Enforcing Rules and Breaking Them: The Labelling of Deviant Female Identities Labelling of Deviant Female Identities

It is contended that the deviance of women is one of the aspects of ‘human behaviour most notably ignored in sociological literature’ (Heidensohn, 1968: 160). This is arguably due to the recognition that women ‘appear to have low rates of participation in deviant activities’ (ibid.: 161) but can also be more broadly understood as the systematic neglect of women as important to the study of deviance (Heidensohn, 1968; Hutter and Williams, 1981). Hutter and Williams (1981: 14) suggest that such neglect of women, within deviancy literature, arises from expectations of ‘normal’

women which suppress ‘questions from being posed and explored’ about deviant women.

Drawing upon Cohen’s (1971: 14) conception of what he terms a ‘sceptical approach’ to crime and deviance, Hutter and Williams (1981: 12) utilise the concept to understand how women are socially controlled through the construction of

‘normal’ and ‘deviant’ categories. They define deviance as:

. . . behaviour that does not accord with those expectations and norms for individual behaviour which are generally shared and recognised within a particular social system. It involves the breach of social rules which are commonly thought of as necessary to cohesion and order within a social group (Hutter and Williams, 1981: 12-13).

49 Defining what constitutes deviance, however, is ‘inextricably related to the difficulty of establishing what is normal’ as definitions vary within different social contexts (Hutter and Williams, 1981: 13).

According to Becker (1963), within society there are different types of rules, which govern behaviour, social interaction and reaction. Some of these rules are ‘formally enacted’ through the law and state agencies, whilst others ‘represent informal agreements . . . enforced by informal sanctions of some kind’

(ibid.: 2). These rules ‘define situations and the kinds of behaviour appropriate to them’, distinguishing certain acts as acceptable and unacceptable (ibid.: 1). Those who break social rules are considered ‘outsiders’ (ibid.: 1). For the individual whose behaviour does not meet the shared norms and expectations held by others, their identity is no longer positively reinforced and instead a deviant identity is constructed (ibid.).

Becker (1963: 9) contends that deviance is ‘created by society’. However, rather than being established in the ‘social situation of the deviant or in “social factors” which prompt his action’ (ibid.: 9) he asserts that:

. . . social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an

‘offender’ (Becker, 1963: 9).

In this sense, deviance is a relational product resulting from interaction between a ‘rule-breaker’ and a social group whose rules have been broken (Becker, 1963: 10). However, the degree to which a transgression will be regarded as deviant depends upon the extent of the harm caused and who has caused it (ibid.). As such, the social rules that determine deviance are more often applied to certain groups and

50 individuals than others. Deviance, according to Becker, is therefore ‘not a quality that lies in behaviour itself, but in the interaction between the person who commits an act and those who respond to it’ (ibid. 14).

This chapter has, thus far, articulated that the gender appropriate ways of behaving, and the mechanisms of social control entrenched within them, are established upon a system of subordination and devaluation, which play a central role in the construction of female deviance. Therefore, for women and girls, it is suggested that being subjected to deviant labels is a routine occurrence due to the extensive range of dominant norms and expectations attached to female identities (Hutter and Williams, 1981; Schur, 1984).

Furthermore, the forms of control exercised over deviant females, for not adhering to social rules, provide clarification of ‘normal behaviour’, whilst illustrating the degree to which subtle forms of social control enforce girls’ conformity to appropriate behaviour patterns (Hutter and Williams, 1981.:

9).

However, deviance is not a concept that is consistent throughout society. It is dependent upon social definitions, reliant upon particular cultures and societies, within a specific time and place (Henry, 2009; Schur, 1984). This is because

‘modern societies are not simple organizations in which everyone agrees on what the rules are’ or how they ought to be applied (Becker, 1963:15). What is considered as deviant is, therefore, a social construction, ‘created by society’

whereby deviant labels are not simply produced as a result of individual behaviour but are reliant upon the ways in which others define certain behaviours as deviant (ibid.: 9). Thus, the deviant individual is ‘one to whom that label has successfully been applied’ (ibid. 9).

Whilst such a perspective establishes that deviance is a product of social processes, dependent upon the reactions of

51 others to a specific behaviour, a key component of the construction of deviance is the enforcement of ‘definitions’

which shape social understandings of certain actions, circumstances and individuals, by those who hold the most power (Becker, 1963: 207). Essentially, those who hold sufficient power have the ability to enforce their rules whilst social divisions of ‘sex, ethnicity, and class are all related to differences in power, which accounts for differences in the degree to which groups so distinguished can make rules for others’ (ibid.: 18).

Whilst definitions and categories of deviance are subject to construction by those groups with accessible means to

‘political and economic power’ within society (Becker, 1963:

191), it is acknowledged that women and girls occupy a position as a ‘disadvantaged category of persons in modern society’ (Goffman, 1977: 307). It is also widely recognised that they hold an inferior social status in comparison to men, which represents their ‘generic devaluation’ (Schur, 1984: 23). For example, de Beauvoir asserts that:

. . . Man represents both the positive and the neutral. . . whereas woman represents only the negative, defined by limiting criteria, without reciprocity . . . Thus humanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relevant to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being.

. . She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the subject, he is the absolute – she is the other (de Beauvoir, 1997: 15-16).

Expectations of ‘normal’ women play a central role in the construction of female deviance as they produce

‘stereotypical’ images which ‘define normal female behaviour’

and, in turn, deviant female behaviour (Hutter and Williams, 1981: 16). However, ‘stereotypes are not necessarily consistent with actual behaviour, and women in any one society may even be presented with contradictory images

52 which are considered to represent typical characteristics of behaviour’ (ibid.: 23). As a consequence their efforts to

‘conform to one standard may be treated as deviance when viewed from the standpoint of the opposing one’ (ibid.: 51).

For example, Oakley (1974: 80) refers to women’s place within society as occupying a position of ‘structural ambivalence’. Oakley discusses how women are ascribed to

‘traditional feminine roles’ on the basis of their gender status.

This role requires them to adopt and adhere to the norms and values associated with their role, predominantly, as a

‘housewife’, ‘wife’ and ‘mother’ (ibid.: 81). However, she discusses how ‘women are also perceived as human beings, endowed with the potentiality for individual fulfilment’ (ibid.:

80). The distinction between these values creates the potential for ‘contradiction between alternatives of apparently equal legitimacy’ (ibid.: 81).

Regardless of what the stereotypes of normal and deviant female behaviour consist of, they provide justification for control over women’s behaviour and function as a form of regulation (Hutter and Williams, 1981). Moreover, they are

‘enforced through informal sanctions of gender-inappropriate behaviour by peers and by formal punishment or threat of punishment, by those in authority, should behaviour deviate too far from socially imposed standards for women and men’

(Lorber, 1994: 32). This is because ‘females are generally subject to more rigorous social control than males. This enables interpersonal groups to thoroughly dominate those who initially deviate and quickly terminate further involvement in unacceptable behaviour’ (Leonard, 1982: 81-82).

Although it is the existence of ‘power differentials’ which enable deviance to be socially constructed and labelling to take place, it should be recognised that the rules which are established and reinforced through labelling acts deviant are not unequivocally agreed to (Becker, 1963: 18). Despite contested definitions of deviance, it is contended that those

53 labelled with a deviant identity assert this identity as their dominant status:

Some statuses in our society as in others override all other statuses and have a certain priority. . . The status of deviant . . . is this kind of . . . master status. One receives the status as a result of breaking a rule and the identification proves to be more important than most others. One will be identified as deviant first before other identifications are made (Becker, 1963: 33).

As a deviant identity becomes an individual’s master status, they are likely to be perceived by others as bearing other

‘undesirable traits’ more generally, producing a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ which functions to ‘shape the person in the image people have of him’ (Becker, 1963: 34). Effectively those who are labelled as deviant for failing to conform to societal rules are ‘stigmatised for their nonconformity’ (ibid.: 163).

Such analysis, provided by Becker (1963), is critiqued on the grounds that it fails to recognise the structural and institutional patriarchal processes which contribute to definitions of deviance (Franzese, 2009). It is argued that Becker not only neglects to account for the ways in which interactions ‘occur within the broader social structure’ of patriarchal society but divisions of ‘social class . . . race and ethnicity’, and the ways in which they influence and determine human behaviour, are also, predominantly, omitted from his analysis (ibid.: 74). The insights provided by Becker ‘emphasise that crime and deviance are socially defined, and that certain groups and individuals, especially those lacking wealth, power and status, are more likely to be officially stigmatised as deviants’

(Leonard, 1982: 79). However, deviance is largely connected to the structural elements of society, as opposed to the individuals themselves, therefore warranting the need to analyse macro structures of power within society (ibid.).

54 Despite the limitations in Becker’s (1963) analysis, concerning macro-level social structures and their influence on the construction of deviance, the application of a label to a deviant identity situates the labelled individual as susceptible to the process of stigmatisation. For Rosenblum (1975) the application of stigma for those women considered deviant coerces others into complying with the structure and operations of patriarchal society.

Drawing upon reflections concerning the construction of deviant identities, the social construction of gender and discourses of femininity, reveals how gender identity is implicated within definitions of deviance. Thus highlighting the ways in which mechanisms of social control contribute to the production of deviant labels in order to ensure conformity to images of ideal femininity (Carlen and Worrall, 1987; Carlen, 1988; Chadwick and Little, 1987; Heidensohn, 1968; Hudson, 1989; Hutter and Williams, 1981; Smart and Smart, 1978).

According to Goffman’s (1963) conception of stigma, girls who do not conform to these ideals, are subjected to stigma, resulting in a spoiled identity (Goffman, 1963).

Such insights also highlight women’s devalued place within society. Such devaluation is evidently characteristic of women’s and girls’ experiences of social interaction and societal responses to them. However, race and ethnicity, in addition to gender, are also salient factors in determining women’s devalued place within society. This is because

‘patriarchy interacts with others systems of power – namely, racism – to uniquely disadvantage some groups of women more than others’ (Cooper, 2015: 387). It is acknowledged that ‘race and gender are not mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis’ as ‘discrimination’, ‘subordination’

and ‘disadvantage’ do not transpire on a ‘single categorical axis’ (Crenshaw, 1989: 139-140). Black, Asian and minority ethnic (BAME) women are subordinated in differential ways to white women and they experience this intersectionally. In

55 addition to race and ethnicity, class and sexuality also

‘simultaneously operate at both the micro-structural and macro-structural levels’ to produce an intersectional experience of gendered oppression, marginalisation, disadvantage and inequality for women and girls (Burgess-Proctor, 2006: 37).

Within society it is therefore clear that masculinity and femininity are constructed in such a way that ‘male is normal . . . and female is different, or Other’ (Laws, 1979: 4). As such, female gender identities are not afforded equal ‘social power’,

‘participation in society’ or access to societal ‘benefits’ as

‘males as a group constitute the dominant class and females are the deviant class’ (ibid.: 4). For Laws, this ‘distinction between the dominant and the deviant’ demonstrates that

‘being female carries a stigma in and of itself, independent of other attributes with which it may be hyphenated’ (ibid.: 4).

2.6 Stigma and Shame: The Implications of a