Restructuring of the security forces of the Republic of Cyprus

Transforming the Republic of Cyprus of 1960 into an independent unitary state, along the lines President Makarios wished meant that there was still another sector of the state that had to be urgently strengthened: the Security Forces of the Republic. The Constitution provided for the establishment and the organization of the security forces and, in particular, the formation of an army of 2000 men, with representation of 60%

Greek-Cypriots and 40% Turkish-Cypriots, along with a police force and a gendarmerie with a representation of 70:30% respectively. According to Stella Soulioti, the Minister of

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Justice, the formation of this army was only for ceremonial reasons and for ensuring employment to Turkish-Cypriots in the public sector.³⁰³ Nonetheless, three years after the birth of the Republic, it proved impossible for the two communities to agree on the specifics for the creation this army. The Greek-Cypriots insisted for an army with mixed units, while the Turkish-Cypriots wanted units formed under communal criteria. By 1963 therefore, although the police and gendarmerie were fully operational, there were not any other efficient or well-organized security cadres or defence infrastructure.

Conversely, both communities organized and trained their own forces. Since 1959, several private armies were secretly formed by Greek-Cypriots, ex-EOKA fighters and several politicians but without any official coordination or strategic planning for their actions. With the help of military personnel from Ankara, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership also secretly retained and strengthened their TMT fighters. It was not long before this underground rivalry and the increase of hostility between the two communities’ militias led to several reckless actions and then to the first serious inter-communal clashes of December 1963.

The achievement of an uneasy truce a few days after those clashes, the constant small breaches of the cease-fire in the following months, along with the concentration of the Turkish-Cypriot fighters into enclaves, showed that the need for well-trained security forces and defence structures was more pressing than ever. Therefore, by February 1964 a new policy emerged for the defence of the Republic; forming an army, building fortifications and purchasing military equipment in order to protect the island from external or internal threats. The key players in this process were the Cyprus and Greek Governments along with General Georgios Grivas.

303 Soulioti, Fettered Independence, op. cit., p.167

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From 1964 until 1967 the defence system of the Government-controlled part of the island grew rapidly in effectiveness and manpower. Nonetheless, this process produced an important side-effect. While it created some insurance against external threats, it also created two internal and serious fronts: the inter-communal violent incidents and the Greek-Cypriots’ split. Regarding the former, armed confrontation was usually sparked between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots around sensitive areas which were considered strategically vital for both sides. Throughout these three years provocative actions from both sides led to confrontations of varying scale with implications for political aspects of the Cyprus problem. Prominent among them was the incident of June 1966 and the even more severe clashes in November 1967. The second front, however, was still more dangerous because it enhanced division and political unrest within the Greek-Cypriot community itself. The incipient fault-line had derived from the antagonism between the political leadership of Makarios and the military leadership of Grivas, who was backed by the Greek Government, regarding the modalities, and even the overarching priority itself of the national aim of enosis. In the following paragraphs we will explore how issues of defence raised tensions between Greek-Cypriots and how this then reverberated on relations between the two communities.

To begin with, a constituent part of the Makarios’ ‘Thirteen Points’ was the amendment of certain provisions about the security forces of the island. First of all, it was the amalgamation of the police and gendarmerie units. Additionally, on 25 February 1964, the Cyprus Government announced the formation of a force on a voluntary basis, named as the National Guard.³⁰⁴ Simultaneously, however, it was decided between the Greek Government, the Cyprus Government and Grivas that the National Guard should

304Garoufalias, Ελλάς και Κύπρος, op. cit., p.94;

Phileletheros, 26 February 1964

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be transformed into a tactical army under compulsory conscription. Athens and General Grivas took up the reins of this transformation process. More particularly, it was decided that a new division, the Cyprus Special Mixed Staff, responsible for the defence planning of Cyprus, was going to be established within the Greek Ministry of Defence, under the command of Grivas. A retired Lieutenant-General of the Greek Army, Georgios Karayiannis, was assigned as the Chief of the National Guard. To reinforce the National Guard, the Greek Ministry of Defence approved the secret assignment of a division of Greek soldiers to Cyprus. This was contrary to the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance for a Greek Contingent of only 950 Greek soldiers. It should be stressed that Turkey did not initially protest against this. The main underlying reason for the division’s assignment to Cyprus was to increase the Greek Government’s leverage on Makarios’

regime.³⁰⁵ These new soldiers were about to come to Cyprus with fake Cypriot passports claiming to wish to volunteer in the National Guard.³⁰⁶

It should be noted that Grivas had gone back to Athens in March 1959, but by 1964 was anxious to return to Cyprus to lead the armed forces of the island and complete his own perceived destiny as the architect of enosis.³⁰⁷ The Cypriot President, however, did not favour Grivas’ return both because of their strong disagreements on the handling of the Cyprus issue and due to the Turkish negative reactions in case of his return. Bearing in mind Grivas’ past, the Greek Government was also reluctant to allow him to go back in Cyprus. Despite everybody’s reservations, however, they all knew that only Grivas could have exerted effective control upon all the irregular armed groups formed from 1959

305 Attalides, op. cit., p.69

306Garoufalias, op. cit., p.99

307 Makarios Drousiotis, The first partition: Cyprus 1963-1964, (Nicosia: Alphadi 2008), p.180

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onwards, in order to incorporate them within one strong force. His return to Cyprus was only a matter of time.³⁰⁸

By 1 June 1964, the legal framework for the National Guard was voted in Cyprus’

Parliament. All men from 18 to 50 would serve a six-month service – which in December was increased to twelve months, in June 1965 to eighteen and in November 1967 to two years. Additionally, the Parliament voted for the compulsory service for all males aged from sixteen to fifty-five and females from twenty to forty in the civil defense services of the Republic.³⁰⁹ The decisions about the re-organization of the security forces, therefore, had been taken and the legal framework set in place. In the light of these developments, Grivas was now more anxious than ever to return to the island. He did so secretly on 12 June 1964 with the pretext of inspecting the armed groups of the paramilitary organizations.³¹⁰ His main goal, however, was to assume full control of the Cyprus army and to remove every obstacle in the road towards enosis, even if that meant getting rid of Makarios as well. However incipient, this was full of ominous possibilities in Greek-Cypriot political life. Although, initially the Greek Government ordered him to return to Athens, Grivas did not comply. With much public expectation of co-operation between these two seminal figures of the ‘national struggle’ before 1959-60, the President felt he had little choice but to welcome Grivas and host a public reception for him.³¹¹ In doing so, however, Makarios surely had few illusions about the likely relationship ahead.

It should be clarified that although Grivas remained in Cyprus, he had no administrative powers over the National Guard. He remained only responsible for the operational

308 Attalides, Nationalism and International Politics, op. cit., p.69

309 Phileleftheros, 1 August 1964

310Drousiotis, op. cit., p.204

311 Eleftheria, 18 June 1965

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command of the Cyprus army in case of war.³¹² However, this changed after August 1964 and the serious inter-communal strife near the Mansoura-Kokkina enclave.

Karayiannis, Chief of the National Guard, hitherto loosely under Grivas’ control, resigned due to their worsening relationship. In a series of articles that Karayiannis published in June 1965 in the Greek newspaper Ethnikos Kiriks, he explained the background of the August 1964 clash and highlighted the responsibilities of the National Guard’s actions which later led to Ankara’s intervention and to the indiscriminate air-bombing of the area with many civilian casualties. Grivas’ decision-making during these days made impossible any cooperation between the two men; this ledto Karayiannis’ resignation. It is noteworthy that the latter publicly accused Grivas of erratic methods and behaviour, giving rise to doubts over his psychological balance.³¹³

After this incident Grivas had effectively, though not officially, taken full control of the National Guard, thus achieving his initial aim. By then he had become convinced that the Cyprus Government had abandoned enosis and was working towards the consolidation of independence. According to Spyros Papageorgiou, (one of Grivas’

closer associates), Grivas was ‘assailing’ the Greek Government and the Greek King with reports accusing Makarios and his entourage of obstructing the effective organization of the National Guard and preserving their private armies in order to undermine the enosis struggle.³¹⁴ By this stage Grivas was already issuing veiled threats to resign himself from the National Guard and lead a guerilla struggle – effectively against Makarios – for enosis.³¹⁵ As indicated in the following abstract of a

312 Nikos Kranidiotis, Ανοχύρωτη Πολιτεία, Κύπρος 1960-1974, Τόμος Ι, (Athens: Estia, 1985) p.186

313 Cited in Eleftheria, 24 June 1965

314 Papageorgiou, Από τη Ζυρίχη στον Αττίλα, op. cit., pp.222-223

315 Ibid., Vol.III, p.75

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letter that Grivas sent in September 1964 to the Greek Premier, the former was ready to use all possible mechanisms to fulfill what he believed to be his national duty:

If you give me your permission, I will try to organize political propaganda in order to influence and direct the masses towards enosis. I believe that progress could be achieved. Contrary to what is happening in Nicosia where the anti-enosis propaganda has affected to a large extent Greek-Cypriot opinion, in most towns and villages the situation is better. Therefore, I would suggest the establishment of a Press Office in the Greek Embassy in Nicosia, which will work for the achievement of the national goal and in the meantime the assignment of a special Press Officer at my office.³¹⁶

The Greek Premier agreed and duly sent a Press Attaché to the Greek Embassy in Nicosia. As stated above, Papandreou and Makarios themselves differed radically about the handling of the Cyprus issue. Makarios’ disregard for the ‘National Centre’ and his tendency to act provocatively towards Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriots, without consulting the Greek Government, was irritating for the Greek Premier.³¹⁷ Papandreou and his in-coming replacement, Stephanos Stephanopoulos, especially after Plaza’s mediation, were anxious to solve the Cyprus issue as soon as possible via direct negotiations with Turkey aiming at enosis with territorial concessions. To this end Makarios was becoming an annoying obstacle.³¹⁸

By mid-1964, a secret operation was initiated and coordinated by the new Press Attaché; it aimed to increase anti-Makarios feelings within the Greek-Cypriot community.³¹⁹ The key tool for this operation was the Greek-Cypriot press. Several newspapers were funded and manipulated in order to propagandize against traitors in the Cyprus Government and condemn their anti-enosis plans. This triggered a ‘war’

316 Ibid, Vol.II, p.225

317 Clerides, Vol.II, op. cit., p.88

318 Ibid. p.185

319 Ibid. p.96

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within the Greek-Cypriot press. The pro-Government papers counterattacked by issuing articles against the Greek Government and the Greek army officers in Cyprus who were conspiring to overthrow Makarios’ Government.³²⁰ The accusations and counter-accusations inflamed public opinion and spread more ‘poison’ within the Greek-Cypriot community. When Makarios was notified about the task of the new emissary of the Greek Embassy, he demanded his immediate recall by the Greek Ambassador.³²¹ In an attempt to calm things down, the House of Representatives passed legislation in December 1965 envisaging that all newspaper editors had to disclose their regular and extraordinary income, while it prohibited the receipt of subsidies from foreign governments or citizens.³²²

Despite the Government’s efforts to soften this explosive atmosphere it was evident that the situation was steadily getting out of hand. As long as there were press attacks against the Cyprus Government, large public demonstrations were organized within the Greek-Cypriot community in favour of Makarios’ policies.³²³ Makarios’ relations with the new Greek Premier, Stephanopoulos, in 1966 were even more embittered than with Papandreou. On 9 March 1966, Stephanopoulos, without any prior consultation with Makarios, officially appointed Grivas as Chief of all the Security Forces on the island, that is both of the National Guard and of the Greek division. In this way the Greek Government wanted to assert its control over the Cyprus problem.³²⁴ Makarios responded immediately arguing that this was an internal affair not to be decided by the Greek Government, highlighting also that Grivas was dangerous and could tie the

320 Eleftheria, 3 July 1965

321 Clerides, Vol II. op. cit., p.96

322Phileleftheros, 4 December 1965

323 Eleftheria, 29 June 1965,

324 Kranidiotis, op. cit., p.359;

Intelligence Report No.11/66, 22 March 1966: WO 386/4, TNA

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country into a civil war.³²⁵ The Greek Government did not accept Makarios’ arguments.

The political crisis between Athens and Nicosia had gradually moved into a more dangerous phase.

Makarios swiftly realized that he had lost effective control over the security forces of the island and decided instead to establish a paramilitary police tactical reserve strictly under his own authority. By November 1966 he came to an agreement for the purchase of Czechoslovakian arms to be allocated to this police force, later named as the Presidential Guard. Greatly alarmed, when Grivas, Athens and Ankara became aware of this development, they were at pains to ensure that these weapons would be immediately taken away from Makarios’ control.³²⁶ The episode that followed became known as the first Czech arms crisis.³²⁷ Ankara threatened to retaliate if a satisfactory arrangement had not been reached soon, while Athens threatened to terminate its diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cyprus if the keys to the armoury were not given to the commander of the Greek forces on the island.³²⁸ After a while, Makarios complied to the extent that the arms would be periodically inspected by UNFICYP.

Contrary, however, to such assurances, Makarios secretly distributed some of the Czech arms without UNFICYP’s prior knowledge. Reportedly those arms were distributed during the later Kophinou crisis of November 1967.³²⁹ Additionally, Makarios took another action to reinforce his own loyalists. The Cyprus Government approved the

325 Papageorgiou, Vol. III op. cit., p.69

326 Kraniditions, op. cit, p.390;

327 The Second Czech arms crisis occurred in February 1972;

328 Clerides, Vol.II, op. cit, p.180-181

329 Brief for Rölz-Bennett’s calls on the Permanent Under-Secretary and Peter Hayman (FO), August

1967: FCO 9/67, TNA;

Costar, Dispatch, The Crisis of November 1967, 28 December 1967: FCO 27/91, TNA

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increase of spending from the state’s budget of 1967 for new recruits and the purchase of arms for the Government-controlled police force.³³⁰

Inevitably such tendencies impacted on inter-communal relations, and violent incidents grew alongside them. The main sources of these clashes were the arms race, the construction of armed posts and the effort of both communities’ forces to entrench their ground positions in strategically important parts of the island. The most problematic areas were those around the Turkish-Cypriot villages or enclaves. Since the formation of the National Guard, one of the main military targets of the Cyprus army was to take over those areas. This is what had triggered the Mansoura crisis in August 1964. In addition, the extension of the National Guards’ coastal defences, fortifications and the patrols in disputed areas became the spark of the serious Famagusta disturbances both in March and November 1965. Several similar incidents produced unrest and tension throughout the island, until a much more severe crisis was sparked in November 1967 in the mixed villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. Although the Cyprus Government persistently argued that the construction of fortifications was necessary for the defence of Cyprus in case of external attack, UNFICYP appealed several times to the National Guard not to site them in the immediate vicinity of Turkish-Cypriot villages. These actions were perceived by the Turkish-Cypriot fighters as provocative and they led to retaliatory actions, while the UN Secretary-General repeatedly urged the parties to terminate the constant building.³³¹ David Hunt in his memoirs recalls:

Confrontation between the Cyprus National Guard and UNFICYP was the sort of thing that kept us occupied most of the time. The Turks were capable of provocation but the majority of the incidents that kept us up late at night were the results of Grivas’ restlessness.

330 UN Security-Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the UN operations in Cyprus, 13 June 1967, (S/7969) paragraph 27

331 Ibid., paragraph 48

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Since I left, and particularly since the 1967 affair when Ankara’s ultimatum forced Grivas to leave the island, I have wondered whether Makarios may not have encouraged him not from any dislike for the Turkish-Cypriots (which I doubt if he feels) but in the hope that he would go too far and pay the penalty … At the time that the Grivas policy of digging trenches and erecting new strongpoints everywhere, and particularly in the neighbourhood of Turkish villages, was in full swing the Diplomatic Crops, especially the American and Greek Ambassadors and myself were liable to great bursts of activity by day and night with the wireless links to London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara working time.

Alexandrakis [the Greek Ambassador] usually had the main role.

Athens would let things take their course until it appeared there would be a severe clash at any minute between the National Guard and UNFICYP; then getting cold feet his Ministry would get on the telephone from Athens to rouse him out of his bed in the small hours with instructions to go and tell Grivas to calm down.³³²

Besides the defensive fortifications, turmoil was also produced with the constant supply of military equipment to both communities. The Cyprus Government was openly importing military equipment from abroad claiming that it was necessary for the defence of the Republic, while the Turkish-Cypriot fighters imported arms and ammunition from Ankara. The missiles importation by the Cyprus Government from the Soviet Union was one of the most explosive incidents throughout 1965, which again threatened the stability of the area. This incident became known as the missile crisis of 1965 and it was generated only a few days before the submission of the UN Mediator’s report.

As already seen in the previous chapter, in August 1964 Nicosia turned to Moscow in order to secure military and diplomatic support in case of foreign invasion in Cyprus. In addition to the diplomatic support, the two governments came to an agreement for the purchase of military equipment including surface-to-air missiles.³³³ When in March 1965

In document The Cyprus Problem 1964-1974: The Divergent Development of the Two Communities and the Quest for Settlement (Page 113-128)