Discourses on Sharia and its Implementation in Indonesia 27

The studies on the discourses of Sharia in Indonesian politics have been widely available in Indonesia. The most prominent research was conducted by Boland (Boland 1971), who elucidates the formation of Indonesia as a nation-state and the endeavours of the Muslim elite to have state constitution based on Sharia. Many other scholars have also conducted research on the issues of Sharia in Indonesia from various perspectives, including Effendy (Effendy 2003), Assyaukani (Assyaukanie 2009), Salim and Azra (2003c), Salim (2003), Hooker (2003) and van Bruinessen (Bruinessen 1996a).

Effendy (Effendy 2003) presented the tense and shifting political relationship between Islam and the state in Indonesia from the pre-independence period until the years following the fall of Suharto. He records the reasons for the division between Islam and the state. He observed two prominent theories in contemporary Islamic political thinking, both of which recognise Islam as a primary force that pervades all spheres of life. The first theory views the formation of a Muslim state with Sharia as the state constitution and the ultimate embodiment of its ideology, thus believing that the concept of a modern democratic nation-state inherently contradicts the fundamental principles of Islam. The second theory argues that Islam does not contradict the concept of a modern democratic nation-state because the Qur’an is flexible, open to multiple interpretations and does not stipulate a particular system of government. This theory believes that the fundamental ethical values found in the Qur’an—‘justice, equality, brotherhood, and freedom’ (Effendy 2003, p. 7)—are in line with the system of democracy. Effendy also provided a critical analysis of the relationship between Islam and the state after the fall of President Suharto in 1998, which opened the door for mass participation in political activities and the formation of 181 political parties, of which 42 were Islamic. Despite the recent increase in Islamic political parties that support Sharia as their ideological basis, Effendy (2003) argues that this is an expected part of the shift from authoritarian to democratic rule.

Other scholars, such as Fealy (2005), Riddell (2005), Salim and Azra (2003c) and Hosen (2007b), observed that Suharto’s departure created opportunities for several Muslim groups and political parties to propose the introduction of Sharia into the constitution, and Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world, entered a new era of political, legal and economic reform, particularly when Habibie’s government passed two laws to promote regional autonomy.

Drakeley (2005) observed that the elimination of the New Order’s political constraints has not resulted in a transformation in the fortunes of political Islam that some expected. As Rumadi (2007) observed, Islam is the dominant religion in Indonesia; however, as a political power, Islamic parties have not been successful at the elections. The results of the general elections of 1999 and 2004 show that the proportion of Indonesian Muslims inclined to give their vote to clearly identifiable

santri-based parties declined when compared with the pre- New Order period. In the 1955 elections, Islamic parties obtained 45.13 per cent of the vote, while in 2004, they attracted only 21 per cent (Rumadi 2007). These figures suggest a decline in Islam’s political influence, despite the fact that Indonesian Muslims appear to have become

more santri.23 In addition, the ‘secular’ parties, such as Golkar and (Partai Demokrasi

Indonesia-Perjuangan (PDI-P: the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle), have

adjusted their stance to attract santri elements (Effendy 2003; Salim, Arskal 2003).

Nonetheless, it is clear that the establishment of an Indonesian Islamic state is not a priority for most Indonesian Muslims (Drakeley 2005; Salim, Arskal & Azra 2003c). The most recent general election—the parliamentary elections of 2009—provided further evidence that Indonesian Muslims are not automatically in favour of giving their votes to Islamic parties. From around 10 Islamic political parties participating in the general elections, only four parties were successful in passing the parliamentary thresholds of 2.5 per cent from the total national legitimate votes in order to have

seats in the parliament. These parties were Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN: National

Mandate Party) with 6.01 per cent, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB: Nation

Awakening Party) with 4.94 per cent, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS: Prosperous

Justice Party) with 7.88 per cent and Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP: United

23_{Santri is a term that is commonly used in Indonesian literature to refer to a Muslim who practices Islam} doctrines devoutly, as opposed to an abangan,who is less devout. For detail, see Geertz (1960).

Development Party) with 5.32 per cent. Of these four parties that met the electoral threshold, only the PKS increased its support, and by less than one percentage point over its showing in 2004.

In contrast to the limited electoral success of santri-based parties in national politics,

since the implementation of Regional Autonomy in January 2001, many districts— such as Enrekang, Gowa, Takalar, Maros, Sinjai and Bulukumba in South Sulawesi; Indramayu, Tasikmalaya, Garut, Cianjur, Kota Depok and Cianjur dan Kota Tangerang in West Java; Kota Padang, Solok and Bukittinggi in West Sumatra; and

Pamekasan in East Java—have enacted Perda Sharia, despite the provision in article 7

of Law No. 22/1999,24 which states that religious matters come under the authority of

the central government rather than the district governments. Hence, according to Satriyo (2003), district governments avoid using the term ‘Sharia’. Instead, they frame the regulations in terms of upholding ‘morality and order’.

However, as Rumadi (2007) argued, it has become the strategy of Islamic groups to

use regional autonomy to enact Perda Sharia, particularly since their failure to

achieve electoral success at the national level. Abu Bakar Ba’ashir, the former leader

of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, has argued that Perda Sharia is one way to formalise

Islamic Sharia in the legal system if Muslims cannot establish an Islamic state (ICRP 2007). Turning to the debate about Sharia, it is clear that, before 1999, most of the debates about the nature of the Indonesian state were conducted at the national level. However, since regional autonomy in 1999, especially after many districts

implemented Perda Sharia, the debate on Sharia has been focused on issues of human

rights, especially women’s security.