Examples of Modernity

With those nuances in mind, the ‘multiple modernities’ approach provides us with a useful framework of analysis for the theoretical framework of this investigation. It shows that modernisation has taken place on the initiative of different elite groups, which construct ‘promissory notes’ that serve to orient their projects and counter-projects of modernisation. In the process of the interaction of the successive projects of modernisation, specific patterns of modernity emerge. Before dealing with the implementation and interaction of projects of modernisation, however, some attention should be paid to their conception and construction. Whitehead, as well as many other authors, emphasises the importance of existing examples of modernity for Latin American elites (Whitehead 2002: 33). For the case of Chile, I propose that the construction of projects of modernisation has roughly been based on four of such

examples. These examples have been used in a highly selective way, though. Even while Chilean political elites have shown a strong orientation towards external models of modernity, they have been very specific in the ways they have applied them to the case of Chile, using certain elements and ignoring others. Also, several examples have served as points of orientation at the same time. As a result, it is difficult to pin-point Chilean projects of modernisation to one specific example of modernity. Nevertheless, they have been of importance as they have provided Chilean elites with images of modernity, from which could serve as the basis for proposals of modernity.

The examples of modernity that have been most important among Chilean elites more or less coincide with the perspectives that have been used to categorise the debate on modernity in Chile. They are the North-West European welfare model, the American-liberal model, the Socialist model, and the Latin American model of modernity.

The North-Western European welfare model is based on the patterns of modernisation that were followed by the North-Western European countries such as England, France and Germany. It was based on what Peter Wagner has labelled ‘restricted liberal modernity’. On the one hand this was based on liberalism and democratic values, and on the other it was based on the central position of the nation- state as a container of these modern ideas. As a result, Wagner argues, already in the nineteenth century liberal modernity was blended with an emphasis on collectiveness. In the twentieth century, this model developed into ‘welfare modernity’, or, as Wagner labels it, ‘organised modernity’. In this model, the liberal autonomy of individuals was restricted by the state, which sought to include social certainties in the interest of the common good. Especially after the Second World War, the ‘European Social-Democrat welfare modernity’ expanded rapidly into an institutional network which provided care ‘from the cradle to the grave’. Apart from creating standardised levels of welfare, it maintained a strong focus on the state as both the provider and container of modernity, and on collectivisation of identity and social structures (ibid., pp. 69, 98).

The liberal example of modernity can mainly be found in the United States. Rather than being a simple ‘fragment of Europe’, North America has produced a fundamentally different model of modernity, with a strong emphasis on individualism and the primacy of civil society over the state (Beriain 2005: 47-50). This does not reflect a different disposition or cultural identity of the original settlers, but rather the way in which modernity has evolved in North America. After independence from England, the American people had to create a completely new order after their break with the English colonial system. Without the existence of substantive rules that served as a foundation for the new order, individual freedom and pluralism were the logical alternative. Thus, as Wagner argues, modernisation in the United States was determined by the absence of a previous model, and provoked fundamentally different patterns of modernity from the European ones. This ‘American liberal modernity’ came to be characterised by a highly articulated civil society that allowed for little intervention by the state. This civil society, in turn, showed a little emphasis on large collectives and a

focus on individual rights and liberties. As a result, no ‘welfare state’ emerged in the US, and the market was allowed a much larger role in the allocation and distribution of material as well as cultural goods than in Europe (ibid., p. 54).

The Socialist example originally emerged as an alternative model of modernity (Brunner 1994b: 19). Rather than constituting a true opposite to the European model, though, it was based on many of the same elements of the European model, such as a strong focus on the state in the organisation of modernity, and an emphasis on class (but without the European idea of the nation). As Peter Wagner put it:

[f]ar from presenting a derailment of the modern project or the emergence of some kind of anti-modernity, Soviet socialism emphasizes certain features of modernity, though obviously at the expense of others. Just as American exceptionalism can be regarded as the epitome of one kind of modernity, so should socialism be seen as the epitome of another kind (1994: 13).

In all respects, we can see socialism as precisely the epitome of organised

modernity, rather than as a non-, pre-, or even anti-modern social configuration (ibid., p. 101; italics in the original)

Ideologically, it drew on an egalitarian reading of liberal theory, in which the state legitimately may intervene by destroying existing structures of privilege for the higher good of social equality. In this sense, important elements of the modern were used in order to create a highly organised model for modernity, while others (such as the liberal idea of the limitation of the influence of the state for the benefit of the individual) were rejected completely (ibid., pp. 100-102).

It should be noted, though, that the Socialist alternative was particularly heterodox in its manifestations. Apart from the Soviet model, several other models emerged, such as the Maoist one, and, particularly influentially for the Latin American case, the Cuban one. Furthermore, the Socialist alternative not only existed in its ‘really existing’ form, but also as an ideology that guided many Socialist and Communist parties. Rather than constituting a full converse to the ‘Social Democratic welfare modernity’, it should be interpreted as its more radical expression, with an extremely high valuation of equality, collectivisation, and the role of the state, combined with a deep mistrust of liberal concepts such as the market and democracy.

The fourth example of modernity consists of the Latin American ‘baroque’ notion of modernity. It has been based on the conservative patterns of culture and identity that were inherited from the colonial era. Nevertheless, like the Socialist alternative, it is an ‘alternative modernity’ rather than an ‘alternative to modernity’. Instead of resisting modernity in all its forms, Latin American conservative modernity selectively differed from European modernity by rejecting specific elements such as Rationalism, Enlightenment, and secularisation. In fact, Morandé argues, foreshadowing the multiple modernities argument, in Latin America a different model of modernity emerged:

If modernity and Enlightenment are equal, then Latin American Catholicism is archaic and secularisation an inevitable process which will eventually demolish this archaism. If, instead, Enlightenment and secularism constitute only one of the historical variations that have been followed by modernity, the discovery of

the ‘baroque’ and the Latin American cultural ethos, which are, apart form an essential virtue of our particular identity, in itself a possibility of discovering the bases of a non-secular modernity (Morandé 1984: 142).

Thus, Latin American conservative modernity can be viewed as a mix between the Catholic and traditional patterns of culture and identity in Latin America with certain elements of modernity. It may be authoritarian, resistant to change, and focused on ritual rather than on written text; but it is simultaneously modern - albeit in a form different from European modernity. This may seem to be a contradiction in terms. However, as Wiarda (2001 95-96) has shown, patterns and institutions that have become cornerstones of European modernity, such as the trias politica and the liberal notion of checks and balances, can be found in the Latin American baroque modernity as well, albeit in less explicit and powerful forms. Even though the outcome of such institutions and practices may deviate from the European model of modernity, they are certainly not anti-modern in essence, and may well be labelled modern themselves.

Some of the most striking elements of Latin American conservative modernity are its authoritarian and top-down orientation (which is checked by means of corporatist institutions), centralism, dominance of the state over civil society (but by no means a disarticulated civil society), and a strong emphasis on order (but also on elements of progress), to name but a few (Wiarda 1978).

Together with these examples modernity, I suggest to add another dimension to the analysis of how projects of modernity are conceptualised and constructed. This dimension consists of three dimensions that can be identified in modernity. Loosely paraphrasing T.H. Marshall’s notions of citizenship, I propose that modernity can be viewed from the a social, a political and a economic perspective.24

The social dimension of modernity fundamentally reflects the notion of the expansion of civil rights in modern societies. This implies that all citizens receive equal access to the benefits of the state, and that no groups remain excluded. As such, social modernity refers to the role of the state in society, both on the level of bestowing citizenship on the members of the population, but also in providing basic care for all citizens. The political dimension of modernity emphasises the expansion of political rights, and includes the notion of power-sharing and a deepening of democratic structures. It is based on the idea that modernity implies the political emancipation of the people and the creation of a society in which the power of the executive is checked by representative and liberal institutions. Finally, the economic dimension of modernity reflects the idea of the expansion of economic rights for the population at large. These three dimensions bring to the light the focus that each project of modernisation has. Often, one or two of the three dimensions are emphasised strongly, while the other(s) are ignored of at least given less importance.

24 _{In his famous Citizenship and Social Class (1950), Marshall underlines three levels of citizenship: civil} citizenship, in which basic civil rights are attributed to the members of a society, political citizenship, in which individuals are bestowed with civil rights, and social citizenship, which allows for certain levels of socio-economic equality within a society.