(Week 11)
Over the last few weeks, we have built up an evaluation of an argument text. This final set of notes contains a sample evaluation, of the kind you will be submitting for your assignment, which is based on the evaluation we've developed. A similar example will be done in class.
Notes on writing your text evaluation
The evaluation below is of a similar length and style to the evaluation you will do for your written assignment. It is here to give you an idea of what sort of thing you could include, but you are in no way bound by this format. For example, some people prefer to construct their analyses under subheadings, as I did in the longer discussion in the previous weeks' notes, and you are free to do that if you choose. What topics you focus on will depend on the argument text you select. Persuasive language, for example, does not play a strong role in this argument, so I have discussed uses of language mainly in connection with the particular subarguments in which they occur. If you were evaluating a text that made use of a lot of emotional language, however, you might want to treat this as a distinct section of your analysis. As was noted previously, you do not have to mention every premise in your evaluation. Try to keep your analysis succinct and to the point, and discuss the features of the argument that you consider most important and relevant.
Broad Standardisation:
1.1: Family resemblances are considered a good thing 1.2: Identical twins are genetically identical
1.3: Identical twins are individuals with the same rights 1.4: Identical twins have separate souls, if souls exist
1.5: Individuality is a matter of environment as well as genetics, and clones would grow up in different environments
1: Concerns about individuality should not lead us to rule out cloning
2.1: There is widespread agreement about the rightness of therapeutic cloning
2.2: From the point of view of 'playing God', therapeutic cloning (which results in the death of the foetuses) is more objectionable than reproductive cloning.
2: Concerns about 'playing God' should not lead us to rule out cloning
3.1: For some people cloning is the only way of having a child.
3.2: We do not question the motivations of parents who have children the conventional way 3: Concerns about clones not being valued for themselves should not lead us to rule out cloning
4.1: IVF and surrogacy were opposed when they were new technology 4.2: We have now come to accept IVF and surrogacy
4: Much of the opposition to cloning is a result of its being new, and this opposition will be overcome
5.1: By emphasising the distinction between reproductive and therapeutic cloning, medical scientists can make therapeutic cloning seem more acceptable
5: Objections from medical scientists may just be attempts to gain support for stem cell research
C: Reproductive cloning should not be ruled out without further serious consideration
Evaluation:
Honey's purpose is to convince the audience that without more debate it would be premature to rule out reproductive cloning of humans. He attempts to show that objections commonly made to cloning are not compelling, and that there are other ways to explain the motivations of scientists and others for condemning cloning.
The argument appeared as an opinion piece in a newspaper, and is written in a colloquial style appropriate to that context. Although the style is informal, the author rarely adopts emotionally charged or persuasive language, writing in a mostly composed and judicious style. That is a strength of the argument, since many readers will have strong views on cloning, and this text is written in a way that is unlikely to antagonise.
What uses there are of persuasive language are quite subtle. The author's use of the word "cloning", for example, to refer not only to reproductive cloning, but to stem cell research, ("therapeutic cloning") and identical twins ("naturally occurring clones") is a way of making reproductive cloning sound innocuous.
The main argument has five premises. The first three premises counter specific objections to cloning that have been cited by the author, who claims that none of these objections constitute a reason to reject reproductive cloning. The fourth and fifth premises are more general, suggesting not that particular
objections are wrong, but that the reasons people have for their condemnation of cloning may not be based on genuine objections at all. These premises are negative, in that they do not provide evidence that cloning should be accepted, but only reasons to question objections to it. Although this methodology would not provide support for a strong conclusion like "cloning should be permitted", Honey's conclusion is the weaker claim that we do not yet have reason to rule out cloning, and that a careful debate on the issue is needed. It should be noted, however, that any argument that proceeds only by responding to objections leaves open the possibility that there are other significant objections that have not been addressed. This can be especially problematic in a case like this where no source information is provided for the objections that are considered.
We will return later to the implications of the author's method, but will now turn to an evaluation of each of the subarguments, since even if the main premises provide sufficient support for the conclusion, our acceptance of the conclusion would still be contingent on our acceptance of those premises.
In the first subargument, Honey provides a series of responses to the objection that clones may lack individuality. The different arguments Honey provides relate to different aspects of this concern, since
"individuality" is understood by his opponents in a number of ways: as a matter of personality, or of rights, or in a more spiritual way. Honey argues that however this objection is understood, it does not provide sufficient reason to reject cloning.
Two parts of this first argument are based on an analogy drawn between identical twins and clones. The similarity between the subject and analogue is that sets of identical twins, like sets of clones, are genetically identical. Honey argues first (in premise 1.3) that twins are individuals with the same rights, and second (1.4) that if souls exist, twins must each have a soul. Based on the analogy, Honey argues that the same would be true of deliberately created clones.
The analogy here is quite strong, at least if we are thinking about individuality in terms of something like personality: genetic individuality cannot be necessary for individuality.
There is a normative aspect to this argument, since the author says that twins are treated as individuals with the same rights, so clones should be as well. This might not work as a descriptive argument, since people do not have the same attitudes to clones as they have to twins, but if we accept the rest of the analogy we
should probably also accept the normative conclusion that clones should be treated as individuals with the same rights.
The other part of the analogical argument is supposed to show that if souls exist, clones would have them.
This is less successful than the earlier part of the analogical argument. All the argument would establish if successful would be that a person's soul is not just a matter of their genetics, and it seems unlikely that this is the real issue. This is a point in the argument where it would be useful to have a reference to some particular objection that had been made on the basis of the problem of souls, since the objection the author attacks does not seem to be the most likely one. If someone believes in souls and considers them a reason to reject cloning, it is unlikely they would do so because they were concerned that a person's soul is
determined by their genetic make-up, so sameness of DNA would entail sameness of soul. Souls,
traditionally understood, are non-physical, and it seems much more likely that the fear would be that cloning would only reproduce the physical properties of a person, so the clone would not get a soul. Twins would be relevantly different to clones, on this argument, because both twins would have been created by God, who could have given them independent souls. Scientists may not have that power. If Honey is responding to a weaker version of the argument than one that is actually given by opponents, he is committing the straw person fallacy.
The strongest evidence for premise 1 may be premise 1.5, which argues that since a lot of what individuates a person is a consequence of their environment and experiences, the separation in time between people and their clones would guarantee individuality in that sense.
The second main premise states that it would be unreasonable to rule out cloning because of a desire to respect human limitations and a reluctance to play God. Honey supports this claim by comparing
reproductive cloning with stem cell research and argues that stem cell research is more problematic in this regard, since while reproductive cloning uses embryos for reproduction, stem cell research ('therapeutic cloning') results in the death of the embryos used. Honey argues that since "there is widespread agreement as to the rightness of therapeutic cloning" we should also be prepared to consider reproductive cloning. The most serious problem with this argument is the assertion that there is such widespread agreement. Stem cell research is still very controversial in many circles, particularly among religious people who are likely to be those most opposed to 'playing God', and to whom this part of the argument needs to be directed. Those people may take the analogy Honey suggests as a further reason to reject stem cell research, rather than as a reason to allow cloning.
In the third subargument, Honey responds to the objection that clones would be created for selfish reasons and not valued for themselves. Honey argues that this is not a good reason for rejecting cloning, firstly because although he admits some people may have selfish motivations, "there are people who can have children in no other way". Given current technology, this is not true, but even if it becomes true it may not be a reason to permit cloning. Honey says that if the technology is available "there will need to be good reasons to deny people that opportunity", so even he does not think that this would necessarily outweigh other considerations if there are yet good reasons not to allow cloning.Consequently, this can provide only weak support for premise 3.
In the final two subarguments, Honey suggests that there may be explanations for the opposition to cloning among the public and scientists that are not based on real issues to do with cloning. His suggestion in the fourth subargument that the public just tend to oppose new technologies and will become used to the idea as they have with IVF and surrogacy has some merit as an inductive argument: we have seen in the past that some controversies fade over time. But to the extent that those techniques have become accepted, their acceptance was a result of their success, and it remains to be seen whether the same will be true of cloning.
New techniques that are found to be unsafe, for example, do not become accepted.
The final subargument suggests that the real reason for medical scientists' opposition to cloning is that they are trying to gain support for stem cell research. There is no direct evidence given for this claim: only the suggestion that scientists might be able to make stem cell research seem more attractive by contrasting it with the more controversial reproductive cloning. There is no evidence given for the explanation proposed here, however, and we have no real reason to suspect that the objections of scientists are not
genuine. Honey does not claim that this is definitely the true explanation, prefacing his claim with "I think it likely that the real reasons ..." but we still have not been given enough evidence to understand why he would consider that the most likely explanation. It is a circumstantial ad hominem fallacy to dismiss someone's argument because of an unjustified claim about their circumstances.
Although some of these subarguments are not well supported, the main premises are convergent and we do not have to accept all of them to have reason to accept the conclusion. Honey has, I think, succeeded in achieving his stated purpose. Because he is not trying to defend a strong positive conclusion, but only trying to show that we do not yet have conclusive reasons to abandon cloning and should debate the arguments, his article is effective. He has shown that at least some of the objections to cloning may be questioned, and although not all such objections have been refuted, Honey's article may constitute one part of the ongoing debate he sought.