Slipping off the Road: the Adaptation of the Project

The development of the project followed a pattern similar to the Revolution in Liberty. After an initial period of rapid progress, the project entered in a period of conflict, in which its implementation was increasingly troubled by outside as well as inside forces. This phase was characterised by increasing opposition, internal division and social unrest, and ended in a severe political crisis. After this crisis, the government lost the initiative, and the implementation of the original project came to a halt. The government was forced to make a choice between stepping on the brake and pushing the project forwards. While Allende attempted to do the first, other sections of the UP did the latter. In the end, Allende lacked the relative autonomy from his political allies he needed to enforce a consistent adaptation of the ‘Chilean Road’, which eventually led to the downfall of the project.

Economic Adaptation

On the economic level, several attempts were made to adapt the project. As mentioned above, economic performance rapidly dropped after the first year, as inflation, shortages and decreased production began to reinforce each other (De Vylder 1976: 87-111). The

75 _{Different interpretations circulate on the motivations of the Christian Democrats during these} negotiations. Authors such as Corvalán (2001: 267-268) and Garcés (1986: 315) claim that the PDC purposely torpedoed the negotiations, because by then Frei had set his mind on a military coup. In contrast, Valenzuela (2003: 162) and Falcoff (1991: 268) argue that the delegation of the PDC feared that Allende, famous for his negotiating skills, would stall, or deceive them. This fear, combined with the tremendous pressure coming from the conservative wing of the party, strengthened their demands for large-scale military incorporation in the political arena, safeguarding the UP’s compliance with the results of the negotiations.

economic team of the UP, however, was divided between correcting the situation by balancing the economy, and rapidly pushing forward with the implementation of the project (Meller 2000: 37). The matter became the cause for intense debates in June of 1972, during a large UP conference in the Santiago suburb of Lo Curro. On the one hand, the PS, supported by the IC, pushed for a radicalisation of the programme, under the motto avanzar sin transar (moving forward without resignation). Apart from the intensification of poder popular, the PS proposed further large-scale nationalisation, and economic readjustment through redistribution of wealth, meaning that the soaring inflation was not to be corrected by compensation for the workers only. Economic stabilisation, the PS argued, would be counterproductive, as it would slow down the pace of political advancement and strengthen the position of the Right. On the other hand, the PC, supported by the Radical Party and the Allende sector of the PS, pleaded for consolidar para avanzar (to consolidate in order to advance), that is, getting inflation under control, giving guarantees to small business owners, seeking agreements with the PDC, and bringing poder popular under institutional rule (Furci 1984: 126-129). As the conference remained undecided, it was up to Allende to enforce a decision. In defiance of his own party, he pushed the balance towards the moderate camp. He rejected the idea of intensifying the political project at the cost of the economy, and decided to reopen negotiations with the PDC on the Fuentealba-Hamilton bill. Furthermore, and most importantly, he announced a shift in his cabinet. Minister of Economics Pedro Vuskovic, the independent hardliner of the radical camp, and Finance Minister Américo Zorilla were replaced with two moderates, Carlos Matus and Orlando Millas (Roxborough et al. 1977: 127).

The change in the economic team did not produce the desired results, however. Attempts to implement cohesive and balanced policies were nipped in the bud by the October strike. After the strike, economic policy-making became characterised by a lack of coherence and decisiveness (De Vylder 1976: 87-88; Stallings 1978: 144; Meller 2000: 37). At first, the government prioritised social order over economic recovery and delayed the formulation of a new economic plan. Furthermore, in December 1972, Finance Minister Millas, attempting to manage shortages of basic foodstuffs and curb the black market, announced the ‘distribution’ of thirty basic consumption goods. As a result, demand for the products in question rose steeply, and the image of ‘state rationing’ only served to antagonise the opposition. Furthermore, due to the lack of infrastructure, and wide-scale opposition, the distribution plan never materialised (Meller 2000: 44-45; Stallings 1978: 145).76 _{Only in March 1973 were new economic} strategies defined. However, despite verbal adherence to economic recovery, nothing much was undertaken until late June, when the government came up with a sixteen- point, detailed plan, the first cohesive plan that was implemented since the UP’s initial

76 _{To the horror of the opposition, distribution was to be carried out by neighbourhood consumer} committees (Juntas de Abastecimientos y Precios, JAPs), which had been set up by the UP during the October strike in order to force shopkeepers to maintain official prices and proper stocks of merchandise. The JAPs were notoriously partisan and known to favour UP voters over members of the opposition.

strategy (Roxborough et al. 1977: 128-130). However, by then economic chaos, social unrest, and political conflict had reached uncontrollable levels.77

Political Adaptation

The adaptation of the project of the Left became highly problematical because of the existence of strong internal opposition within the UP, which had started to implement an alternative project. This opposition set in motion a grass-roots form of poder popular, which proved to be beyond the reach of the government, and could not be adapted by the moderate sectors of the UP.

It was the MIR, working outside the UP but maintaining close relations with the Socialist Party, which took the initiative for this second form of poder popular. Initially maintaining a sceptical but supportive position towards the Chilean Road after the UP’s electoral victory, the MIR changed its strategy towards the end of 1971. Considering that the institutional path had been exhausted (as the problems for the UP, both economical and political, were mounting), the MIR retook its confrontational and revolutionary course. This alternative mainly consisted of the creation of local forms of grass-roots power, both in the cities and in the countryside, that eventually were to destroy the institutions and powers of the state, and installing a ‘Revolutionary Government of Workers and Peasants’, as well as ‘People’s Assembly’ (Corvalán 2001: 174). To this end, MIR sought to unite a ‘Revolutionary Left’, which included large sections of the Socialist Party, the MAPU-Garretón, and the majority of the IC, excluding the PC, the Radical Party, and the Allendista camp of the PS. As a result, the creation of poder popular envisaged the cooperation of a large section of the UP in the creation of an alternative to the Chilean Road to Socialism.

The first step towards the creation of poder popular took place in Concepción, by no coincidence the main bulwark of the MIR, where in July of 1972 a ‘People’s Assembly’ was created, with the support of most of the parties of the UP except the Communist Party. Despite the broad support for this initiative, Allende moved quickly to suppress it, considering it a danger for the institutional path. The next step was the creation of so-called ‘industrial cordons’ (cordones industriales) during the October Strike. During the weeks of the strike, local workers’ organisations, supported by the MIR and sectors of the UP, took control of closed down factories (which had not been listed for requisitioning) in order to ensure their production. At the same time the logistics on transport, inputs and distribution were taken over by local community groups, ranging from mothers’ centres to student associations, popularly called ‘community commandos’ (comandos comunales). However, after the strike, the factories were not

77 _{One of the causes of the failure to achieve coherent economic policies, Nove (1976: 66-76) argues, was} that planning, the prize feature of the economic model, failed, as most of the state’s enterprises continued to function autonomously. ODEPLAN and CORFO came to compete amongst each other while increasing internal disagreement at the level of central control within the UP began to characterise policy-making. At the same time the workers of the Social Property Area were repeatedly told that they were now free and no longer subject to the rule of others, a principle which did not relate well with the centralised decision-making that is central to state planning.

returned to their owners, and most of the cordones remained in place.78

In the countryside, similar developments took place, through the creation of so-called ‘peasant’s councils’, which were intended to emerge as a form of alternative power for the Left (De Vylder 1976: 204). Even though none of the parties of the UP (or, for that matter, the MIR), were able to transform the loosely organised poder popular into a viable alternative to the Chilean Road, it certainly served to weaken and jeopardise the project (Roxborough et al. 1977: 182). Furthermore, the illegal nature of the poder popular and its violent rhetoric (and, at times, practice) fed the fears of the opposition that the Chilean Road in reality was pretence for a revolutionary takeover.

Despite the grass-roots operations of the MIR and the radical sectors of the Left, Allende and his moderate camp sought to adapt the ‘Chilean Road’ in several respects. First of all, and as a direct result of the October strike, the military were incorporated in the government. All three heads of the branches of the Armed Forces, as well as of Carabineros, were installed as Cabinet Ministers. The reasoning behind this move was that military presence in the government would serve as a guarantee to the opposition forces that institutional order was to be maintained (Bitar 1986: 137). The main military figure in this new cabinet was General Carlos Prats, Commander-in-Chief of the Army, who became the new Minister of Interior. Prats moved swiftly, not only restoring order within a month, but simultaneously searching for possibilities to reduce the level of political conflict in the country. In the end, though, military intervention in the government was successful in restoring and maintaining social order for some months, but counterproductive in several other ways. First of all, the intra-coalition conflict between the PS and the PC radicalised over the issue: the Communists argued that it would help to gain the support of the middle classes, while the Socialists claimed that it slowed down the transition to Socialism. Second, it infuriated sectors of the military, who considered Prats’ line of conduct as a form of collaboration with the enemy, or, at least, as a breach of the institutional neutrality of the Armed Forces, a matter of high importance to the Chilean military. When in addition Prats’ strategy proved to have little success, the number of officers inclined to a coup rapidly increased (ibid., p. 139).79 Among the Right, Prats increasingly came to be seen as a supporter of the Chilean Road, rather than as a neutral military man. Even though he never publicly adhered to the UP, he did take an openly anti-oligarchic position, and excluded the Right from negotiations about a possible solution for the UP government. As a result, his presence in government served to antagonise the Right even further, rather than to appease it (Vial 2005: 117). In March 1973, after the Congressional elections, the military

78 _{In June of 1973, after an abortive military coup against the government, the cordones proved to be very} powerful, simultaneously seizing over 350 factories in defence of the government (Stallings 1978: 147) 79 _{Vial (2005: 119) argues that the resentment within the military towards Prats’ participation in the} government was greatly reinforced by his independent attitude towards the Armed Forces. Rather than consulting the military staff on his course of action in the Allende government, Prats followed his own line.

retreated from the government, despite pressure from Allende to stay (Roxborough et al. 1977: 201).80

The second attempt to reverse the tide was the so-called Millas plan, named after Minister of Economy Orlando Millas. It consisted of a law on the Social Property Area, which was generally thought to be acceptable to the Christian Democrats. The law proposed the return to the owners of about 200 small and medium-size firms that had been requisitioned during the October strike, while another set of firms that had been illegally requisitioned would be transferred to the Social Property Area, in some cases in negotiation with the owners. Once again, however, the attempts made by the UP government to mend relations with the opposition were blocked by the internal divisions within the coalition. The Millas plan met with rejection by not only the Socialist Party but also the MAPU and the Christian Left. In an attempt to save the day, Millas suggested that the firms would, instead of being added to the Social Property Area, be transformed into workers’ cooperatives, which at least in part followed Christian Democrat demands. By then, however, the plan had lost all support (Roxborough et al. 1977: 174).

Third, the government repeatedly sought to gain the support of the Christian Democrat Party. In June of 1973, Allende even appealed to the primate of the Catholic Church, Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, to pressure the PDC to re-open the negotiations. However, as has been shown in Section 4.2.2, time and again the negotiations broke down, largely (although not exclusively) as a result of the internal resistance to an agreement within the UP itself.

Finally, by mid-1973, polarisation within as well outside the UP peaked. The PS, by now in close collaboration with MIR, and supported by the IC and MAPU-Garretón, openly rejected any strategy which involved negotiations with the Christian Democrats.81 _{Allende, together with the Communists, Radicals and MAPU-OC,} continued feverishly to negotiate with the Christian Democrats and broaden the base of the Chilean Road. However, the PDC had lost hope of a peaceful solution, and called for military intervention. In the streets, both MIR and Right-wing Patria y Libertad attempted to provoke, through terrorist attacks, the outbreak of an open civil war. Allende’s last attempt to break the stalemate was to call for a plebiscite and let the people decide. The idea was quickly discarded by the PS, IC and MAPU-Garretón, who argued that the best way to move forward was to await the imminent military coup, which undoubtedly would lead to a popular counter-coup, after which the transition to Socialism could be advanced without the support of the middle classes. As PS leader Carlos Altamirano put it, in a speech delivered on 9 September:

80 _{In August, amidst economic and social chaos, Prats re-joined the UP government. By then, however,} his support within the military had sharply diminished. After only two weeks, Prats resigned, both from government and as Commander-in-Chief (Vial 2005: 138-143).

81 _{After the Congressional elections, MAPU proved to be utterly divided into a moderate and a radical} camp, and the party split into a section led by Oscar Garretón, which held positions close to MIR (its motto was ‘to win the civil war!’, in reaction to the PC slogan ‘no to civil war!’) and a moderate section

The Socialist Party has stated that there can be no dialogue with those who are leading our fatherland into economic chaos. (…) The Socialist Party considers that the Right can only be overwhelmed by the unstoppable force of the united people (quoted in Corvalán 2001: 272).

Although there is considerable evidence that Allende eventually wanted to call the referendum after all, even though this would probably split the UP, no indication exists of the degree of seriousness of such a plan. As Prats’ memoirs indicate, Allende intended to organise a country-wide referendum with two days’ notice (Falcoff 1991: 284).Either way, by now it had become too late, as on 11 September, the military took over the country in a violent coup.

In conclusion, the October Strike formed a breaking point for the ‘Chilean Road’. After the strike, the Allende government lost the initiative, trying to, in the words of Stallings (1978: 144) ‘survive on a day-to-day basis, of reacting to the initiative of others, of floating some trial balloons and pulling them down as they encountered rough going’.82

The government attempted in many ways to adapt its project, mainly by changing the economic team, reaching an agreement with the PDC, incorporating the military in his government, and by disarticulating the radical sectors of his coalition. All four strategies failed, however, while the grass-roots form of poder popular gained influence well outside the reach of the government. In the end, Allende government did not have the moving space it needed in order to change course.