Evaluation

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Text Evaluation

Often the simplest way to evaluate an argument's inferences once you have broad standardisation is just to go through each of the arguments: the main argument, and each of the subarguments, and consider whether adequate support has been given in each of the inferences. For the purposes of writing an evaluation, however, it is not necessary to comment on every premise or every inference. Part of the skill involved in writing a short evaluation is to work out what is most important, and most relevant to the success of the argument.

Main argument

One of the strengths of the main argument is that the conclusion, "Reproductive cloning should not be ruled out without further consideration" is relatively weak. To say that a conclusion is "weak" in this sense is not to criticise it (as you would by saying that an inference is weak, for example.) To say that a conclusion is weak means that it is not making too ambitious a claim, and thus it is more likely to be supported by the evidence.

So this weak conclusion is a better one to draw from the premises than a strong conclusion like "Cloning should be permitted", which would require a lot more evidence.

Although the author is not trying to justify cloning in this argument, nor is he trying to present an entirely objective view of the arguments for and against cloning. His point is to offer negative support for cloning by arguing that many of the objections made against it are not compelling, so it is at least too early to reject cloning now.

With any argument that proceeds by arguing against objections, the strength of the argument will depend in part on whether there are other significant objections that have not been addressed. Even if the author succeeds in arguing against the objections he mentions, cloning may still be unacceptable for other reasons.

This is something the author of this text acknowledges, and we will return to this point later in the discussion.

Subargument supporting premise 1

The first subargument is the longest in the text, and involves a series of convergent lines of reasoning for the subconclusion that "Concerns about individuality should not lead us to rule out cloning".

The first of the subpremises, which says that family resemblances are generally considered to be a good thing, is not strongly relevant to the conclusion drawn from it. There seems to be some equivocation here about "individuality". While it is true that families may appreciate resemblances between their members, resemblances are really not evidence of a lack of individuality in the sense in which it may be feared that a deliberately created clone would lack individuality. The fact that some degree of similarity is considered a good thing does not provide good evidence that complete genetic similarity would or should also be considered a good thing. Therefore premise 1.1, which is convergent with the other subpremises in this subargument, is not strong.

Premises 1.2 and 1.3 are the first of the arguments from analogy in this text. It is argued that since identical twins are genetically identical, and yet twins are considered to be individuals with the same rights (and not 'abominations'), there is no reason for deliberately created clones to be lacking that same individuality.

As this is an argument from analogy, it can be evaluated using the techniques developed in the second section of the course: In particular, you should decide how strong and positively relevant the similarities between the subject and analogue are, and whether there are any negatively relevant differences that might outweigh those similarities. Clones are the subject in this argument, identical twins are the analogue. The similarities stated to exist between them is that a pair of identical twins, like a pair of clones, will be

genetically identical. The property being extended from the analogue to the subject is the property of having individuality, and having the rights of an individual.

The similarity, genetic identity, does seem to be relevant, since if genetic identity does not prevent twins from becoming individuals, then the same could be expected to hold for clones. Genetic difference cannot be what determines individuality.

There are, however, significant negatively relevant differences as well, particularly if we consider the broader target property of being thought of by society as individuals, or not being considered

'abominations'. Twins do differ from clones in their origins: twins occur naturally, while clones have been

created deliberately, and society might well treat them differently on that basis. Honey claims that no-one thinks that "the second twin is not an individual with the same rights", but even the use of the word

"second" here points to a difference between clones and twins. Which of a pair of twins is the second is basically arbitrary: an accident of position at the time of birth. But the distinction between first and second in the case of clones is a genuine distinction, since one is a copy of the other.

The argument, however, is presumably intended as normative rather than descriptive (that is, as a claim that society should not treat clones as lacking individuality, rather than as a claim that it would not so treat them), in which case the author's claim could still be accepted.

The next inference concerns the question of whether clones would have distinct souls. Again, Honey uses the analogy with twins to argue that this would not be a problem: "the fact that there are identical twins counts against there being a problem. Twins seem to manage, and that seems to suggest that each person is able to be ensouled regardless of their genetic make-up." There are a few things worth noting about this argument. First, it would be wrong to criticise this argument by saying that it is based on the assumption that souls exist, and would therefore not be persuasive for an atheist, or anyone who does not believe in souls.

The reason this would be inappropriate is that because this is offered as a response to an objection, it only needs to be persuasive to people who would find that objection compelling. While it is true that an atheist will not find Honey's claims about twins (and therefore clones) being "separately ensouled" convincing, neither would he or she have been persuaded by an objection to cloning on the basis that clones would not have souls.

I think that there is, however, a problem with Honey's response to the "souls" objection, and that is that it seems to mischaracterise the most likely form of that objection. Because no exact source for the objection is given it is hard to know exactly what was intended, but the objection to which Honey's argument would be a response does not seem to be the strongest version of this concern.

Honey argues that it is wrong to think that souls pose a problem for the individuality of clones, because twins seem to be separately 'ensouled', and because "It's hard to imagine that God would have any difficulty telling the difference between one clone and another". In arguing this way, he is assuming that the problem is firstly one about whether genetic individuation is necessary for the individuation of souls, and secondly about whether God could tell clones apart. The latter point is unlikely to be the one to have troubled any theist who thinks of God as omnipotent and omniscient, and the former objection, easily refuted by the twins analogy, also does not sound like an objection anyone would actually make. Those who do believe in souls generally believe that souls can exist independently of bodies, in which case there would be no good reason to think that a soul would have to be tied to a body of a particular genetic constitution.

A more likely objection based on the problem of souls would be one based again on the origin of the clone.

Even if scientists could successfully clone a human, would they thereby create a soul for that person? It might be thought that our capacity for cloning only extends as far a cloning the physical body, so if there is something non-physical which is essential to a person's life or identity, clones would be missing it: Perhaps we can build a human like we can build a table or a chair, but it could be that only God can create souls. If the objection to cloning based on the question of whether clones would be adequately 'ensouled' is

characterised along these lines, Honey's response would not be successful. If indeed Honey's argument does respond only to a weaker position than one actually held by his opponents, it commits the "straw person"

fallacy.

The final premise in the first subargument, premise 1.5, provides quite a strong reason to believe premise 1.

The fact that a person's environment and experiences are relevant to determining their personality and what makes them an individual does give us a good reason to think that clones would necessarily differ in these respects. This is perhaps the strongest piece of evidence given in this subargument.

Subargument supporting premise 2

The second premise maintains that we should not be deterred from cloning just because we are reluctant to

"play God". It is supported by a normative argument from analogy, comparing reproductive cloning to 'therapeutic cloning', or stem cell research. It is argued that since stem cell research is at least as problematic from a "playing God" point of view, and we accept stem cell research, we should also be prepared to consider reproductive cloning. In fact, the argument is a little stronger than this, since it is not claiming just that the two kinds of cloning are similarly objectionable, but that stem cell research (which relies on killing embryos unlike reproductive cloning which uses them for procreation), is more

objectionable. So if we are prepared to accept that therapeutic cloning is acceptable, Honey argues, it is deeply inconsistent to oppose reproductive cloning. (It is interesting to note that this argument could not be used to support the claim that reproductive cloning would not involve playing God -- only that unlike

therapeutic cloning, reproductive cloning involves playing God in a way that God might approve of).

One potential problem with a normative analogical argument like this, that is based on our inconsistent attitudes towards two similar things, is that the same analogy could be used to draw a different conclusion:

in this case the conclusion that because of the similarity between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, we should not be prepared to countenance therapeutic cloning either. Normative analogical arguments rely on the audience being more committed to their attitudes towards the analogue than their attitudes towards the subject. Because a lot of people are strongly opposed to reproductive cloning, some readers of this argument may conclude from it not that reproductive cloning is as acceptable as stem cell research and should be allowed, but that stem cell research is at least as objectionable as reproductive cloning, and should be resisted.

Another possible objection to this subargument is that one of the two linked premises states that "there is widespread agreement about the rightness of therapeutic cloning." This seems to be overstating the case, since therapeutic cloning (stem cell research) is still a deeply controversial subject. If all that is required for the sake of the analogy is that stem cell research is more widely accepted than reproductive cloning, then that is undoubtedly true, but to claim "widespread agreement" appears to be a misrepresentation of the reality of the debate.

Subargument supporting premise 3

The third subargument argues that we should not reject cloning because of the danger of the clones not being valued for themselves. Honey does not deny that some of the motivations that have been suggested for cloning are selfish, but he thinks that the benefits to those who want to use cloning for good reasons, would outweigh any potential for harm arising from more 'unsavoury' motives.

There are at least two problems with this argument. First, the premise that "there are people who can have a baby in no other way and who would be childless otherwise" might be questioned. It is true that there are some people who are unable to have a child using existing technology, but it is not true that those couples could conceive through cloning. As things are now, cloning technology is not sufficiently advanced to successfully clone humans, and there is no reason to think that cloning will succeed where other methods fail. It might in the future come about that there will be some people who can conceive only through cloning, but to state this as an unsupported premise suggesting that this is the case now is misleading.

If it were true, would it provide good support for premise 3.1? Should we allow cloning so that otherwise childless people can procreate? Honey's explicit claim here is just that "If the technology becomes available there will need to be good reasons to deny people this opportunity." What is at issue in this debate, though, is whether we do in fact have good reasons to deny them the opportunity. If there are good reasons to oppose cloning, the desire of some childless people to have a child would be unlikely to outweigh those reasons. So this provides only weak support for premise 3.

Another problem with this subargument is in the implicitly analogical premise, 3.2. Honey responds to the objection that some people may clone themselves or others for selfish reasons, saying :" imagine what would happen if we tested the motives of couples wanting to have children the normal way!" The suggestion here seems to be that those who can conceive naturally are not prevented from doing so for having selfish motives, so those who want to reproduce by cloning should not be judged on their motives either. This is what is sometimes referred to as a "two wrongs fallacy". A "two wrongs" fallacy is a fallacy of analogical reasoning that occurs when an arguer attempts to justify one bad action by showing that it is analogous to another bad action that has been permitted. It is a fallacy because, as the saying goes "two wrongs don't make a right". A bad action is not made permissible just because some other bad action has been permitted.

Subargument supporting premise 4

The subargument supporting premise 4 is another analogical argument. It is argued that other reproductive technologies, such as surrogacy and IVF, were originally opposed and have become accepted, so the opposition to cloning can also be explained by its novelty, and, like the opposition to the other techniques, will wane over time.

The similarity between the subject and analogue is that they are each techniques allowing people who otherwise would not have had children to have them, and each was initially opposed. The property being extended from the analogue to the subject is that the initial opposition will not last. While the experiences of past attitudes to technologies like IVF may give advocates of cloning some hope that opposition to cloning will not last, there are other new possibilities that continue to be opposed, so the argument is not

conclusive. (Buying children via the internet is also a new possibility allowing otherwise childless people to obtain children, but does the analogical argument give us any reason to think that the existing opposition to it will eventually evaporate?)

Honey tries to support the argument with the generalisation that "Whenever a new possibility comes along, we tend to oppose it", but this is not really true of all new possibilities. It is true of some advances that seem to be potentially harmful, (as was the case with IVF), but the opposition fades only when those fears are shown to be unfounded. IVF was found to be safe, and became widely accepted, but it remains to be seen whether the same will be true of cloning.

This subargument also contains another example of an unjustified suggestion of certainty, in the claim with respect to surrogacy and IVF that "We have come to accept both". Surrogacy, at least, is still quite

controversial.

This is not, I think, a very strong subargument. We have no good reason to think that cloning is being opposed just because it is new, and consequently no reason to think that the opposition is only temporary.

Subargument supporting premise 5

Premise 5 suggests that the real reason for medical scientists' opposition to cloning is that they are trying to gain support for stem cell research. There is no direct evidence given for this claim: only the suggestion that scientists might be able to make stem cell research seem more attractive by contrasting it with the more controversial technology of reproductive cloning. Because there is no evidence for the 'conspiracy theory' proposed here, however, the subargument is not strong. We have no real reason to suspect that the objections of scientists are not genuine.

To be fair to the author, he does not claim that this is certain, prefacing his claim with "I think it likely that the real reasons ..."but we still have not been given enough evidence to understand why he would consider that the most likely explanation.

To reject an argument because of some unsupported speculation about how some person or group's views could explained by their circumstances is to be guilty of a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy. Even if their opposition can be explained in some other way, the objections of the scientists should be considered fairly.

Note: An alternate reading of the argument

Applying the principle of charity, we might try a different reading of the argument, which would make premise 5 appear more motivated. On that alternative reading, which would require a revised

standardisation, we could interpret the argument as saying that the real reason for the scientists' rejection of cloning must be that they are attempting to gain support for stem cell research by emphasising the distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, since the other reasons for rejecting cloning (those discussed in premises 1, 2 and 3) are not genuine problems. If this is the correct reading of the argument, then the fifth subargument would not be a circumstantial ad hominem, because Honey would only be rejecting the scientists' objections after considering and responding to them. While it is true that this would appear to give some support for what is now premise 5, that premise would still not be strongly supported. The problem with this argument is that the reasons considered in the early part of the argument for rejecting cloning, based on issues including the problem of whether clones would have souls and of

standardisation, we could interpret the argument as saying that the real reason for the scientists' rejection of cloning must be that they are attempting to gain support for stem cell research by emphasising the distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, since the other reasons for rejecting cloning (those discussed in premises 1, 2 and 3) are not genuine problems. If this is the correct reading of the argument, then the fifth subargument would not be a circumstantial ad hominem, because Honey would only be rejecting the scientists' objections after considering and responding to them. While it is true that this would appear to give some support for what is now premise 5, that premise would still not be strongly supported. The problem with this argument is that the reasons considered in the early part of the argument for rejecting cloning, based on issues including the problem of whether clones would have souls and of