EPISTEMOLOGICAL POSITIONING

This research is underpinned by a social constructionist epistemology. Consequently, my focus is not concerned with discovering objective truths from my data. Instead, my focus lies with exploring the ‘different 

94 meanings with which our worlds become invested’ (Burr, 1998: 13).  Moreover, I am concerned with exploring how constructions of meaning are applied to the lived experiences of everyday life for the Muslim family carers in this study. This section explores these philosophical choices. As such, the section begins with exploring the definitions and applications of social constructionism. It then moves on to exploring the limitations and criticisms of constructionism, and how, in response to these challenges it has been usefully adapted and developed. The conclusion maps how this philosophical standpoint underpins this research.

Social constructionism as a philosophical standpoint has contributed much to existing literature, and continues to be applied by numerous disciplines to study human beings as ‘social animals’ (Burr, 2003).  Some argue that this makes it difficult to define (Brown, 1995). Locke and Strong (2010) conceptualise social constructionism as a ‘broad  church’, with ‘some expansive tenets that hold it together’ (p.6). Crotty  (1998) argues that from a constructionist viewpoint:

Meaning does not inhere in the object, merely waiting for someone to come upon it…the world and objects in the world are indeterminate.  They may be pregnant with potential meaning, but actual meaning emerges only when consciousness engages with them (p. 42-43).

95 Burr (2003: 2-5) defines four characteristics that a researcher usually adopts if they are to label themselves as a social constructionist.

1. A critical opinion of assumed or ‘taken-for-granted’ knowledge.  2. The ways in which aspects of the world are understood are

culturally and historically specific.

3. Knowledge of the world is not derived from the ‘real’ nature of the  world. Versions of knowledge are fabricated and constructed from the everyday social interactions between people. 4. Knowledge and social action are interrelated. What society

‘knows’ about something has an impact on how it is treated. 

Much of the appeal of social constructionism is in its implicit anti- essentialism (Burr, 1998; Lock and Strong, 2010). In this way, Gergen (1999) notes how constructionist arguments invite moral and political deliberation, as they do not champion one idea over another.

Consequently, he argues that it offers ‘a mandate for feminists, ethnic  minorities, Marxists, gays and lesbians, the elderly, the poor and indeed all of us to challenge the “truth” and the “facts” of the dominant order’  (Gergen, 1999: 231). Consequently, its application to political and moral debates, such as the disability movement, has been particularly

effective. This is discussed in more detail below.

Classical sociological theory has tended to conceptualise chronic illness and disability as a ‘problem’ (Shakespeare, 1996). As such the 

96 individual is responsible for ‘normalising’ herself or himself to fit into society and accept the limitations imposed by the impairment. This ‘medical’ model came under attack by the Disability Liberation Network  that employed social constructionism to locate disability...

squarely within society. It is not individual limitations, of whatever kind, which are the cause of the problem but society’s failure to provide  appropriate services and adequately ensure the needs of disabled people are fully taken into account in its social organisation (Oliver, 1996: p. 32).

These views formed the basis of the social model of disability, which has achieved much progress for the rights of people with chronic illnesses and disabilities. Recently, however the social model has been criticised for denying the personal experiences of disability by reducing it to mere construction. Handley (2003) cites the feminist slogan ‘the  personal is political’ arguing that the social model simplifies disability,  discounting for the complexity of individual experience. Whilst

acknowledging the positive consequences of the existence of the social model, Gabel and Peters (2004) argue that a growing number of

researchers are employing eclectic theories whilst identifying their work within the social model.

I identify with Gabel and Peters (2004) in that I also consider my research to be underpinned by an eclectic mix of social constructionist theories. When I consider the nature of my research, I find it difficult to

97 suggest that a mother caring for her child with severe physical

disabilities is not faced with ‘real’ medical conditions. Such arguments,  as Handley (2003) asserts, simplifies the complexity of the disabled experience and reduces medical conditions to mere construction. However, the ways in which the carer interprets the meanings of the medical condition of her child and her caring role within this is what is of interest and significance within this research.

Burr (1998) challenges both the proponents of social constructionism and its critics by asserting that its original meaning has been lost to dichotomous debates surrounding social constructionism (or relativism), and positivism (or realism). She argues that critics of constructionism seem to be ‘contesting the idea that the world is a figment of our imaginations and has no materiality […], which was never 

constructionism’s claim (p. 23). Consequently, Burr (1998: 23) argues  that debates need to transcend this misleading dichotomy ‘so that we  can talk of things being one and the same time socially constructed and

real’ (original emphasis). In this way, Burr (1998) encourages  constructionists to go beyond being mere ‘observers and 

commentators’, and follow through with recommendations for change. 

In response to the arguments proposed above, I assert my social constructionist stance with some caution. I acknowledge that there are certain areas where the application of social constructionism has been problematic (see Sayer, 1997 and Turner, 1996 for detailed discussions

98 of this), especially when it has historically resulted in core aspects of some people’s identity being rendered as construction rather than a  reality. Consequently, this research does not attempt to place emphasis on asserting what is “real” and what is “constructed”. Moreover, the  social constructionist approach here attempts to explore how meanings and understandings are constructed within the lived circumstances of everyday life.

Holstein and Miller (2007) describe the somewhat fitting term for this form of social constructionism as ‘contextual constructionism’. They  argue that such researchers assume that ‘we will understand the  empirical world better if we pay attention to the manner in which social problems emerge, and at a more basic level, they also assume that understanding the empirical world is desirable. That is, contextual constructionism is inspired by a sociological imagination’ (p. 139).  Brown (1995) further explains that contextual constructionists can give credence to actual conditions, such as medical illness, without putting primary emphasis on the condition. This research most comfortably adheres to these epistemological positionings. As such, the ensuing discussions are underpinned by these assumptions.