On 12 May 1965 the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers met in London and initiated a new process, hoping to reach a mutually satisfactory settlement for Cyprus. Both Ministers appeared cautiously optimistic about the continuation of this initiative and agreed to set up a suitable ‘mechanism’ for the continuation of discussions between the two Governments.486 They also agreed that it was of utmost importance to maintain secrecy of the substance of the talks in order to avoid any complications issuing from the internal politics of each country. In spite of this secrecy, Athens had to be extremely careful not to appear that it was side-stepping the Cyprus Government, since that would have strengthened the anti-enosis movement among the Greek-Cypriots, a phenomenon that was beginning to present a real challenge to Athens.
483 Allen to Rennie, 23 April 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
484 FO to Athens, No.679 & No.680, 13 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
485 UN Security-Council, Report of the UN Mediator, (S/6253), paragraphs 120 & 170
486 FO to Athens No.679 & No.680 ,13 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
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The only element agreed on by both countries and the starting point of their talks was their willingness to settle the Cyprus problem as soon as possible. Τhis was indeed a propitious omen. Another important factor was that both the US and the UK, although privately admitting that any type of enosis, with Turkey’s agreement, would better suit their own and Western interests in general - since this would have established definitive harmony in the Southern flank of NATO - nonetheless stated that they would remain neutral towards the efforts of the parties to settle the Cyprus problem.487 The British Foreign Office concluded that: “we must keep on the right side of Turkey and avoid annoying Ankara, but otherwise we should equally avoid unnecessary disputes with Makarios”.488 Above all, both America and Britain wanted a stable and permanent settlement which was acceptable to all contested parties.
They were consequently bent on assisting the parties maintain the momentum created by the London meeting; that in the long-term could provide a settlement and in the short-term deflect the possibility of another crisis on the island.489 Contrary to what was usually reported in the Greek-Cypriot press, neither the British nor the Americans had any intention of imposing any particular solution on Cyprus.490
Although the Cyprus Government had accepted this bilateral and external process, the different perceptions of Nicosia and Athens over the specifics of this dialogue seemed unbridgeable from the very beginning. In order to fully apprehend this substantial gap and the limited chances of success of this process, we must take
487 Cyprus Policy Planning Paper, (FO) December 1967: FCO 9/74, TNA
488 Diggines to Tyler, 24 January 1967: DO 220/86, TNA
489Cyprus Policy PlanningPaper, FO, December 1967: FCO 9/74, TNA
490 Hunt to CRO, 15 May 1965: DO 220/49, TNA;
Intelligence Report No.21/65, 18-25 May 1965, US Attitude: CAB 191/10, TNA;
Lewis to Peters, 13 April 1966: DO 220/50, TNA;
Note: During 1966 the US drafted four proposals to be used in case the Greco-Turkish dialogue collapsed. However, as Nicolet reports, all of them were shelved because of the American reluctance to become actively involved and due to the change in circumstances. Nicolet, op. cit, p.335
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note of the background meeting of the Cyprus and Greek Governments on the eve of the Ministerial conference in London. George Papandreou, the Greek Prime-Minister, invited Makarios to Athens in order to exchange views. The ultimate aim of the Greek Government was to commit Makarios to a common policy of achieving enosis.491 Although at the end of this meeting a joint communiqué was published announcing the common views of the two governments, there was no true convergence of their positions. Papandreou initially explained that the aim of his Government was firstly to find out whether Ankara indeed sought to “consolidate peace” on the island by accepting enosis, and what they might ask in exchange.492 Then, he explained, if there was a preliminary agreement on such a solution, they intended to propose for a summit conference under the aegis of the UN to solidify the details. Makarios replied that he agreed primarily to the Greco-Turkish dialogue, as long as this was justified on the grounds of Plaza’s report. He stated, furthermore, that his Government’s chief aim in the long-term was enosis but without any quid pro quo for Turkey that affected the situation within Cyprus itself.493 Cyprus had nothing to offer in exchange for enosis. Makarios and his entourage were surprised when they were asked by Papandreou about the option of a Turkish base in Cyprus in the area of Cape Greco, and it came as a further shock when the Defence Minister, Petros Garoufalias, added that Grivas had already agreed to the suggestion.494 Naturally, Makarios reacted negatively emphasizing once again that there would be no territorial concessions of any kind from the Cyprus Government. Although Grivas’
exact views have not been fully clarified, it was true that he had accepted some
491Murray to Hunt, 18 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
492 Intelligence Report No.20/65, 11-18 May 1965, Arch. Makarios talks in Athens 6-8 May 1965: CAB 191/10, TNA
493 Ibid.
494 Intelligence Report No.21/65, 18-25 May 1965, The Athens talks and after: CAB 191/10, TNA
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territorial concessions in Cyprus albeit of “minor importance”, as he characterized them.495 Besides, it was a widely known secret that if such an agreement was eventually reached with Turkey, the Greek Government would seriously consider of deploying the Greek army stationed in Cyprus, led by Grivas, to impose the solution on Makarios.496
According to Stavros Costopoulos, the Greek Foreign Minister, the nature and extent of concessions was the particular point of contention between the two Governments and eventually a source of misinterpretation - perhaps deliberately - in the final outcome of the meeting in Athens.497 Costopoulos stated that during their stormy discussions, his Government told Makarios that enosis was either possible through negotiations or war. The latter was not an option. However, if negotiations were held, inevitably that meant that compensations had to be given. When Makarios told them that he would not object if Greece wanted to make territorial compensations in its own territory, Papandreou responded that “he had no mandate to surrender parts of Greek territory which had been Greek for decades, when Cyprus had not even reached the stage of being a Greek territory”.498 After a long debate Costopoulos stated that Makarios had agreed that enosis would require certain exchanges but without clarifying what he really meant. Although vague, his agreement on the principle of concessions to Turkey was perceived for the time being as quite sufficient for the Greek Government. Nonetheless, the latter was still afraid that this would not prevent Makarios from torpedoing the bilateral dialogue at any stage. In
495Intelligence Report No.12/65, 18-15 May 1965, General: WO 386/3, TNA;
Intelligence Report No.41/65, 5-12 October 1965, Grivas’ Visit to Athens: CAB 191/10, TNA
496Intelligence Report No.18/65, 27 April-4 May 1965, Greek Relations with Makarios: CAB 191/10, TNA
497 Murray to Hunt, 18 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
498 Ibid.
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fact, what Makarios for his own part had meant by concessions was probably a Charter of Minority Rights for the Turkish-Cypriots, as Plaza recommended, and as he recurrently asserted publicly and privately after his return from Athens. This Charter, however, was ‘off the table’ for Turkey and thus not a useful negotiating card for the Greek diplomats. The gulf between the two Governments was still wide open.
Despite their differences, on 9 May their joint communiqué confirmed their agreement to continue working in order to secure the right of self-determination in Cyprus in accordance with the UN Charter.499 At a press conference when he returned to Cyprus, Makarios stated that he gave his consent for talks on enosis between Greece and Turkey but he also diverged from the sanguine statements of the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers in London. When asked whether he shared the general optimism embodied by Greece and Turkey after the London meeting, Makarios answered: “It is a fact that I am optimistic but I think there are others who are more optimistic than me”.500
Indeed, the other parties, especially Greece, seemed to believe that with certain moderate concessions to Turkey, enosis was within reach. In reality, in spite of the two motherlands willingness for a quick Cyprus settlement, this dialogue faced long odds from the start and these eventually proved insurmountable. In spite of the mistrust and rivalry between Athens and Nicosia, the intensifying split within the Greek political arena and the constant change of weak governments during the period of 1965-1967 undermined the progress of negotiations, leaving little room to
499 Κranidiotis, Ανοχύρωτη Πολιτεία, op. cit., p.359
500 Murray to FO, 15 May 1965: DO 220/168, TNA
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manoeuvre or to maintain leverage for Athens. Greece, therefore, was entering hamstrung’ into this dialogue.
Ankara, on the other hand, it had privately agreed to consider enosis with territorial concessions, but in order to appease Turkish public opinion and the Turkish-Cypriot fighters emphatically insisted that discussions be based on the existing 1960 Treaties.501 Publicly committing itself to the latter meant that the Turkish Government would have required significant territorial gains in order to avoid domestic criticism for presenting a future solution based on enosis. Finally, the key to any solution agreed between Athens and Ankara was Makarios’ compliance, and he consistently attempted to sabotage the Greco-Turkish dialogue in order to ensure that he would not be confronted with an unacceptable Acheson-type solution. In September 1967, the meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime-Ministers, which became known as the
‘Evros fiasco’, effectively terminated this bilateral dialogue without even minimum agreement over the outline of a final solution to the Cyprus problem. It seemed that things were heading to the same dead-end as in April 1965. Nonetheless, circumstances on the island had in the meantime undergone a considerable transformation, and it is to shifts at the internal level of Cypriot affairs – including the UN’s efforts – that we must now turn.