Japan’s position in the international community. During the Cold War, ironically enough, the US-Soviet rivalry gave Japan a mighty shield, notably in the form of the Japan-US alliance, under which Japan’s security was well protected. But when the Cold War ended Japan was exposed to new reality and uncertainty which surrounded the world. Japan was not prepared for that.
The Gulf War of 1990–91 fell upon Japan precisely at this junc- ture. Japan’s lack of preparedness was demonstrated to the extent that this war is remembered in Japan with bitter national con- sciousness as ‘Japan’s defeat in 1991’. The crucial issue of security, Japan’s position in the global community and her relations with the US were shattered. But the deep sense of crisis, which enveloped Japan after the ‘defeat in the Gulf ’, in turn, became the basis for future development. So much intertwined, complex and complicated
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and yet very dynamic Japan-US security relations developed over the 1990’s to the beginning of the 2000’s.
‘Japan’s defeat’ in the 1991 Gulf War and its direct consequences
In August 1990 Saddam Hussein attacked Kuwait and the Gulf War began. Multinational forces waged war against Iraq in January 1991. Japan, however, was unable to react in a timely way with credible financial assistance, and above all, to implement concrete Japanese participation with tangible and visible Japanese personnel. Although Japan contributed a total of $1.4 billion in financial assistance, it received very little appreciation from the international community. Open feelings of disappointment and subdued anger prevailed, par- ticularly in the minds of Americans (Chapter 9). The accumulated passive pacifism starting from the demand for ‘comprehensive peace’ in 1951, combined with the negation of SDF, the call for the abro- gation of the Security Treaty with America, and the call for an emo- tionally rigid implementation of the three non-nuclear principles, all resulted in a psychological set-up that made even the government unprepared for such an eventuality as the Gulf War. Realists had been worried and thought that something had to be done. Some efforts by Foreign Ministry officials on peace keeping activities had already begun (Chapter 12). But these worries or efforts were far from adequate during the Gulf crisis in 1991.
Japan’s ‘defeat’ in the Gulf War, however, in turn became a seri- ous occasion for Japan to begin its participation in the cause of inter- national peace and security. A sense of crisis, that relying on cheque book diplomacy simply could not be continued, went deep into the hearts and minds of the realists, and the voices of the passive pacifists became considerably subdued.
The government did its best to enact a new International Peace Cooperation Law on Japan’s participation in the peacekeeping oper- ations (PKO) under the United Nations in June 1992, and based on this new law Japan made a substantial contribution to the PKO activities, in particular, in Cambodia from September 1992 onwards (Chapter 12).
A sea change in domestic politics
A dramatic change then occurred in Japanese internal politics. From 1992 to summer 1993 several ‘reformist’ oriented politicians split
the united states 79 from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and subsequently created the Japan New Party (led by Morihiro Hosokawa), the Sakigake (Harbinger) Party (led by Masayoshi Takemura) and the Japan Renewal Party (led by Tsutomu Hata and Ichiro Ozawa). In August 1993 the LDP lost the election for the first time since the creation of the Coalition of Conservatives in 1955, and a coalition of eight parties headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa was created. In a year’s time, that is in June 1994 however, the LDP came back to power in coalition with the long-standing opposition, a minority Japan Socialist Party, under its Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama.
Murayama, a socialist but now standing on the ruling side, changed the fundamental platform of the Socialist Party, acknowledged the Self-Defence Forces as constitutional, and the Japan-US Security Treaty as admissible. Thus Murayama made one of the most significant contributions to the cause of realism in postwar Japanese foreign policy.
Meanwhile in February 1994 Prime Minister Hosokawa established a group of wise men under the leadership of Yotaro Higuchi, Chairman of Asahi Beer, to recommend Japan’s post-Cold War secu- rity and defence policy. In August 1994 the Higuchi Commission finalized a report and presented it to Prime Minister Murayama. The report suggested a further consolidated role of SDF in the post- Cold War era. It argued forcefully the importance of the traditional two pillars of security policy: to enhance security relations with the US and to maintain credible defence capabilities. But having taken into account Japan’s traumatic experience during the Gulf War and the enactment of the International Peace Cooperation Law, the report also emphasized the role of multilateral cooperation.33
Ironically, for the socialists whose power was already considerably weakened at the 1993 election, the ‘betrayal of its long standing ideals’ became the last blow for its political influence, and after the LDP gained full-fledged power in January 1996, the leading role of the opposition moved to the Democratic Party, newly formed in September 1996. The traditional passive pacifism was no longer the ideology of this newly-born Party. Thus towards the latter part of the 1990’s passive pacifism lost its vigour of the 1950’s and 1960’s.
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The Korean crisis and the National Defence Programme Outline
In the background of these internal psychological changes, the emerg- ing post-Cold War tension in the Far East played a substantial role. From 1993 to 1994 there emerged a truly dangerous possibility of North Korea becoming nuclear. America naturally reacted decisively, war could have been close, but finally an understanding emerged between America and North Korea (Chapter 5).
During this crisis defence-related people in the US realized with horror that, should any crisis break out in the Korean peninsula, Japan was not ready to cooperate with US troops because the necessary legal basis was lacking. This realization was shared by their Japanese counterparts and intense coordination began between the two sides. First, in February 1995, the US Department of Defence published a report called East Asian Strategic Review (EASR), based on the initiative of Joseph S. Nye and Ezra F. Vogel, two Harvard profes- sors, who had joined the Clinton administration. The report stated the US intent to maintain approximately 100,000 troops in Asia.
Second, in November 1995, the Murayama cabinet adopted—as its last contribution to the policy of realism—the third major document of postwar security policy, a new National Defence Programme Out- line (NDPO). While preserving the major characteristics of the NDPO of 1976, the new NDPO reconfirmed the importance of Japan-US security relations in the post-Cold War arena and enlarged the activ- ities of the Self-Defence Forces to such areas as participation in international peacekeeping operations or large-scale disaster relief.
Based on these efforts on the two sides, a joint Japan-US joint reaffirmation of their security relations was due to take place at the fringe of the APEC Leaders Meeting in Osaka in November 1995. But because President William J. Clinton was absent from this meeting, the reaffirmation was postponed. While waiting for the next occasion for a summit meeting between the two leaders, two phenomenal crises exploded in and around Japan: Okinawa and Taiwan.34
The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security and the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation
First, in Okinawa: in September 1995 a young Japanese primary school girl was raped by an American soldier. Indignation by the
the united states 81 people of Okinawa flared. After the reversion, Okinawa had remained the key American base in the Far East, and the underlying dissat- isfaction and frustration of the people of Okinawa, who felt that they had born far too much of the heavy burden of accepting the American bases, had never been alleviated. By 1994, 40 American bases were concentrated in Okinawa alone, whereas the rest of Japan had only 54 American bases.
Prime Minister Murayama did what he could. The Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa (SACO) was estab- lished under the Security Treaty in November 1995, to find con- crete measures to alleviate the burden of Okinawa as much as possible. Second, around Taiwan: in July and August 1995 the missile cri- sis over the Taiwan Strait began and it escalated with tense public attention in March 1996. Inevitably tension in the Far Eastern arena rose (Chapter 4).
Thus the primary task for Ryutaro Hashimoto, when he was elected as an LDP prime minister in January 1996, became the restructur- ing of the unsettled security relations with the United States. Basic direction toward a reaffirmation of the security relationship had already been given by the EASR and the NDPO, but furthermore, the political climate which surrounded the two countries changed substantially from the autumn of 1995 to the spring of 1996.
In April 1996, upon the visit of President Clinton to Japan ‘The Japan-US Joint Declaration on Security—Alliance for the 21st Century’35 was adopted.
The document begins with a philosophical reaffirmation that “the Japan-US security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region as we enter the twenty-first century.” It then introduced two key policy agendas “to initiate a review of the 1978 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation” and with respect to Okinawa “to carry out steps to consolidate, realign, and reduce U.S. facilities and areas consistent with the objectives of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security”.
China’, in: David M. Lampton (ed.) Major Power Relations in Northeast Asia: Win-Win
or Zero-Sum Game, Tokyo, 2001, pp. 75–79.
35 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/security.html. All subse-
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On the latter point an audacious agreement was reached in prin- ciple between the two leaders to reallocate the Futenma base, one of the most important American bases in Okinawa. In December 1996, the final SACO Report confirmed in concrete terms the relo- cation of the Futenma base.
On the former point, it is important to note that in the minds of those who were working in the defence-security relationship, the operational credibility of the defence-security alliance was at stake. The adoption of new Guidelines a few years after the NDPO, in line with the precedents in 1976 (the first NDPO) and 1978 (the first Defence Guidelines) was their primary aim.36 It took nearly a
year to review the Guidelines and in September 1997 the new Guidelines for Defence Cooperation were adopted.
Parliamentary debates on the Defence Guidelines
It took nearly another year for Japan to prepare the necessary inter- nal legislation to implement the new Guidelines and after full-scale parliamentary debates in the spring, in May 1999 a new law named ‘The Law Concerning Measures to Ensure Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan’ was adopted.
The new law prescribed Japanese Self-Defence Forces logistic sup- port to US forces such as supply, transportation, repair and main- tenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport operations, and base operations. It also provided for search and res- cue activities primarily conducted by the SDF. Vessel inspection activities were included in the original bill, but omitted during the parliamentary debate. Use of weapons was allowed to protect the lives of members of units of the SDF, as well as the lives of those conducting relevant activities with them, while implementing the measures mentioned above.
I happened to be in the post of the Director General of the Treaties Bureau during the period of parliamentary debates over the new Bill and was fortunate to have participated in its full process. It was a fascinating occasion to contemplate some of the basic issues pertaining to Japan’s security policy:
the united states 83 (1) The most difficult point in defending the new Bill was related to the notion of ‘Surrounding Situations (Shuuhen Jitai )’. Cooperation by the SDF was envisaged to take place in those “situations in areas surrounding Japan”. Those ‘Surrounding Situations’ were those which “will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security”. It was argued that those “situations in areas surrounding Japan” were “not geographical but situational”. Opposition parties drew sharp edges into this aspect from several perspectives:
(2) The first concern which had been talked about within the opposition parties and media was that the definition of the ‘Surrounding Situations’ was so vague that the new Guidelines actually had intended to enlarge the activities of the SDF outside the scope of the Japan- US Security Treaty. The fact that the wording of the ‘Surrounding Situations’ was first used in the 1995 NDPO, which stretched its reach to the SDF activities based on multilateral international coop- eration, might have deepened their concern. Having realized this possible criticism, the government prepared a bill, which clearly prescribed that the activities under the new law were exclusively confined “within the purposes of the Japan-US Security Treaty”. Throughout the course of the debate, that government position was well sustained.37
(3) But the opposition parties were not satisfied. They argued against the vagueness of the new concept. Even if what was envis- aged was restricted within the Japan-US Security Treaty, they requested precise definition regarding the nature of this ‘Surrounding Situations’. Toward the end of the debates in late April, the government had to submit a list of exemplary situations which could be considered as ‘Surrounding Situations’. But none of the explanations were geo- graphical.
(4) In fact, one of the focal points of the parliamentary debates was to clarify the geographic applicability of the new guidelines to
37 One question still remained: as the 1978 Guidelines were directed at an Article
V situation (an armed attack against Japan), the next Guidelines were scheduled to be directed at an Article VI situation (US activities to contribute to the mainte- nance of international peace and security in the Far East). The notion of the ‘Far East’ had been extensively discussed during the parliamentary debate in 1960, and a geographical definition was made by the government as “North of the Philippines and Japan and its surrounding areas, including areas under the control of Korea and the Republic of China (Taiwan)”. If the purpose of the 1997 Guidelines were exclusively to further cooperation within the Security Treaty, why could it not have referred more straightforwardly to the Article VI situation?
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North Korea and Taiwan. That was an impossible task for the gov- ernment. In reality, the 1993–94 North Korean nuclear crises triggered the endeavours of the two sides to agree to the new Guidelines. The Taiwan crises in 1995–96 heavily affected the political climate when the Joint Security Declaration was adopted. China became particularly sensitive to the fact that the new Guidelines were not directed against it, in particular, in its relations with Taiwan. In such circumstances a statement by the Japanese government indicating any regional con- notation could have ignited a huge political emotion on the part of the country concerned. Wisely and bravely, everyone in the defending team stayed away from a ‘geographic definition’ in relation to any country. Michael J. Green, now working at the White House for the Bush administration made similar remarks about the absolute neces- sity of keeping silence over this geographic definition, where clarification could only have harmed and undermined regional security.38
(5) Notwithstanding the difficulty around the notion of ‘Surrounding Situations’ and notwithstanding the many heated and emotional debates on traditional or new security agendas, during the five months of parliamentary debates there was not a single occasion where they were interrupted. In the turbulent debates on the new Security Treaty in 1960 or in the heated row in relation to confidential agreements concerning nuclear introduction raised by retired Rear Admiral La Rocque in 1974 or by Professor Reischauer in 1981, so many times the debates were suspended for hours or for days. Yet perhaps in a limited scope, security matters could now be regarded as a matter pertaining to less emotion and more intellectual discourse.
(6) In this context, one of the amazing changes, which I observed in the parliamentary debates, was the question of the interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution regarding minimal self-defence. For many years after the enactment of the constitution it had almost been a taboo to question the strict interpretation of Article 9, i.e. that Japan was only allowed to exercise minimal forces for individ- ual self-defence. The right of collective self-defence was uncondi- tionally denied by this interpretation. During the parliamentary debates, however, not only those ‘rightist’ parliamentarians in the Party of Freedom, but also some of the young leading speakers from the Democratic Party, successors to the fallen Socialist Party in oppo-
the united states 85 sition, started to argue about the inadequacy of the interpretation of Article 9. The impact of this new attitude of the ‘young democ- rats’ is certainly an interesting new phenomenon which is casting influence to current security debates in Japan.