The reporting of land transactions occurs only in non-royal inscriptions. The locations of inscription sites where these are recorded should therefore inform about where land issues were important. For example, if they relate to land allocated for cultivation in new territories during Angkor’s expansion, such as to the south-west of Angkor and in the Phimai area from the 10th century, it might be expected that they would not occur frequently in the regional centres. In fact, 71 percent of all sites with reported land transactions were in one of the designated clusters (Figure A 14.4), which is higher than the percentage for all inscriptions (63
percent). Outside Angkor the differences were also marked (61 percent for land exchanges compared with 49 percent for all inscriptions),122 contrary to what was expected (Table 4).
It is likely that many inscriptions were written with the purpose of registering the legal ownership of land and property, and a number of the texts written by officials during the 10th and 11th centuries were doing this retrospectively (Section 5.2.3). The distribution of these registrations seems to indicate a focus of land concerns in the clusters. Perhaps land close to the regional centres, within important communication corridors, was more in demand than in outlying areas.
6.9 6.9
6.9 6.9 Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The cycles of royal and non-royal dominance of inscription production are a marked feature of the Angkorian period — that is, when the number of royal inscriptions is high, that of non-royal inscriptions is low, and vice versa. This suggests that the relationships between the two groups altered with time. How the patterns of royal and non-royal inscription production were affected by Angkor’s changing political economy is examined in Section 9.3.
The nature of state control of Khmer territories varied according to distance from the capital, and over the Angkorian period. There is a high concentration of royal inscriptions in the inner Angkor area. Elsewhere, central influence dropped off in two stages: fairly rapidly outside Angkor’s core area of about 25 km radius, about a day’s journey, remaining reasonably steady up to 150 km. These two distances appear to mark respectively the core area of Angkor the city and the strategic hinterland of the city, which contained much of the formalised roads.
From 150 km, Angkor’s influence again diminishes, and it is minimal beyond 350 km. The three zones are indicative of different modes of control across the territorial-hegemonic spectrum, where states control regions of economic importance close to the capital more directly (territorial), while areas further away and of less importance are given greater autonomy (hegemonic).
The study has identified three different classes of sites which may have served as regional centres:
• Clusters of enduring sites (tending to span Pre-Angkor to Angkor)
• Non-clustered enduring sites
• Non-clustered Angkorian period prominent sites
The clusters, mostly of long duration, can be reasonably posited as containing centres of administration which were the focus of religious, economic and political activity, requiring
122 A chi-squared test (Appendix A16.9) showed that that the concentration of land exchanges was appreciably different when compared with non-royal inscriptions as a whole (p=<10%)
central support and communication links. Temples having the longest duration within their cluster were arguably the centre of activity of the group and constituted some of the central or senior temples in Sedov’s hierarchy. Despite the Pre-Angkorian shift of power to the north and Angkorian development to the east and west of the capital, the links between proximate clusters of long duration and other important sites constituted long-standing communication corridors during both Pre-Angkorian and Angkorian periods. A dominant corridor ran from Angkor to the south of Cambodia. Another corridor may have also run along the Mekong River from Vat Phu to the south. Other corridors led along and beyond the known roads and waterways, generally in the direction of centres of trade. The concentrations of sites and their links suggest that the empire can be usefully viewed in terms of nodes and communication links, rather than as held territory.
Distributions of key indicators of central influence suggest a decentralised administration. The relatively high percentage of royal inscriptions in the clusters outside Angkor points to regional centres for overseeing the state’s administration. Based on a travel time of 20-25 km per day on land, distances were probably too great for most decisions to have been made in the capital. However, despite a degree of regional autonomy, the relatively uniform distribution of references to rājakāryya (royal service) and to sabha (courts and their officials) outside Angkor suggest that tax collection and the law were applied in most areas where there were temples.
The distribution of official titles had been interpreted as a bureaucracy increasing in complexity over at least the period 944-1000 CE during the consolidation and territorial integration carried out from early in the Angkorian period (Rājendravarman to Sūryavarman I). However, the close correlation between distributions of non-royal inscriptions and officials implies that the official titles were already largely in existence in the Rājendravarman period, which is earlier than suggested by researchers who regard the 10th to the mid 11th century as the period in which the administration grew. Thus there is little evidence for a substantial increase in complexity of the bureaucracy in this period.
Three issues of strategic concern arise from the analyses of central influence in this chapter.
• The long-standing communication corridors shaped the cultural links between those living along them, and must have contributed to the progressive formation of the Khmer state.
Thereafter, enhancing this network, particularly in the hinterland area, contributed towards maintaining the integrity of the empire.
• The Khmer must have had a decentralised administration to oversee their large territories.
This is in agreement with the 3rd stage of Kulke’s Processual model, a feature of which is the decentralised collection of levies. Decentralisation has implications for other aspects of the political economy, in that it appears to run counter to the view of Angkor having strong central control. Evidence of an overall increase in central authority starting in the
Pre-Angkorian period and continuing into the Pre-Angkorian period has been observed by others
— in the increasing central controls over land and communities, and in the greater ability of rulers to restructure sections of society (Sections 3.4.1; 3.4.3). The apparent inconsistency, that there was increased central authority in the face of a decentralised economy, might be seen as authority operating at two levels: allowing the exercise of regional authority for local issues, but ensuring central authority for matters of state significance, such as taxation.
• The cycles of royal and non-royal inscription production indicate shifts in relative influence of the rulers and the officials. This has implications for the distribution of wealth within the Khmer state and, given the reliance of the ruler on the regional elite for the decentralised administration, this may have consequences for the stability of the state. Moreover, these cycles indicate that the increase in central authority was not uniform.
The management of an empire such as Angkor’s entailed developing strategies for the centre to exercise authority over its extensive territories in a cost-effective manner, that is, without employing excessively large numbers of people in its administration. From the above discussion, three interrelated processes are seen to contribute to the integrity of the state:
enhancing the communications network; maintaining an effective decentralised administration appropriate to the locality; and maintaining a system of mutual support between the ruler and the regional elite.
7777 Economic processes: money, markets and trade Economic processes: money, markets and trade Economic processes: money, markets and trade Economic processes: money, markets and trade
In 908 śaka, on the 14th day of the crescent moon of Bhādrapada, a Sunday, there was an order from His Majesty to Vāp Hṛdayaśiva, paṃcāṃ pratyaya ot the fourth category, stipulating that he go and give a rice field, because he had borrowed with interest a pair of buffaloes, in order to buy the laterite, in view of building a holy pyramid.
K. 105 (987 CE) For long years this country has enjoyed commercial relations with us.
(Zhou 1993[1297]: xviii)
7.1 7.1 7.1
7.1 Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
The geographic analysis of the inscription locations has helped to provide an outline of the Angkorian Empire’s communication and administration network. This in turn has brought to the fore political processes which were arguably important for ensuring Angkor’s security and prosperity. Economic processes were also important, and these will now be assessed in some detail.
A degree of sophistication in management, including accounting, would be expected of an empire that extended across seven centuries. Yet, as outlined in Chapter 4, researchers have suggested that markets and trade were not important for its economy, a few even that the Angkorian period Khmer may have abandoned a practical, universally accepted basis of accounting used by other organisationally complex societies, that is, a unit of account. Society in the Angkorian period appears to have been more integrated and hierarchical than in the Pre-Angkorian period, with more comprehensive communication networks across a larger area. Yet, the Angkorian period inscriptions appear to be little concerned with monetary values and depict a relatively unwieldy transaction system. The inscriptions may record details of the exchange prices for land, servants or services, but never payments for goods and services outside the elite world of the rulers, religious foundations and titled officials. Indeed, the Khmer epigraphy is never explicit about issues of money and markets.
A number of explanations for Angkor’s seemingly low degree of commercialisation are explored. Explanations for Angkor’s lack of money, and how goods and services were valued, are considered together with evidence for a unit of account. In order to cast some light on the complex barter exchanges, the expressions used to describe different kinds of transactions and the transactions themselves are assessed. These suggest that Angkor had a unit of account and that the complex barter exchanges were unlikely to represent the broader Angkorian economy. The inscriptions are examined for evidence of Angkor’s external trade and contact with other polities and, together with the historical and archaeological record,
indicate that trade was continual over a long period. The epigraphic records of the goods used either for barter or as gifts to the foundations are compared, to demonstrate an increase in wealth in the Angkorian period relative to the Pre-Angkorian period. The increase in wealth in the hands of elite individuals and temples implies Angkor had effective economic strategies for its empire and thus was able to secure a strong flow of taxation revenue. An explanation will be proposed for the apparent lack of interest in commerce.