Kulke proposes three distinct phases of development as part of an overall process of state formation in India, which he argues was also applicable to Southeast Asian states, such as Angkor (Kulke 1986; 1995). Kulke argued that from the 7th century, most Indian states emerged through agrarian expansion and political integration in a process connecting three concentric geographical areas (nuclear, peripheral and beyond) and three chronologically distinct stages of state development (chiefdom, early kingdom and imperial kingdom) (Kulke 1986; 1995: 233).
In Stage 1, the chieftaincy, elites rise to power over a clan and social strata develop, though without any form of institutionalised bureaucracy. The authority of the leader enables him to gain control over resources and to mobilise supporters.
In Stage 2, political control intensifies with the creation of hierarchies within the nuclear area and to some extent in the peripheral zones. Neighbouring chiefs and rājās are forced into tributary dependence. After subjugation, they are reinstated but have to pay (nominal) tribute to the rulers and to donate women to the royal harem. Permanent control of outlying zones often fails and their rulers are sometimes able to remain autonomous.
Stage 3 is that of the Imperial Kingdom. Rulers expand their original realms, sometimes considerably, and empires emerge from a continuous process of integration, often by uniting earlier nuclear areas of kingdoms and shifting the capital to a new core region. The central administration and the apparatus of legitimisation of the imperial centre are expanded.
Conquered rulers are removed from power, rather than reconfirmed as tributary princes, and intermediate zones are integrated. A major impact of the development of the Imperial Kingdom is that former autonomous local or regional centres are restructured to form provinces (viṣaya or pramān in Angkor, a process which appears to have coincided with the establishment of a centralised bureaucracy) (Sahai 1977a: 35-45; Kulke 1986: 11). At this stage, the kingdom’s unity is rarely challenged (Kulke 1986: 7-17; 1995: 256). These changes are observed most clearly from the reign of Rājendravarman (de Mestier du Bourg 1970: 290; Kulke 1986: 12;
Lieberman 2003: 218). Stage 3 is characterised by an increased number of officials supported by the decentralised collection of levies and their redistribution. However, transfer of resources to the centre is often minimal.
Comparative studies indicated that regional authorities such as governors and state tax officials, in keeping with integration policies, tended to be local appointees, but these were sometimes replaced by direct representatives of the centre, as in Pagan (Aung Thwin 1985:
104-5) and Vijayanagara with the central appointment of the military officials, nyakas (Morrison 2001a: 268; Karashima 2002). Governors of Inka provinces were appointed by the centre, but local elites held offices at lower levels (D'Altroy 1992: 131). Pagan’s core districts were ruled by members of the royal family (Aung Thwin 1985: 101). Its tributary states were governed by royal appointees or local leaders depending on their importance (Aung Thwin 1976: 218-2;
1985: 99-108). Expansion of imperial kingdoms did not necessarily erase the socio-political identity of the annexed areas. During the early years of the Mahīdharapura dynasty under Sūryavarman II, Lavo sent its own mission to China in 1115 (Section 2.3.4 above) and appears to have asserted its independence again in 1155 after Sūryavarman’s death (Kulke, 1986: 11).
Kulke (ibid) argued that the growth of the Imperial Kingdoms in Southeast Asia (Angkor: 9th– 13th century; Pagan: mid 11th–end 13th century; Ayudhya: 14th–18th century; Java: 13th– 14th century) was not just a matter of expansion. Rather, there were structural changes (from Stage 2 to Stage 3) in the region around 1000 CE which enabled a few ‘men of prowess’ to transcend the limitations, i.e. the political uncertainties, of the Early Kingdom (ibid., 9).
Following these structural changes, the Mandala model, with overlapping and changing loyalties, could no longer be applicable. Rather than seeking independence or new alliances, leaders of successful coups might aim to gain control at the centre. Thus, according to Kulke (1986: 12-13) the aims of both Sūryavarman I and Sūryavarman II, in their respective struggles for supremacy were neither to defeat or destroy the Angkor kingdom, but to conquer the already firmly established centre, and facilitate greater stability of the outer core areas.
An additional feature was the new ‘ritual policy’ whereby temples were increasingly constructed near or at the political centre, while earlier they had more often been at holy places. At Angkor, this function of the temple is seen in its most developed form under Jayavarman VII. Temples became more and more the focal point of a ‘magico-politico force field’ emanating from the political centre (Kulke 1986: 14) with the rulers associating themselves with divine power (ibid., 14-15).
Kulke’s model is essentially political and, apart from reference to extraction of tribute from subject populations, does not consider the many interdependent imperial strategies, such as the use of state ideology, the extraction of natural resources or engagement in trade. The provinces are described as being more controlled by the centre, yet decentralised for collection of taxes, which leaves unanswered the question of the division of responsibility. The model clearly attempts to deal with change, yet, although acknowledging that different structural problems were encountered by different states (ibid., 5), assumes a similar overall trajectory for early South and Southeast Asian states.
Given the variability within and between states, Kulke’s proposed evolutionary typology is too restrictive, since it downplays the dynamics of state processes. These might focus more on culture-specific interactions such as ideology, power relationships, craft production or exchange patterns at different levels, perhaps at village or household level or within a world systems framework (Stein 2001: 355-356). Sinopoli (2001: 444-455) advocates making the distinction between the processes, events and causes of imperial formation and those of consolidation,19 where territories are incorporated effectively, rather than focusing on stages.
Moreover, not all Indian or Indianised states need have gone through Kulke’s three stages, since development may have been influenced more by local factors, or because the centre was unsuccessful in implementing strategies. For example, where control was more fragmented, local elites may not have been replaced by central appointees as a matter of course. Sinopoli argues that considerable political authority in empires sometimes remained in the hands of regional administrators, who interacted with only a small number of central elites based at imperial centres.20
Much of Kulke’s model appears applicable to Angkor. For example, the many titled officials appearing in the Angkorian period inscriptions demonstrate links to the central administration and recognition of the state’s authority. There do appear to be indications of increasing exercise of central authority — e.g. in the organisation of property in the Pre-Angkorian period (Vickery 1998: 294-295) or in the Angkorian period, with the more overt move by Sūryavarman I, following his success in the war against Jayavīravarman, to conscript some thousands of officials into his taṃrvāc21corps (Cœdès 1951; 205-21; Sedov 1967: 194; Sahai 1978: 25; Sedov 1978: 119; Hall 1985: 141; Briggs 1999[1951]: 151; Vickery 2002: 88-90). Yet the question arises whether there was continual increase of central control. A polity such as the Khmer state required a capacity for adaptation to changing political and economic circumstances. In Chapter 6, indicators of Angkor’s central control are examined in some detail, and point to spatial and temporal variations not represented by the Processual model.
In Section 9.3, the final stage, the Imperial Kingdom, is perhaps more accurately depicted as cycles of alternating dominance of royal and non-royal inscriptions concurrent with cycles of political events.
19 Consolidation could include the building of infrastructure or demographic shifts, which might depend on pre-existing conditions in the ‘acquired’ territories and imperial demands.
20 Under Vijayanagara, tax obligations, for example, were sometimes negotiated (Sinopoli 2001: 455).
21 Approximately 4000 individuals from about 200 different sruk (villages) took an oath of allegiance, in which they agreed to be neither hostile to the king, nor associated with his enemies. These were listed in 4 classes in K. 292/ 1011. According to Cœdès (1951: 206), because of the reference to an alliance by blood, the taṃrvāc could have been an elite corps, rather than administrators. Vickery (2002: 89) regards them, not as local chiefs, but inspectors sent out to the sruk.