tionship between Japan and the United States. Before Okinawa, politico-security issues primarily dominated the relationship. Despite some pleas for an equal partnership, in reality Japan was a junior partner to the United States. After Okinawa a major political issue was overcome in the bilateral relationship and the growing economic power of Japan emerged on the surface, while America’s monopo- lar economic power in the free world was losing its basis.
22 K. Wakaizumi, Tasakunakarishiwo Shinzentohossu (I wanted to believe that there was
no other option), Bungeishinjyu, 1995, p. 417.
the united states 71 Before Okinawa it was primarily Japan that called for changes in the bilateral political relationship, like the revision of the Security Treaty or the reversion of Okinawa. In that sense the 1950’s and 1960’s had been proactive and dynamic periods, when Japan tried to rise from the position of little brother to an equal partner. After the reversion of Okinawa it was more the USA that called for changes in the eco- nomic bilateral relationship. Japan increasingly stood in a position to meet demands from America. Important changes were occurring in the relative economic balance of power between the two countries. During those years of trade conflict after the reversion of Okinawa, which lasted at least for a quarter of a century (as we are going to see in Chapter 3), it is important to note that the security relations became, on the whole, an effective bond between the two countries. As in any other areas of foreign policy, this was also the result of strenuous efforts by those who were particularly concerned with the security aspects of the relationship, to make the security ties even sounder and stronger.
Changing circumstances in international relations were not unre- lated to Japanese endeavours. The fruits of Detente as we observed in the US-PRC Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972 (Chapter 4), in the SALT I and ABM Treaty in May 1972, and in the Helsinki Final Act in August 1975 (Chapter 8) gradually became replaced by the growing expansionist movement of the Soviet Union. 1975 marked the emergence of socialist regimes in Indochina (Chapter 6) and the expanding influence of the Soviet Union in Africa, for instance in Angola. 1976 came to be called the year of the ‘end of Detente’. The cooling off of the bilateral relations between Japan and the Soviet Union (Chapter 7) coincided with this rising East- West tension from the mid-1970’s.
So, in 1976 the Japanese government took an important policy decision on defence by adopting the ‘National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO)’. It was the second major policy decision on defence after the adoption of the ‘Basic Policy for National Defence’ in 1957. The newly adopted Outline was based on the ‘Concepts of Basic Defence Force’.24 In accordance with the new Outline “Japan should
possess the minimum necessary defence capability for an indepen- dent nation so that it would not become a source of instability in
72 chapter two
the surrounding region by creating a vacuum of power, rather than building a capability directly linked to a military threat to Japan”.25
In the thinking permeating passive pacifists amongst the general pub- lic, this was probably an unavoidable approach to seek further under- standing and support from the Japanese people for the maintenance of effective Self-Defence Forces.
One week after the NDPO was adopted by the cabinet, however, another cabinet decision was taken to keep the level of defence expenditure in principle below 1% of GNP. That was a decision reflecting the passive pacifists’ fear that even such a minimal approach reflected in NDPO might unleash militaristic tendencies in Japan. In reality, the Japanese defence budget steadily increased after the war and with a smooth curve of increase reached 1 trillion yen in 1974. But because the rate of growth of overall GNP had been greater, the defence budget percentage declined from 2% in early 50’s to over 1% in early 60’s and dropped well below 1% in late 60’s. It stayed at that level over the 70’s.26 Thus the introduction of
the 1% ceiling did not mean an immediate cut in defence expen- diture, but it mitigated the creative aspect of the NDPO and made the tenure of Prime Minister Takeo Miki (December 1974–December 1976), who took the two decisions, remembered more because of passive pacifism.
Under the cabinet of Takeo Fukuda, who took office in December 1976, the year 1978 should be remembered by two important deci- sions which strengthened the security ties with America.
The first decision was to increase substantially financial support for the expenses incurred in the stationing of American troops in Japan. It was initiated in May by the Minister of State on Self- Defence Shin Kanemaru. It started with the coverage of locally employed Japanese workers and year by year expanded to include the housing expenses of American troops and various auxiliary expenses related to their stationing. It eventually amounted to $3.2 billion in 1990, reached its apex of $6.6 billion in 1996 on dollar basis and since then has been kept at the same level on yen basis, even in the ill-functioning conditions of the Japanese economy.27The Host Nation
25 http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/kouho/taikou/made_e.htm 2004–07–21. 26 M.Tadokoro, Sengo Nihon Gaikoushi (Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy) Chapter 3,
M. Iokibe ed., Yuuhikaku, 2001, p. 121.
the united states 73 Support, as it came to be called, was much appreciated by the Americans and the Japanese host nation support was known to be the most generous one among all US allies.
The second decision was the adoption with the United States of the Guidelines for Defence Cooperation in November. The Guidelines were intended to establish a concrete cooperative scheme under Article V of the Security Treaty with an enlarged and clear role for the Japanese SDF.
Under Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira, who replaced Fukuda in December 1978, Japan’s efforts continued. In his visit to Washington in May 1979 Prime Minister Ohira called America “an ally and irreplaceable friend”.28 Soviet moves then culminated in its invasion
of Afghanistan in December 1979. To protest against Soviet action in Afghanistan and to show Japan’s solidarity with the West, Japan took a series of measures including the boycotting of the Olympic Games in Moscow in the summer of 1980. Prime Minister Ohira visited Washington again in May 1980 and expressed his commit- ment to increase the defence budget and assured the US that coop- eration under the newly established Guidelines was steadily advancing. Needless to say, those efforts to further strengthen the security ties were conducted against the opposition of the passive pacifists’ anti- American voices. Against that background, the leadership shown by the Fukuda-Ohira line of positive cooperation in the security area was commendable.
However, Prime Minister Ohira died suddenly in June 1980 dur- ing a rough election campaign and confusion occurred under his successor Zenko Suzuki, who was a close supporter of Ohira in his faction within the Liberal Democratic Party, but was not necessar- ily aiming for the seat of Prime Minister. The confusion was heav- ily conditioned by the passive pacifism which surrounded the suddenly elected and unprepared Prime Minister.
In May 1981 Z. Suzuki visited Washington and had a meeting with newly elected President Ronald Reagan. The communiqué issued after the meeting used the term ‘alliance’ to describe the Japan-US relationship. Suzuki afterwards maintained that the word ‘alliance’
following, in 100 million yen: 5612, 5944, 6257, 6389, 6416, 6342, 6619, 6659, 6534, 6392 ( Japan Defence Facilities Administration Agencyfigures).
28 H. Nakanishi, Sengo Nihon Gaikoushi (Postwar Japanese Foreign Policy) Chapter 4,
74 chapter two
had no military connotations and his view was publicly contested by his Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Masuro Takashima, as a result of which both resigned. Under the general passive pacifist environment the issue of military conno- tations could have produced such an outcome even as late as 1981. Meanwhile, at a luncheon meeting at the National Press Club after the presidential meeting, Prime Minister Suzuki referred to Japan’s possible role in defending “a few hundred miles around Japan and 1000 nautical miles of sea lanes”.29 The US took his statement
as an important commitment to a more responsible role and wel- comed it. There was unfortunately no policy decision to that effect and the two administrations had to face difficult months of read- justment due to this emerging discrepancy. In the US Congress calls came for the enhancement of the Japanese defence capability and terminology such as ‘defence friction’ in addition to ‘trade friction’ began to appear in the media.30