THIRD PURE TYPE SOLUTION TO WEBER’S PROBLEM OF THEODICY: KARMA

Weber (1922) regarded the Hindu doctrine of karma to be the most

complete solution to the problem of theodicy. Karmic principles perceive

that good fortune and suffering are awarded on the basis of good or bad behaviour. Consequently, the responsibility of suffering is placed

squarely with the individual. As such, Weber perceived it to be the most rational of all possible theodicies (see section 2.2.2 for a more detailed discussion of this). Although the doctrine of karma is most popularly

associated with Hinduism, Weber (1922) argued that all theodicies may be measured by their approximation to the three pure type solutions. As such, the adoption of karma by the respondents in this research refers

to the philosophy, rather than the religion of the Hindu doctrine.

Sharma (1973) analysed the application of Weber’s theories of theodicy  in practice by investigating the doctrine of Karma in her ethnographic

study of a Hindu Himachal Pradesh village. She argued that if an individual accepts the doctrine of karma then the need for a theodicy

192 will never arise as all suffering is the result of past sins committed. From this perspective, no suffering can be perceived to be unjust. However, Sharma warns that Hindus do not necessarily hold to scriptural beliefs about karma: ‘Individuals may reject certain ‘orthodox’ beliefs, or at any 

rate adhere to modified beliefs or idiosyncratic interpretations of these beliefs’ (p.350). The findings from Sharma’s study provide an interesting context to how the respondents in this study presented karmic beliefs.

This is examined below.

Some respondents presented beliefs that pertained to Weber’s third  pure type solution to the problem of theodicy in that they applied

aspects of karmic principles (that rewards and suffering are the result of

individual moral and immoral actions) to their religious explanations of their caring role, however, this was only partly embraced. As such, the prospect that their caring circumstances were ultimately self-inflicted was not cited within the accounts presented during the interviews. Instead, respondents employed karmic principles, which aligned with

Weber’s third pure type solution to the problem of theodicy to illuminate  the spiritual significance of their caring role. Parvina employed karmic

principles to explain how the undertaking of care will be rewarded in the afterlife.

Qur’an teaches us to look after them very well, […] don’t tell them off, keep 

the child happy, also in return for this; when you die, it will be easy for you, you will have an easier death. You will get rewarded in your life after death (Parvina cares for her son with Down’s syndrome).

193 Similarly, Yalina presented aspects of karma in her explanation of how

she perceives the religious dimensions of her caring role:

[I]f you do bad with someone, you get bad. So if you are caring for someone with a physical or learning disability and you are not looking after them properly and they are suffering in some way then you are not doing good for them and you will get a bad reward for that. But if you are going to do good for someone then you will get good.

Parvina and Yalina’s accounts suggest that although some of the  respondents in the study adopted aspects of karma, or Weber’s third

pure type solution to the problem of theodicy, this undertaking was somewhat incomplete, complex and included aspects of Weber’s first  pure type solution to the problem of theodicy (that suffering would be ultimately reconciled in the afterlife). Sharma (1973) also found that the Hindu villagers in her study presented mixed beliefs. She argued that even though karma provides a complete solution to the problem of

theodicy in theory, it was not always employed by the villagers to

explain their suffering. For instance, a chronic illness or ailment that did not respond to treatment was often attributed to the sorcery of another kinsman. The sufferer would then consult a ritual specialist who would attempt to detect the origin of the trouble and prescribe protective charms or amulets.

Sharma (1973) concluded that the kind of answer that karma provides

194 rather than alleviate or comfort the sufferer. Consequently, the

individual is afflicted by both suffering and guilt. Instead, the villagers in her study combined these philosophies with other beliefs that existed alongside, in both logical and illogical ways, to deflect the fatalistic blame that karma places on a sufferer. Sharma argues that we cannot

expect religious adherents to act in accordance to scriptural statements. Conversely, one should observe how religious belief operates within the total belief system of its adherents:

We cannot understand the meaning of a particular belief if we depend only upon scriptural statements, or any other cultural expression of creed, until we have discovered its position in the total belief system of its adherents and seen how it operates in its social context. If we expect the sacred literature on Hinduism to supply us with the context of beliefs we are expecting something which it cannot provide and are liable to further confusion’ (p.349).

These theories may contextualise why only certain ‘pure type’ solutions that Weber (1922) presents to explain suffering seemed to be adopted by the carers in this study. For example, Weber’s second pure type  solution to the problem of theodicy (the battle between good and evil) would have required the respondents to report that they perceived their caring situation to involve some form of evil. As Sharma suggests, employing religious beliefs that take on a potentially negative

195 undermine the positive reinforcements that many of the respondents in the study reported receiving from their religious beliefs.

These theories are supported by the findings in this research, whereby carers regularly presented negative accounts of how disability was perceived by others within the Muslim community, but not by the respondents themselves. These issues are discussed in more detail below.

4.5.3 EXPLORING ‘OTHER PEOPLE’S’ NEGATIVE MUSLIM