Is it possible to envision the ‘self’ without ‘enemies’?

Connolly argues that there is a “double relation of interdependence and strife between identity and difference”, which constitutes the ‘paradox of difference’ and makes identity an insecure experience (Connolly 1991:64). The paradox of difference, which means that identity is dependent on difference, epitomises the omnipresent potential that the behavioural relationship between self and other can be constituted on the representation of the other as threatening to self’s identity. However, Rumelili also emphasises that “the two levels of security are mutually constitutive, yet are partially independent, in the sense that neither representations of self and other are derivate of representations of threat and danger, nor are the social structures of meaning that shape identities reducible to acts of securitisation and desecuritisation” (Rumelili 2011:16). Hence, although the potential for the transformation of difference into threatening always exist, the logic of identity allows for a great deal of variation in self/other relationships. Rumelili distinguishes between threatening-others where the relationship is characterised by conflict and othering, and different-others where the other is seen as non-threatening and the relationship could be characterised as guardian/children or leader/partner (Rumelili 2004).

Rumelili’s two layered approach identifies three constitutive dimensions along which self/other relationships vary to (not) produce relationships of othering: nature of the difference, social distance and response of the other (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011). The nature of difference relates to whether the identities in question are exclusive identities or inclusive identities. Where the former identify the other based on acquirable characteristics such as democratic, liberal or developed, the latter base difference on inherent characteristics such as European (in terms of geography), Islamic or heterosexual. This is simply an experiential distinction, as an objective marker does not exist to help us categorise identities as simply inclusive and exclusive. Rumelili explains that for exclusive identities, the difference is permanent and possibilities for change in the other are by default non-existent; whereas if the difference is constructed based on acquired characteristics the difference is perceived to be temporary and possibilities for reconfiguring the identity narratives are ample. This does

identities can configure self/other relationships that can be characterised by threat, fear and othering (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011). Rather, it gives us an indication of what types of desecuritisation strategies are potentially more effective and feasible (i.e. parental, partnership, friendship etc.).

The second constitutive dimension that Rumelili identifies is the social distance between the self and the other. Identities can be secured through association with or dissociation from the different others (Rumelili 2011). In terms of states or collectives, she differentiates association from cooperation as it embodies a feeling of similarity, or co-belonging. In this context, association means that the other is not a polar opposite, and the self/other relationship can be configured based on guardian/children or leader/partner axis. On the other hand, while dissociation makes the inclusive identity more insecure by challenging the perceived similarity and co-belonging, it makes the exclusive identity more secure as it reinforces the inherent differences and boundaries (Rumelili 2011).

Since the construction of identity is a performative action that includes both the self and the other, the third constitutive dimension is about the response of the other. The response of the other in terms of discourses and practices has reinforcing or destabilising effects on the difference attributed to the other and on self-identity, which is conceptualised on a spectrum running between recognition and resistance. Whereas recognition reinforces the self-identity narratives, resistance makes it more insecure by challenging the perceived difference. Consequently, resistance tempts actors to reaffirm their self-identity by asserting the differences of the other, which would in turn result in securitisation of subjectivity, where the other is represented as a threat. However, inclusive/exclusive, association/dissociation, recognition/resistance, othering/not-othering are all a matter of degree and there can be myriad variations of self/other configurations (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2011).

In the case of Cyprus, although the peacebuilding efforts reduce the conflict to one that is based on ethnicity and see only two sides to the conflict, we need to challenge the view that “ethnic identity is generally singular and these singular identities reliably predict behaviour, attitudes and values” (Wetherell 2009:10). It is exactly this approach that boxes the Cyprus

Problem into two opposing ethnic poles hyphenated between the Greek-side and the Turkish- side; it disregards the multiplicity and fluidity of identity narratives and fails to account for ontological security. For example, while Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots are each other’s ‘other’, they also perceive people from Turkey as their ‘other’ as well. Historically, ethnic identity signifiers in Cyprus, which are based on inherent characteristics that assume a permanent difference, provided a mutually exclusive future on the same territory for Turkish- Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Yet, Turkish-Cypriots’ growing Cypriotism, and disassociation from Turkey and Turkishness challenges these singular ethnic narratives. As a result, Turkish- Cypriots find themselves in identity dissonance and by extension ontological dissonance, where affirmation of their distinctiveness from Greek-Cypriots clashes with their affirmation of distinctiveness from Turks. The response of the other (people from Turkey) and the limited capacity for reflexivity further complicates the picture; while the other depicts Turkish- Cypriots as Turks who happen to live in Cyprus and hence resists their perceived distinctiveness18, Turkish-Cypriots lack the ability to address their anxieties, due to their significant political, economic and financial dependence on Turkey. On the other hand, disassociation from Turkey (i.e. under the EU umbrella) and the response of the other (Turks) reaffirms the perceived differences of Greek-Cypriots and thus, reinforce their self-identity narratives, but the peacebuilding efforts challenge both their Greekness and Cypriotness by associating it with Turkish-Cypriots, Turkish migrants and by extension Turkishness.

18 _{Tuğrul İlter argues, Turkish-Cypriots “are surrounded by denials of their independent existence” (İlter 2015). This}

denial in itself has two roots; one is the denial of distinctiveness by the ‘other’ and the other is the denial of legitimacy by the ‘international’. While the first one is focused on the response of the other, where the official rhetoric in Turkey denies a distinct Turkish-Cypriot identity and sees Turkish-Cypriots as one and the same as the greater Turkish nation, the second one is focused on international recognition and legitimacy of Turkish-Cypriots’ communal existence. Mainstream media and politicians in Turkey are, at best, indifferent to the distinctiveness of the Turkish-Cypriot identity and mostly refer to Turkish-Cypriots as ‘Cypriot Turks’ (Kıbrıs Türkü), or as ‘our compatriots in Cyprus’, which undermines and circumstantialises their Cypriotness. They also refer to the northern part of Cyprus as babyland (yavruvatan), implying a sense of ownership over the northern part of Cyprus and Turkish-Cypriots. Even though this rhetoric was historically accepted and even celebrated by many Turkish-Cypriots, a growing sense of Cypriotism and discontent with Turkish immigrants and Turkey’s policies created a strong displeasure towards this paternal relationship that denies distinctiveness to Cypriots. In reaction to the expressions such as the ‘Cypriot Turk’ that underplays Cypriotness, left-wing journalists such as Sevgül Uludağ and Arif Hasan Tahsin, choose to use new terms to define Turkish-Cypriots that underplays Turkishness. For instance, Uludağ uses the term ‘Kıbrıslıtürk’ instead of ‘Kıbrıslı Türk’, to

Table No 1: Ontological security matrix

Vamık Volkan problematises the peacemaking and peacebuilding policies concerning the Cyprus Problem that center around the promotion of an ‘illusionary’ ‘new’ large-group

‘Cypriot’ identity, arguing that they undermine the ethnic identities of being a Turk or a Greek (Volkan 2008:8). Volkan, who argues that there has never been a ‘Cypriot’ ethnicity or na- tionality, seems to fall into the same singular ethnicity trap. He rejects the idea that there is a distinct sense of Cypriotness shared across collectives living in Cyprus that creates a sui generis character independent from the motherlands of the two main communities. In his view, civic or cultural perceptions of Cypriotism are not only illusionary but they cannot coexist with ethnic or religious associations with the motherlands. However, despite their different religious, linguistic or ethnic ancestries, and despite the nationalist discourse that dominated the identity narratives historically, the sense of Cypriotness has been growing across the island. Loizides notes that the identity narratives of the two main communities on the island are not only increasingly detaching themselves from the motherland narratives, but the growing variations of Cypriotism and its political manifestations are moving at a faster pace than the related mediation and peacebuilding formulas (Loizides 2015).

That being said, even though I disagree with Volkan’s prioritisation and singular view of ethnic identity over other identity layers, and his view of Cypriotism as ‘illusory’, reading Volkan’s argument from an ontological security perspective provides better ground for his analysis. Identity narratives in general and collective identity narratives in particular, are resistant to

change. Giddens and Lupovici argue that actors’ attachment to their identity makes it difficult to implement a reflexive behavioural or an identity change to adapt to a new situation that is creating anxiety (Giddens 1991, Lupovici 2012). Similarly, humans, according to Volkan, cannot accept change without mourning what is lost, which is valid for collectives as well (Volkan 1997). Since desecuritisation does not and cannot leave the existing identity constructions intact, peacemaking and peacebuilding can in fact disturb existing and embedded identity narratives and create anxieties by blurring distinctiveness.

Desecuritisation processes that have been predicated on the transcendence and blurring of differences are unsustainable because they elicit a sense of uncertainty regarding the biographical continuity and distinct identity of the self vis-à-vis the other (Rumelili 2011). This means that the resolution of protracted conflicts challenge deep-rooted antagonistic identities and unsettle self-identity narratives that are dependent on the conflict. As such, desecuritisation processes that culminate in a state of ontological insecurity/physical asecurity are easily reversible because existential anxieties can easily be politically mobilised and manipulated into fear (Rumelili 2015). We secure ourselves as beings mainly by discourses and practices that differentiate us from others because identity lacks a pre-given, objectively identifiable essence (Connolly 1991, Campbell 1998). Thus, perceived incompatibilities between Turkish-Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants, between Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants or between the two main Cypriot communities are not a pre-given but ‘exist’ only because they are continuously re-produced both bottom-up and horizontally. Departing from this approach, the thesis empirically argues that a collective ‘shared’ Cypriot large-group identity needs to be envisioned carefully. Ethnic, religious and linguistic differences can be re-constructed as part of a broader, more inclusive identity that encompasses different ways of being Cypriot without subsuming or transcending distinctions. In other words, Cypriotism that undermines difference and only underlines similarity would produce existential anxieties for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots; it can also result in essentialisation of Cypriotness which in turn risk securitisation of migrant communities or other minorities in Cyprus. Therefore, peacebuilding efforts need to consider ontological

identity; instead of minimising the distinctiveness of variant identities in Cyprus, they need to acknowledge their ‘shared-ness’ under a more inclusive and fluid identity narrative and celebrate their difference rather than avoiding or securitising it.

This by no means is an idealistic approach. There are success stories that show formerly antagonistic identities can be sustainably desecuritised without resecuritisation of another group as a replacement. One such example that Browning and Joenniemi explore is the construction of a security community among the Nordic states where similarity is appreciated, difference is celebrated, and it is not translated into danger (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). The Nordic Security community has emerged from a mutually reproducing war community and was transformed into a region of peace where the idea that there are different ways of being Scandinavian has replaced the categorical perceptions of difference between the Scandinavian nations as existentially threatening (Browning and Joenniemi 2013). Could it be possible to envision a Mediterranean security community too, where Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots do not only reconfigure their relationship to fit a larger and more inclusive Cypriot identity narrative without undermining their distinctiveness but also come to see themselves as the members of a different but unthreatening larger Mediterranean community that includes Greece and Turkey among others?

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter unpacked the concept of desecuritisation to explore its intricate relationship with ontological security. The chapter argued that even though there is an omnipresent potential of desecuritisation in creating a sense of ontological insecurity as the removal of threat perceptions can leave actors in a state of uncertainty and existential anxiety vis-à-vis their self-identities and relationships with their significant others, this does not have to be the case. Conflict can become a source of ontological security and “the desire to protect a ‘sense of self’ can be the basis from which old conflicts become new” (Kay 2012:239). Yet, coupling desecuritisation in Track 1 level negotiations that challenge self-identity narratives with desecuritisation at the grassroots level can provide a way out of the vicious cycle the securitisation framework creates. Put differently, multi-directional institutionalised securitisations require multi-directional desecuritisation strategies that are equipped to reflect on ontological concerns.

Although the concept of ontological security is intimately tied to identity, and that its pursuit requires differentiation from an other, a stable relationship with the other can be based on minor distinctions that are recognised in the context of similarity, positive identification and friendship or they may be major distinctions that situate self and other as polar opposites and enemies (Rumelili 2004, Rumelili 2013). As Kay stresses, ultimate attainment of peace in conflict environments requires fundamental transformation of the self (Kay 2012). Still, this does not mean that I envision an idealised form of self/other relationship that is not latent with power; instead, the intricate link between (de)securitisation, ontological security and peacebuilding suggests that non-securitised forms of otherness is possible, and the normative commitment of this thesis is more concerned with facilitating transformative peace in Cyprus than with the emancipation of identities from constraints of power imbued relations.

From a pragmatic perspective, we may be interested in questioning whether the securitisation of the Turkish immigrants would bring Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots closer together against a common enemy and produce a sense of urgency for reaching a comprehensive

be further supported in the empirical chapters, I argue in favour of both the normative preference for desecuritisation, and for the desecuritisation of the Turkish immigrants as the way forward for transformative peace. While securitisation of Turkish immigrants is the reason behind growing xenophobia, racism and existential anxieties among the TCc as well as the reason for their consolidated Cypriot identity, it is also creating ontological dissonance and peace-anxities. Consequently, it may be argued that the peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts for the reunification of Cyprus are repeatedly failing because they generate existential anxieties that tempt parties into securitising issues and differences that need to be resolved for making a comprehensive settlement possible.

Challenging the essentialised ethnic approaches to protracted conflicts where reconciliation efforts singularly focus on imposing a sense of similarity at the expense of ontological security could be the key to fully understanding the potential of desecuritisation for transformative peace. Constructing a collective non-essentialised narrative for a larger Cypriot identity that simultaneously celebrates similarities as well as the differences of people who call Cyprus home can be the way forward for achieving certainty and stability of being, while remaining in a state of physical asecurity vis-à-vis one another. Within this context, I argue that in order to facilitate a comprehensive solution and achieve transformative peace in Cyprus, we need desecuritisation strategies that include all ‘others’. Peacebuilding efforts on the island should not only address reconciliation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish- Cypriots, but they should employ desecuritisation as a tool to reconfigure the relationship between the two main communities and Turkish immigrants for the very reason that a comprehensive solution will, by default, create existential anxieties for all parties that perceive each other as threatening.

However, this thesis does not go as far as to devise desecuritisation strategies for the case of Cyprus. More research and comparative analysis would be needed to formulate specific policy recommendations in this regard. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to explore the ontological security, (de)securitisation and peacebuilding nexus in order to answer the research questions, which can in turn inform the desecuritisation literature, peace research and break

the dual-ethnic approach to the Cyprus Problem that has locked the island in stalemate for nearly five decades.