What is it and how does it relate to identity?

Conceptualisation of ontological security in the literature can be conflicting and elusive, which can prompt us to ask whether ontological security provides us with extra utility or added- value for our understanding of conflict, identity politics and societal security. How is it different than societal security or human security? How is it linked to self-identity or different than identity politics? Can we scale it up and extrapolate it to collectives and states? Is ontological security something actors have? Is it a state of being? A spectrum? Is it endogenously or exogenously constructed? And what does it mean to be ontologically (in)secure?

Unlike securitisation that views security as a negative, where security and insecurity share the same security problematique and do not constitute a binary opposition, ontological security can be seen as a positive security, meaning that actors desire it. In Wæver’s definition, the state of security suggests a situation marked by the presence of a security issue that includes a response, where the state of insecurity suggests that there is a security issue but no response (Wæver 1995). In this understanding, actors do not desire a situation conceptualised in security terms; when there is no security issue (asecurity), security becomes an irrelevant concern. Unlike security-as-survival, the concept of ontological security is something actors aspire for; it is about feeling secure in who we were, who we are and who we wish to be. When we are [ontologically] insecure, we feel uncomfortable with who we are on least one level of our identity or another.

Ontological security was first coined by psychiatrist Ronald D. Laing, who described it as having a constant sense of presence in the world as real, alive and whole, and noted that in the absence of ontological security actors would be crushed under the burdens and anxieties of everyday life, feeling a continual and deadly threat (Laing 1971). Within the discipline of sociology, the term is most closely coupled with Anthony Giddens, who defined it as having the confidence in the continuity of the self. For Giddens, “to be ontologically secure is to possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, answers to fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses”, which allows actors to

manage the inherent anxieties of everyday life (Giddens 1991:47). He explains that, self- identity is the development of a consistent feeling of a self-biography, whereas ontological security is about the confidence an individual has in sustaining a biographical continuity through establishing a system of basic trust for the real world and for social relations with others (Giddens 1991).

Self-biography is the form of ‘discursive consciousness’ manifested in self-narrative, through which agents create meanings for their actions (Giddens 1984:374). Self-narratives add meaning to actors self-identity; they are the expressions of our ‘reality production’ (Steele 2008:11). Individuals have multiple identities (i.e. gender, ethnic, religious, sex, national, ideological, occupational and so on), thus we constitute our self-identity through multi- layered identity narratives. As a result, self gains coherence, at least to some extent. Alternatively, for Neumann, “the making of selves is a narrative process of identification whereby a number of identities that have been negotiated in specific contexts are strung together into one overarching story...” (Neumann 1999:218). Thus, self-narratives are central to the study of ontological security.

Mostly drawing on Giddens’ work, the concept of ontological security has given birth to a growing body of literature in IR (McSweeney 1999, Kinnvall 2004, Steele 2005, Mitzen 2006, Roe 2008, Steele 2008, Zarakol 2010, Lupovici 2012, Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Even though there is no consensus among IR scholars on whether states, collectives or groups are primarily driven by ontological security seeking/producing practices, McSweeney, Huysmans, Mitzen and Steele have all convincingly argued that collectives care about their ontological security as much as – if not more than – their physical security (Huysmans 1998, McSweeney 1999, Steele 2005, Mitzen 2006). Along similar lines, other scholars from the constructivists tradition, such as Wendt, assert that states, like individuals, have both physical and social motivations (Wendt 1999).

I take the position that ontological security can be extrapolated to collective or state level, not simply because it is common in IR to personify states, but because both collectives and states

belonging to a nation, ethnicity or group is consolidated based on a narrative that promises continuation, without which ‘membership’ cannot acquire meaning. Therefore, collectives/states would naturally seek actions that may alleviate challenges to their self- narrative. Kinnvall, who centralises the role of narrative, suggests that organising history in a particular way constructs a salient narrative for group self-identity (Kinnvall 2004). Steele maintains that we can extrapolate individual feelings to states, and for the purposes of this thesis, to collectives, not because everyone does it, but because individuals are attached to their collective identities and states (Steele 2008).

Self-identity has an intimate relationship with group identities (be it social, political, familial groups); we feel a certain level of attachment to the narrative our collectives/states provide for our own self-identity. Ontological security is as much about memory and history of being as it is about the future of being (continuity of being). Thus, it is not far-fetched to argue that collective identities and states, that too construct their narratives on their pasts, seek ontological security as much as individuals. Collective identities and states can provide individuals with ancestry that reaches beyond their lifetime and add meaning, a sense of immortality, to their existence. However, the argument here is not that ontological security is an alternative account for understanding collective or state behaviour, but that it provides us with a more complete picture especially when we are studying security and conflict.

Mitzen defends the argument about scaling up ontological security, contending that assumptions about individuals help us explain macro-level patterns and ontological security of collectives/states reinforce the ontological security of its members (Mitzen 2006). Conceptually, the idea of a group, collective or a state cannot exist without a story that develops a sense of continuity for its members; collectives and “states have a historical account of themselves that has been built up through the narrative of agents of the past, present and the future”(Steele 2008:20). In his book ‘Modernity and Self-Identity’, Giddens points that “people in all cultures including the most resolutely traditional, distinguish future, present and past, and weigh alternative courses of action in terms of likely future considerations” (Giddens 1991:48). At the very least, collectives and states have identity commitments based on their narratives, and by extension they can experience challenges to

these identity commitments, which means they too seek ontological security. Steele eloquently stresses that “the process of the construction of self for any individual and collective is so complex that it might defy understanding, yet we can investigate particular components of that construction”, such as narrative, history, memory or actions and routines that reflect those narratives (Steele 2008:49). As such, this thesis accepts the assumption that ontological security and identity are important for collectives as well as individuals.

The concept of identity is ambiguous and frustratingly complex. According to McSweeney, the human and moral connotations of identity make it a popular subject and “its apparent subjectivity makes everyone an expert” because its fundamental character as an “inalienable human property blocks all criticism and makes it a secure possession” (McSweeney 1996:86, 87). It is almost a self-declaration or a self-revelation, not always on the level of consciousness, with many layers, some lax and some more rigid but it is fundamental to who we are. Even though the epistemology of identity is highly disputed, one thing that most scholars can agree on is that identity is not a fact of society but it is rather fluid and amorphous (Giddens 1991, Campbell 1998, Kinnvall 2004, Lupovici 2012). Collective identity is not ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered; rather what is ‘out there’ is identity discourse entailing the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand for a collective image (McSweeney 1996).

Giddens explains that “the identity of the self… presumes reflexive awareness … It is the self as reflexively understood by the person in terms of her or his biography” (Giddens 1991:52- 53). For states and collectives, this self-biography is their historical narrative interpreted and (re)produced over time. Identity is not a property or a fact of society; it is a process of negotiation, a choice, a construct made by people, politicians, and historians alike. The collective question, 'Who are we?' cannot be answered simply by reference to opinion polls, ancient myths, folk music or other measures of collective history. For McSweeney, being English, Irish, Danish is a consequence of political and social processes, and “it is that process, not the label symbolising it, which constitutes the reality that needs explication” (McSweeney 1999:85-90). Although, ‘we are who we choose to be’ overstates our freedom in the matter

identity narratives, collective identity is not a property of society that transcends agency. As such, we cannot decide on the status or the relevance of identity a priori, identity can be the cause of a conflict but it is just as likely to be its effect (McSweeney 1996).

Nonetheless, we cannot deny our need for a secure stable self-identity or our need to belong to some group, community or society. Nor can we deny that some sense of common identity is a product of living together in common, or that national or ethnic identities can become a security problem (McSweeney 1999). In fact, social psychologists such as Herbert Kelman assert that identity is both a psychological need in itself and a mobilising force toward the fulfilment of needs (Kelman 2007). Similarly, according to Janice Stein’s simple but effective definition, identity is the way in which a person is, or wishes to be known by others, meaning it is the conception of self in relation to others (Stein 2002).

Even though there is somewhat of a consensus among scholars that identity is a social construct, the literature is divided on how scholars view identity construction; while some scholars like Steele and Wendt argue that it is an endogenous process (Wendt 1999, Steele 2008), others like Rumelili and Mitzen maintain that identity is dependent on difference, hence the process is exogenous (Rumelili 2004, Mitzen 2006). Steele stresses that identities can emerge endogenously, not just “in the dialectic between self and other but within the internal dialectic that arises from the ontological security-seeking process” (Steele 2008:32). In his analysis, I must first know self before I can relate it to an other. Similarly, Wendt downplays the role of difference in identity formation by arguing that corporate identities are “constituted by self-organising homeostatic structures”, and therefore are “constitutionally exogenous to otherness” (Wendt 1999:224). On the contrary, Mitzen claims that identities are constituted and sustained through social relationships rather than being intrinsic properties of actors (Mitzen 2006:35). Adopting a middle ground, Zarakol, argues that it is a chicken and egg situation, identity is both endogeneously and exogenously constructed. For example, she points out that it is difficult to identify whether it is the identity-challenging interactions that are the main source of ontological insecurity, or whether insecure interactions are merely a symptom of an actor’s uncertainty about its self-identity (Zarakol 2010). Although this sounds like a problematique in establishing a causal relationship rather than a problematique about

the ontology of identity construction, Prozorov underlines that internal and external processes of identity construction cannot be disassociated from each other, and that temporal (self-narratives) and spatial (relations with others) identity formations cannot be detached (Prozorov 2011). Yet, I maintain that self does not come into existence without relating to an other; it cannot be assumed independent of an other, or the social and material environment. Make no mistake, the other does not have to be external to the self, but can be an othered- self established within an internal dialectic through reflexivity (see Rumelili 2004). In other words, however internal, the process of identity construction cannot exclusively be endogenous devoid of a relational relationship based on a different other.

We are who we are because we draw the boundaries of our identities based on what we are not. The world is built upon relative dichotomies, however minor they may be. Identities are always constituted in relation to difference because a thing can only be known by what it is not. We would not know who we are if we lacked any kind of interaction with the outside world where we could establish reference points of difference to establish our own distinctiveness. In Wibben’s words, “we cannot understand what it means to be inside without at the same time understanding who or what is outside” (Wibben 2013:86-88).

Giddens, who notes that “learning what is not me” is the origin of self-identity, affirms the

discursive necessities that make identity dependent on difference (Giddens 1991:42). At the same time however, Giddens also points to endogenous formations of identity and asserts that self-identity is “…something that has to be routinely created and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (Giddens 1991:52). Still, a reflexive approach to self- identity and an emphasis on relationships are not mutually exclusive approaches to identity construction. In fact they overlap to an extent that it becomes impossible to separate reflexivity from relation. Self-narratives always need the rule of relativity/difference to be produced and sustained even if that difference is reflexively created. As long as identity has boundaries, whether flexible or rigid, there are those that are in and those that are out, which means those that are out are different to the ‘self’ – an old self, a worse self, an othered-self or a different other.

Rumelili, using the EU as a case where its own confrontational war-torn past is othered, asserts that a relationist ontology does not presume the other be external to self; hence it is compatible with Steele’s idea of ‘internal dialectic’ (Rumelili 2004). Even though ontological security requires differentiation and in that sense presupposes an other, these may be minor distinctions that are recognised in the context of similarity, positive identification and friendship or they may be major distinctions that situate the self and other as polar opposites (Rumelili 2004). Therefore, although actors need to distinguish themselves from other actors to be able to exist, difference need not to always appear as negative (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Embracing a relationist approach, I concede the interaction of the self with the social and material environment cumulatively constructs the subjective biographical narrative of the self. However, this construction is “not destined to translate into mutually exclusive and incompatible categories of subjectivity” (Browning and Joenniemi 2013:493). Browning emphases that “the very notion of friendship (at both the individual and inter-state level) suggests alternative options are available for anchoring ontological security that may even (and often does) include an active appreciation of difference. …Rather than being built on antagonism, it [friendship] is a positive form of difference premised on equality, respect and solidarity” (Browning 2016:169).

In order to better understand how ontological security is interlinked but different than identity, we should turn back to Giddens; he explains that to ‘be’ is to have ontological awareness; though closely related, ontological awareness is not the same as awareness of self-identity (Giddens 1991). For him, ontological security is about having an element of trust in the continuity of identity not only for the present but also for the future. In a sociological and psychological context, ontological security develops with self-identity and trust, as a continuance of life, self and the existence of the real world. The two are closely related in the developing experience at infancy. Drawing on Erik Erikson and Donald Winnicott, Giddens centralises the concept of ‘basic trust’ for self-identity, which emerges from “the original nexus that combines emotive-cognitive orientation towards others and the object- world”(Giddens 1991:38). The concept of ‘basic trust’ is integral for both the concept of ‘hope’ and what Tillich calls ‘the courage to be’ (Tillich 1962) as it acts as a shield to block off negative possibilities that loom in the background of actors’ daily lives .

Developing a sense of ‘basic trust’ starts at infancy for individuals, and this infancy can translate to the inception of group identities (i.e. nation-building). The infant, who is on the brink of unimaginable anxiety is called into existence by the environment provided by the caretaker; as such, the infant develops a self in response to the social and material context it experiences (Giddens 1991). In Giddens’ words “The ‘struggle of being against non-being’ is the perpetual task of the individual, not just to accept reality, but to create ontological reference points as an integral aspect of ‘going on’ in the contexts of day-to-day life. In ‘doing’ everyday life, all human beings ‘answer’ the question of being…” (Giddens 1991:48). Hence, routines become integral for ontological security, as they nourish the trust we have in our social and material environment, and help us manage endless possibilities that can create chaos and anxiety. Mitzen, for example, resembles ontological security to a immunity vaccination against all that can possibly go wrong, stating that it serves “the important emotional function of ‘inoculating’ individuals against the paralytic, deep fear of chaos”, without which we would feel a deep sense of incapacitating anxiety (Mitzen 2006:347). At some level, ontological security is concerned with repetition, which creates a coping mechanism and provides stability and predictability (Browning and Joenniemi 2013).

According to Giddens, to be ontologically secure is to possess answers to fundamental existential questions about life and it is based on our ability to be recognised as belonging (Giddens 1991). Thus, “the responses of the other are necessary to the sustaining of an ‘observable/accountable’ world” (Giddens 1991:52). Once again, this indicates that ontological security cannot be separated from the self/other configurations. Goffman and Butler assert that the self always needs an audience. The ‘presentation of self’ is always designed for an audience, even if that audience is imaginary or self observing (Goffman 2012). In other words, identity is about becoming intelligible to one’s self and to others (Wetherell 2009), and according to Butler being intelligible includes engaging with current forms of social recognition (Butler 2004). Similarly, Kinnvall supports that ontological security is essentially a quest for a stable narrative about the self but stresses the “intersubjective ordering of relations” (Kinnvall 2004:748), which refers to the way individuals or collectives define themselves in relation to others.

Consequently, self-identity and ontological security is dependent on and in part the property of our relationships with others; basic trust in the nature of those relationships and acknowledgement of others is necessary to reproduce and bolster self-identity and