to control workers and their labour (Friedman, 1977, 2000). According to Friedman, it requires managers to give workers some freedom in how they perform their work tasks and makes managers reliant on their “goodwill” to work in productive ways. The contrasting class interests of workers and owners motivate managers to align workers’ interests to the firm’s goals. In order to facilitate a goodwill that contributes to firms’ productiveness and competitiveness, managers give workers higher statuses and greater authority and responsibilities

compared to their previous circumstances and to other workers. In the past, this strategy was abandoned when owners or top managers decided that managers needed greater control over the day-to-day work activities of workers in order to respond to changes in demand in the market (Friedman, 1977).

Direct control and responsible autonomy are useful concepts to explain

managerial control and can be used in relation to the study of FWPs. Whether workers can use FWPs depends on their relative control over their work and the strategies managers use to control them (Bailyn, 2006; Blair-Loy & Wharton, 2004; Fenwich &

Tausig, 2004; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Peper et al., 2009). As discussed earlier in this chapter, workers stratified in relatively privileged or better jobs, such as professionals and managers, tend to have access to FWPs compared to workers stratified in lower-leveled jobs, such as part-time retail workers (see e.g., Higgins et al., 2008; Jacobs & Gerson, 2004; Lambert & Haley-Lock, 2004). Privileged workers’ relative advantage to access FWPs and greater control over work tasks may be a function of responsible autonomy.

Friedman warns that responsible autonomy is flawed because it emphasizes workers’ autonomy while obscuring the lack of control workers actually have over the labour process. This contradiction may become evident when workers begin to expect firms to be responsive to their needs (Friedman, 1977, 2000). If workers’ needs oppose the owners’ interests in increasing profits, accommodations will not be made.

Accordingly, workers may lose their goodwill and disrupt the labour process or leave the firm. Managers then may need to change their managerial control strategies once again.

MacEachen and colleagues (MacEachen, Polzer, & Clarke, 2008) illustrate this contradiction in their examination of managers’ discourse of flexibility in computer software firms. MacEachen and colleagues find that although managers speak of

flexibility for employees (FWPs) favourably, greater flexibility is required by workers to the firm than the flexibility given to workers. In these workplaces, workers had the autonomy to work when and where they wanted but had to finish their work, which required long hours. Firms largely benefit from this practice of responsible autonomy. Personal and work time and space became merged or blurred for workers, and as a result, “all time is potential work time” (MacEachen et al., 2008: 1028). If workers demanded

FWPs that involved a reduction in hours of work, problems would likely arise because the bottom-line may be affected.

Responsible autonomy is typically the way to manage workers in knowledge- intensive firms in the new economy (Frenkel, Korczynski, Donoghue, & Shire, 1995; MacEachen et al., 2008). This strategy is described as the most effective way to

“coordinate and cultivate” (Malone, 2004) highly skilled knowledge workers (Damarin, 2006; Newell, Robertson, Scarbrough, & Swan, 2002). Managers are to set the goals and objectives for workers and to facilitate their creativity and knowledge work through favourable workplace conditions (Malone, 2004; Newell et al., 2002). For instance, better wages, monetary benefits, and the lack of rules about how to work are touted as strategies to keep workers motivated and be committed to the goals of the firms (Frenkel et al., 1995; Malone, 2004; Newell et al., 2002); they are also a means to retain skilled and knowledgeable workers. But the urgency to come up with new ideas and the

precariousness of knowledge-intensive firms in the market results in managerial control over the working and personal lives of workers (MacEachen et al., 2008).