Stigma and Shame: The Implications of a Deviant Identity Deviant Identity

Goffman (1963: 3) defines stigma as 'an attribute that is deeply discrediting' and states that one who is stigmatised goes from being regarded as 'a whole and usual person to a tainted discounted one'. It is a characteristic, which distinguishes an individual as being ‘of a less desirable kind’

and is recognised as ‘a failing, a shortcoming or a handicap’, upon one’s identity (ibid. 12). Stigma is only established and reinforced through social interaction, entirely contingent upon power differentials (Link and Phelan, 2001; Pescosolido and Martin, 2015). Thus, Goffman (1963: 4) contends that stigmatisation does not occur based upon a single attribute but instead is constructed upon ‘the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype’.

Essentially the attribute is determined by others as an undesirable characteristic, which results in a devalued

56 identity. This devaluation ‘works to advantage or disadvantage others through social interactions with individuals, groups, organizations, and “institutions”’

(Pescosolido and Martin, 2015: 93). The labels, upon which the stigma is conferred, are reinforced through formal and informal mechanisms of social control whilst the negative consequences of the stigma applied vary according to the extent to which the attribute and stereotype are accepted by others in society (ibid.). Once a stigma has been attached to a deviant identity, the individual who is stigmatised becomes

‘not quite human’ and their identity becomes spoiled in the eyes of others (Goffman, 1963: 15).

Drawing upon the conceptualisation of stigma ‘as the relationship between an attribute and a stereotype’ (Goffman, 1963: cited in Link and Phelan, 2001: 366), Link and Phelan (2001) distinguish four components which are intrinsic to the construction and application of stigma to spoiled identities.

These components are; ‘distinguish[ing] and label[ling] human differences’, linking ‘labelled persons to undesirable characteristics – to negative stereotypes’, the ‘separation of

“us” from “them’’ [and] status loss and discrimination that lead to unequal outcomes’ (ibid.: 367). Additionally, Link and Phelan suggest that stigmatisation is dependent upon ‘social, economic and political power’ which facilitates the

‘identification of differentness’, the creation of ‘stereotypes, and the separation of labelled persons into distinct categories’

(ibid.: 367). It is contended that such processes facilitate the

‘disapproval, rejection, exclusion, and discrimination’ of those stigmatised (ibid.: 367).

For Goffman (1963), individuals are classified around attributes associated with a given social identity. These attributes constitute expectations associated with an individual’s identity. Goffman notes that such expectations are made in retrospect and are used to construct a ‘virtual social identity’ (ibid.: 12). When an individual does not meet the

57 expectations which others attribute to their identity, a stigma is attached to their ‘actual social identity’ (ibid.: 12). He therefore theorises stigma as a concept which is embodied within social relationships and occurs as a result of a disparity between an individual’s ‘virtual social identity’ and their ‘actual social identity’ (ibid.: 12).

Goffman (1963: 14) distinguishes between three types of stigma: ‘physical deformities, blemishes of character and the tribal stigma of race, nation and religion’. For Goffman, stigma is present only when all members from social categories support the same standards of judgment (ibid.). It is suggested that those individuals, who do not depart from shared normative expectations, ‘construct a stigma theory’ in order to explain the stigmatised individual’s departure from their ‘virtual social identity’ and ‘his inferiority’, in order to

‘exercise variants of discrimination’ against them which efficaciously ‘restricts’ an individual’s ‘life chances’ (ibid.: 15).

However, Goffman (1963) notes that those who are stigmatised share the same assertions with regards to identity attributes as those who are not stigmatised.

His deepest feelings about what he is may be his sense of being a “normal person”, a human being like everyone else, a person, therefore, who deserves a fair chance and a fair break . . . Yet he may perceive, usually quite correctly, that whatever others profess, they do not really

“accept” him and are not ready to make contact with him on “equal grounds” (Goffman, 1963: 17-18).

At this point the individual becomes ‘intimately alive to what others see as his failing’ thus the individual is caused to ‘agree that he does indeed fall short of what he really ought to be’

(Goffman, 1963: 18). The individual is, therefore, socialised into the beliefs and values upon which the stigma is applied.

According to Goffman, this acknowledgement is likely to result

58 in ‘self-hate and self-derogation’ (ibid.: 18). Additionally

‘shame becomes a central possibility, arising from the individual’s perception of one of his own attributes as being a defiling thing to possess, and one he can readily see himself as not possessing’ (ibid.: 18).

The theoretical insights provided by Goffman (1971) and Cooley (1902), concerning the construction of identity as dependent upon the view of others are integral to understanding the implications that result from being labelled with a deviant identity and stigmatised. Both Cooley and Goffman suggest that an individual will experience shame as a result of being viewed negatively by others when they have failed to impute a positive social identity. For example, Cooley (1902: 152) contends that the second stage of the ‘looking-glass self, the imagination of oneself in the eyes of others, is

‘quite essential’ in terms of understanding the impact social processes have upon ‘self-feelings’ or emotions. His analysis suggests that the perception of oneself, based upon the view of others, plays an integral role in the emotions the individual will experience, asserting that the main emotions experienced, as result of being viewed through the eyes of others, is shame or pride (ibid.). Additionally, Goffman’s perspective on stigma implies that shame is a central emotion, which is manifested in response to being viewed negatively by others (Goffman, 1963 cited in Scheff, 2003: 244). As stigmatisation is a result of social processes, which involves the degradation of one’s identity by others, when an individual is stigmatised they are viewed negatively in the eyes of others as they possess a ‘discrediting’ attribute (Goffman, 1963: 3).

The individual who is stigmatised is aware of this devaluation of their social self and, as a consequence, they internalise this negative perception as part of their identity.

However, Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma has been challenged on the basis that it ‘assumes the existence of a normatively shared understanding of the criteria for and the

59 distribution of stigma’ (Kusow, 2004: 180). It is suggested that his predominant focus on the experiences of stigmatised groups essentially neglected to consider structural components of oppression and marginalisation and the influence of macro-level components on the processes of stigmatisation (ibid.). As such, it has been contended that whilst Goffman’s ‘concept of stigma has provided a powerful analytic category for understanding how stigmatized individuals manage the everyday problems attached to their spoiled identities, his treatment does not go far beyond the issues of identity management’ (Kusow, 2004: 195).

It is suggested by Parker and Aggleton (2003: 14) that stigma is characterised by ‘by cross-cultural diversity and complexity . . . [and] the relative simplicity of existing conceptual frameworks’, such as Goffman’s conceptualisation of stigma, limit knowledge and ‘understanding of [this] phenomena’.

They contend that what is missing from Goffman’s work is an understanding of ‘how stigma is used by individuals, communities and the state to produce and reproduce social inequality . . . [as well as a recognition of how] stigma and discrimination . . . encourages a focus on the political economy of stigmatisation and its links to social exclusion’

(ibid.: 17). Nonetheless Goffman’s contributions to the stigma concept have ‘proved a productive concept, in terms of furthering research on social stigma and its effects . . . [as well as] widening public understandings of stigma’ (Tyler and Slater, 2018: 721).

By utilising the theoretical perspectives developed by Cooley (1902), Becker (1963) and Goffman (1963), thus far this chapter has provided a theoretical account of the construction of deviant identities and the application of stigma to those labelled as deviant. The insights provided by Cooley (1902) and Goffman (1971) have been utilised to describe the processes individuals engage in, in order to ensure their identity is perceived positively in the eyes of others. This

60 chapter will now move on to consider the theoretical insights discussed, in relation to the construction of deviant identities and the application of stigma, through a gendered lens. The aim is to highlight how the application of stigma to deviant female identities is a process, which situates girls’

experiences of shame within a framework of gendered responses.

2.6 Regulating Female Identities: The role of Stigma